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CHAPTER 1
Introduction : Renewable Energy Sources in a Liberalized
Electricity Sector
Chapter overview
This chapter introduces the research work realized in the frame of this thesis by
starting with a short description of the actual energy context and the development
of renewable energy sources. The issues concerning the large scale integration of
renewable generation in power systems, in a liberalized context, are presented. The
chapter then focuses on the challenges related to the participation of renewable
generation in electricity markets, which is the core of the thesis. Finally, the main
objectives and the contribution of the thesis, as well as an outline of the structure
of the present document, are given.
1.1 General energy context and renewable energy sources
1.1.1 Energy context
In recent energy policies, special attention is given to three main aspects: security
of supply, market efficiency and environmental friendliness. These three dimensions
are specifically covered in the 2007 Energy Package for Europe, which aims at es-
tablishing a new energy policy for the European Union [1]. The three aspects are
explained as follows, and depicted in Figure 1.1:
• In the actual energy context, the security of supply of energy resources is
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a key point which has to be guaranteed. To achieve this goal, the energy supply
has to be diversified, from the geographical source of energy point of view, and
from the nature of the energy product point of view, in order to guarantee long-
term primary energy availability. Focus is given to the reliability and quality
of the energy supply, and the guarantee of the required energy capacity.
• Market efficiency in the energy sector results from the liberalization of this
sector. Competition has been introduced in the sector by significantly re-
ducing the governments’ role in the ownership and management of domestic
energy industries, especially in the gas and electricity sector. Regarding the
European Union, the directive 96/92/CE relative to electricity market rules [2]
confirms the objective of liberalization of the electricity market. This is seen
as a possibility for increasing the efficiency of electric energy production and
distribution, for offering a lower price, as well as a higher quality and secured
supply.
• Reducing the environmental impact consists in limiting the pollution rela-
tive to the energy use and reducing the possible contribution to climate change
and the impact on nature and wildlife. The objective of reducing the environ-
mental impact of human activities, and more particularly greenhouse gases,
was initiated in the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) of 1992. Binding limitations were negotiated in Kyoto where more
than 160 nations met in 1997. The outcome of the meeting was the Kyoto
Protocol, in which the developed nations agreed to limit their greenhouse gas
emissions, relative to the levels emitted in 1990.
Figure 1.1 describes the energy policy triangle where the objectives of security
of supply, market efficiency and environmental friendliness are the major policy
competitors 1.
1.1.2 Renewable energy sources as a solution
In the current energy context, where security of supply and environmental aspects
have become major concerns, the development of energy technologies based on re-
newable energies is seen as an indispensable solution for these main issues.
1The three main aspects are often illustrated as the Moscow-Lisbon-Kyoto triangle; Moscow
refers to the concept of security of supply due to the recent gas crisis between some countries of
the European Union and Russia [3]; Lisbon refers to the European Council held in 2000 in this city
during which the objective of liberalization of many sectors in Europe was given; Kyoto refers to
the Kyoto protocol.
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Figure 1.1: Energy context
National and international bodies use a variety of definitions for renewable
energy. The Renewable Energy Working Party (REWP) of the International Energy
Agency set down the following broad definition [4]:
“Renewable Energy is energy that is derived from natural processes that
are replenished constantly. In its various forms, it derives directly or
indirectly from the sun, or from heat generated deep within the earth.
Included in the definition is energy generated from solar, wind, biomass,
geothermal, hydropower and ocean resources, and biofuels and hydrogen
derived from renewable resources”.
In this work, the term Renewable Energy Sources (RES) is by extension used to
denote energy sources based on the conversion of renewable energy. The development
of RES first takes advantage of endogenous resources. It permits to reduce the fossil
fuel consumption, which in turn increases the security of supply of the country where
RES are installed. A consequence of the reduction of fossil fuel consumption is the
reduction of the impact on the environment, namely greenhouse gas emissions and
fossil fuel depletion.
1.2 Renewable energy sources in power generation
This section first presents the electricity generation technologies based on Renewable
energy sources (RES). Then, the characteristics of the RES production, which highly
depend on the converted resource properties, are presented. In particular, the vari-
ability, the limited predictability and the geographical distribution of RES power
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generation are characteristics that distinguish RES from conventional generation.
Finally, this section decribes the fast development of RES in Europe.
1.2.1 Electricity generation based on RES
Electricity generation accounts for approximately one third of the world’s primary
energy demand [5]. As a consequence, the energy context is of particular importance
for the current evolution of the electricity sector. Regarding security of supply, ef-
forts are made to promote generation technologies which increase the variety of the
energy mix and the independence of countries on resources used for power genera-
tion. In order to increase economic efficiency, power systems are nowadays operated
within a liberalized electricity sector, under market conditions. Electricity is thus
treated as a tradable product, characterized by its quality and reliability. Finally,
technologies which reduce pollution associated with electricity generation are encou-
raged. Importance is given to the reduction of CO2 emissions and more generally
reduction of greenhouse gases.
This context motivates the development of power generation units based on RES.
An overview of different technologies available for power generation from RES is
proposed in [6]: hydro power, wind power, photovolta¨ıc power, solar thermodynamic
power, geothermal power and power from biomass. The RES power units are based
on the conversion from primary renewable energy to electrical energy. For instance,
hydro power and wind power convert the mechanical energy from the water and the
wind, respectively, to electrical power. Photovolta¨ıc cells convert solar irradiation
to electric power using the photoelectric effect.
In this case, the term RES unit does not necessarily refer to only one generation
unit such as a wind turbine or a PV panel, but is extended to a power plant composed
of several RES-based units, such as a wind farm or a PV plant. This extended
definition of the RES unit is kept for the rest of the thesis.
In opposition to RES units, conventional power generation units refer to units
based on non-renewable energy conversion. These units include the nuclear power
plants and the power generation units which are based on energy conversion from
fossil fuel such as coal-fired, gas-fired and oil-fired units.
1.2.2 Characteristics of power generation from RES
Variability and limited predictability of the renewable generation
The electricity generation from RES results from the energy conversion of non-
regulated resources, from existing flows of energy from on-going processes. Depend-
ing on the type of their resource, RES units can generate electricity constantly or
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in a variable way, with fluctuations. In particular, wind, photovolta¨ıc and wave
power generation are characterized by the natural variability of the energy resource,
whereas biomass and hydro power generation (excepting the run-of-the river hydro)
can be dispatched based on system requirements [6]. Biomass and hydro power units
can thus be considered as conventional units from the power generation management
point of view.
Regarding generation from wind, photovolta¨ıc, and wave power, this generation
can be more precisely described as intermittent generation. The term intermittent
refers here to the interruption or periodic stopping of the resource, from the definition
in [7]. The intermittency is due to the atmospheric dynamics. The study of the
different effects resulting from atmosphere dynamics is a complex subject which
refers to meteorology.
The intermittency level depends on the RES technology and the natural cycles
of the renewable sources [8]. Details are given below for the photovolta¨ıc (PV) and
wind power sources.
• Regarding PV power generation, natural cycles have three dimensions. There
is first a seasonal variation in potential electricity production with the peak
in summer, although in principle PV cells operating along the equator have
an almost constant exploitable potential throughout the year. Secondly, pro-
duction varies on a diurnal basis from dawn to dusk peaking during mid day.
Finally, short-term fluctuation of weather conditions, including clouds and rain
fall, impact on the inter-hourly amount of electricity that can be harvested.
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Figure 1.2: Example of power production from a 12.8 MWp photovolta¨ıc power plant from
03/07/04 00h00 to 09/07/04 23h00, in France.
Figure 1.2 shows an example of the hourly power production from a 12.8 MWp
photovolta¨ıc power plant located in France for a week from 03/07/04 00h00
to 09/07/04 23h00. The unit MWp stands for MegaWatt peak, which is a
measurement unit for the electrical power delivered by a PV unit for stan-
dard solar irradiance conditions. The figure clearly demonstrates the diurnal
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variations of the production. The variations between the production for the
different days result from variations of meteorological conditions.
• Wind power generation is subject to seasonal variations of peak electricity
production in winter or summer depending on the region, as well as diurnal
and hourly changes. Generally, very short-term fluctuations - in the intra-
minute and inter-minute timeframe - are small relative to installed capacity,
compared to hourly or daily variations. However, it has also to be noted that
wind turbines become unavailable at times of very high wind speed, when
they need to be shut down in order to avoid damage to equipment. This
disconnection leads to an extreme variation of the produced electricity. The
disconnection of wind turbines resulting from voltage dips also leads to a steep
generation drop.
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Figure 1.3: Example of power production from a 18 MW wind power plant from 09/01/03
07h00 to 06/01/03 06h00, in Western Denmark.
Figure 1.3 shows an example of the hourly power production from a 18 MW
wind power plant for a week from 09/01/03 07h00 to 06/01/03 06h00, in
Western Denmark. The figure clearly shows the short-term variations of the
production. An important production drop from nominal power production to
nearly zero production can be noted in the period between hour 132 and 135
in the graph. The production variations illustrated in Figure 1.3 are related
to variations of the meteorological conditions, mainly the wind speed.
In order to analyze the wind power variability, the operational data measured
from the 160 MW Horns Rev I offshore wind farm in Western Denmark were
analyzed in [9]. The authors showed that the power output of the wind farm
was characterized by intense, rapid and repeating fluctuations due to unsteady
wind conditions. In certain wind conditions, the power output from the off-
shore wind farm changes between zero and rated power levels in less than a
quarter of an hour. However, the degree of variability depends on the consi-
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dered geographical scale. The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA)
explains in [10] that the variability of the wind energy resource is important
to consider only in the context of the power system, rather than in the context
of an individual wind farm or turbine. When considering wind energy in the
scale of the power system, individual energy variations may compensate which
results in a less variable production. This phenomenon is denoted as statistical
smoothing and is analyzed into detail in [11].
• In comparison, the biomass natural cycle length varies between several gen-
erations for wood to a single season for purposefully planted biomass crops.
Large hydro systems are based on the conversion of a seasonal resource, the
rain, but the dam makes the hydro unit able to control their energy delivery
and, as a result, limits such seasonality. Run-of-the river units are subject to
variability in precipitation.
In addition to the variability, the production from some RES technologies may
not be completely predictable. This can be the case for wind, photovolta¨ıc and wave
power. Limited predictability results from the atmosphere dynamics which are not
deterministic. For instance, the wind power will depend on the wind speed, which in
turn depends on the solar radiation, evaporation of water, cloud cover, and surface
roughness among others.
The limited predictability of RES generation leads to some uncertainty about
the production in the next period of time (i.e. minutes, hours or days). The no-
tion of uncertainty here refers to the decision-making science, and is defined as “a
state of having limited knowledge where it is impossible to exactly describe existing
state or future outcome, more than one possible outcome” [12]. Another term for
describing the limited predictability of the RES generation consists in defining it as
a stochastic generation.
The degree of variability and the degree of predictability are the two main aspects
characterizing time series of RES generation. They can be derived from real time
series of RES production in order to be used for generating realistic time series of
RES production when needed, such as in [13].
The variability and limited predictability of the RES generation result to an addi-
tional property: its limited dispatchability. A generation unit is said to be dispatch-
able if it can be controlled at the request of power grid operators. Biomass-based
units and hydro power units may be controlled and be operated as a dispatchable
unit. However, RES generation units, which are based on the conversion of exist-
ing flows of energy from on-going processes, have a limited dispatchability. Wind
power, PV power and wave power are examples of such units. Recent advances in
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RES technologies have enabled some of these units to reduce their power output
when needed. This control is denoted as “down regulation”.
Geographical distribution of the RES units
Some RES technologies are based on the conversion of energy resources which are
found in huge quantities in nature, but geographically distributed and presenting a
low density on each position site. This is the case for wind or photovolta¨ıc power. In
order to capture this energy and convert it to electricity, small-scale converters are
spread in many sites and connected into the power system. In the case of the power
generation from biomass, the resource cannot be transported long distances without
incurring unreasonable cost, because of its low energy density, and, consequently,
most biomass units are small-scale units [14]. As a result, most geographically spread
RES power units are connected to the distribution network.
A definition of Distributed Generation (DG) is proposed in [15] as “an electric
power source connected directly to the distribution network or on the customer site
of the meter”. Given this definition, most RES power units are DG units. In partic-
ular, the technology or capacity of the RES unit is not considered for characterizing
it as a DG unit, but only its network connection [16]. From this definition, the
distributed generation units are separated from the units which are connected di-
rectly to the transmission network. Different aspects distinguish distribution from
transmission networks. First, distribution networks are operated at medium or low
voltage contrary to transmission networks which are operated at high voltage 2.
Also, the goal of the two networks is different: the transmission network aims at
transporting power generation over long distances, whereas the distribution network
aims at delivering the power generation to the consumers. Finally, the two networks
are distinguished on a legal definition, as explained in [16]: in most competitive
markets, an electricity network is legally defined as a transmission network if it con-
tributes to the electricity market regulation. Any other network can be regarded as
distribution network.
The capacity of the distributed generation units is limited by the connection
to the distribution network, which in turn is limited by the voltage level of this
network. Consequently, the distributed power plants have a capacity limited to
several hundred MW [15]. Regarding RES, large hydro power plants may have a
capacity in the order of GW, and are thus connected to the transmission network.
The same happens for large wind farms.
2In the case of France, the transmission network as it is considered in this thesis, is composed
of the transmission and repartition networks. The voltage limit between the distribution networks
and the repartition and transmission networks is 63 kV.
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When connected to the distribution network, distributed RES units contribute
to the improvement of the voltage level management; they may increase the flex-
ibility of the power systems while reducing transmission losses; they may also be
an alternative to transmission grid reinforcement. More general benefits and issues
resulting from DG deployment are explained in [16].
1.2.3 RES in power systems in Europe
In March 2007, the 27 EU member states adopted a binding target of 20 % renewable
energy from final energy consumption by 2020. This target is associated with a
commitment to increase energy efficiency by 20 % until 2020.
In January 2008, the European Commission presented a draft Directive on the
promotion of the use of energy from Renewable Energy Sources (RES). This sets the
legislative framework that should ensure the increase of the 8.5 % renewable energy
share of final energy consumption in 2005 to 20 % in 2020 [17]. In order to reach this
objective, the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) proposes in [17] a target
of 40 % of EU electricity coming from RES in 2020. An intermediate target has been
formulated in the Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of renewable electricity
aiming at having 21 % of EU electricity coming from RES by 2010. Table 1.1
describes the projections for the installed capacity of RES units till 2020.
Type of energy Inst. capacity (2006) Projection 2010 Projection 2020
Wind 47.7 GW 80 GW 180 GW
Hydro 106.1 GW 111 GW 120 GW
Photovolta¨ıc 3.2 GWp 18 GWp 150 GWp
Biomass 22.3 GW 30 GW 50 GW
Geothermal 0.7 GW 1 GW 4 GW
Solar thermal elect. - 1 GW 15 GW
Ocean - 0.5 GW 2.5 GW
Table 1.1: Renewable electricity installed capacity projections, from [17].
Among the various RES technologies, wind power benefits from a high reduction
of production costs. The wind power industry is considered as one of the fastest
growing ones. For example in Europe, 57 GW were installed at the end of 2008.
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) regularly revises its own target
for the next few years. The projections for 2020 and 2030 are 180 and 300 GW
respectively [18]. However, it has to be noted that EWEA presented an upgraded
target at the EWEC 09 conference which is 230 GW including 40 GW offshore.
This corresponds to 600 TWh per year by 2020, covering 14-18 % of EU electricity
demand. Similar projections are made for the United States by the American Wind
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Energy Association (AWEA) [19].
1.3 Challenges about large scale integration of renewable
energy sources
This section presents the main challenges related to the large scale integration of RES
in power systems. First, an overview of the issues regarding large scale integration
of RES is given and examples are presented. Then, the main impacts of the RES
on the power system management are described. Finally, this section draws the
link between the impact of the RES on the power system management and the
challenges related to the integration of the renewable generation in the electricity
markets, which is the core of the thesis.
1.3.1 Overview of issues regarding large scale integration of RES
The current policy of installing RES has focused on connection rather than integra-
tion. This approach is denoted in [20] as a “fit and forget” approach. In particular,
RES units have been treated as exceptions for the management of the power systems.
For example, the E.ON Netz Grid Code in Germany exempts renewable energy gen-
eration units from providing primary control power [21,22]. These exemptions have
been allowed to encourage the deployment of RES. As a result, several GWs of
RES capacity have been installed in some areas, such as wind power in Northern
Germany.
Figure 1.4: Short-term drop in wind power feed-in in December 2004, from [23].
The variability of the wind power production results in large power variations
in the power system. Figure 1.4 depicts the variation of the wind power production
10
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
in the E.ON control area in Northern Germany during the week from 20th to 26th
December 2004. Whilst wind power output at 9.15 am 24th December reached
its maximum for the year at 6024 MW, it fell to below 2000 MW within only 10
hours, with a difference of over 4000 MW. This reduction corresponds to 58% of
the installed wind capacity in the area. In comparison, this also corresponds to the
capacity of eight 500 MW coal-fired power station blocks. On 26th December, the
wind power output fell to below 40 MW.
Future RES developments are expected to include larger RES units, such as
several hundred MW offshore wind farms. Such large developments on relatively
small areas will generate large output variations. Handling these variations of RES
power output leads to major challenges for managing the power system.
A number of technical factors resulting from specific RES characteristics, detailed
in section 1.2.2, lead to difficulties for a large scale integration of RES generation in
power systems [4]:
• Limited dispatchability: RES generation can only be dispatched down
rather than up;
• Variability: RES generation can exhibit extreme ramp up or down rates;
• Limited predictability: uncertainty associated with RES generation in-
creases the need of ancillary services;
• Geographical distribution: RES units may be located far from demand, in
remote locations.
Handling these combined technical factors introduces several challenges to reliable
operation and may lead to power system control and balancing problems.
An analysis presented in [8] summarizes the issues that are likely to be encoun-
tered as wind power penetration into power systems progressively increases. The
study explains that for low levels of wind penetration, the added variability due to
wind is not significantly noticed on the system, and wind can be treated as nega-
tive load. However, as the penetration level increases, additional operational and
capacity reserve may become necessary. Also, grid reinforcements might become
necessary, depending on wind farm location and demand centers.
1.3.2 Impacts of large scale integration of renewable production on
the power system management
Large scale RES integration is raising a long list of important consequences on the
power system management [24]. For example, the study in [25] lists the impacts of
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wind power on the power system reliability and efficiency and proposes a classifi-
cation of these impacts based on the time and geographical scales. In this section,
focus is given on the impact relative to the operation of the power system, and more
specifically on functions such as unit commitment, grid congestion management and
grid regulation. This limited list of impacts is related to the geographical scale of
the power system and time scales ranging from minutes to days. In particular, lo-
cal issues, such as the ones related to the connection of RES to the grid, are not
considered. Also, very short term impacts referring to as power quality, as well as
long term impacts such as adequacy of power and adequacy of the grid, are not
considered in the present work.
Unit commitment and economic dispatch
The unit commitment problem aims at deciding for an upcoming period which elec-
tricity generation units should be running, and deciding the way the units are oper-
ated so as to satisfy a predictably varying demand for electricity [26]. The economic
dispatch defines the exact level of production of each generator for this upcoming
period, based on economic criteria. The considered upcoming period ranges from
several hours to several days. In the case of large scale integration of RES units, the
unpredicted variations of output power of these RES units may impact the power
system unit commitment.
Moreover, the available deterministic software tools for the optimal scheduling
of conventional power plants are not appropriate when considering an energy mix
with high share of intermittent sources [25]. Current unit commitment or economic
dispatch algorithms consider RES generation as a “negative load” and foresee usu-
ally a fixed margin to account for the variability and uncertainty associated with
RES generation. In cases of high penetration, operators often consider high reserve
margins leading to a less economic operation of the power system.
Grid congestion management
The location of RES units, especially of hydro power plants and of wind farms,
are conditioned by regional conditions. Most of the hydro plants and wind farms
are erected in areas with low population density. This means that the production of
energy by RES is often much higher than the local demand. Therefore the electricity
must be transported via the transmission grid to regions of high demand. Because
the grid was originally designed to cover the relatively low load in these regions, it
has to be extended and reinforced for this new task. Regarding wind power, the
high development of offshore wind and the repowering of old wind farms contribute
to the need of grid extension and reinforcement.
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Again, the variability and the uncertainty associated with RES generation require
special attention. First, these characteristics make it difficult to determine the
optimal grid reinforcement. The standard practice is to enforce the grid by building
new power lines and connectors based on the worst-case scenarios of maximum RES
production. Also, from an operational point of view, high concentration of RES
generation can lead to grid points congestions. Actual load-flow calculations and
daily congestion forecasts do not systematically take into account the uncertainty
associated with RES generation. Consequently, RES generation may be curtailed
on demand to ensure grid stability, and connections of new RES units in areas with
frequent congestions may be restricted. Examples of congestion issues resulting from
a high wind penetration and a limited transmission capability are given in [27], for
the case of Greece. The same article also gives some simple ideas, based on the
control of the generation from the wind farms, which are currently being applied to
the Hellenic Interconnected System, in order to increase the wind-power penetration.
Reserve management
The equilibrium between the power generation and the load is one of the prerequisite
for stable and reliable operation of a power system. This equilibrium can be per-
turbed by an unexpected variation of either the demand or the generation [28]. The
unpredicted variations of output power of these RES units is one example of such
perturbation. The Transmission System Operator (TSO) is responsible for main-
taining the balance between power generation and load and, thereby for keeping
frequency and voltage within acceptable limits.
The power system balance is obtained from two types of control, which are
the primary and secondary control [29, 30]. The primary control results from the
automatic regulation of synchronous generators. From this control, an unpredicted
decrease of the generation from a RES unit, which is similar to an increase of the
demand, leads to a decrease of the rotating speed of the synchronous generators,
which results to a decrease of the grid frequency. Conversely, an unpredicted increase
of the RES generation leads to an increase of the frequency. The time constant
relative to this control is in the order of a few seconds. Such primary control is
possible only if a given amount of power, denoted as primary reserve is available
from the synchronous generators.
Then, the secondary control aims at restoring the grid frequency to its nominal
value. In case the grid frequency is lower than its nominal value, the TSO acti-
vates up-regulation. This consists in sending a signal for increasing the delivered
power to the generators which are involved in the secondary control. Similarly, the
TSO activates down-regulation, which consists in sending signals to decrease the
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delivered energy, when the grid frequency is higher than its nominal value. The
amount of power available from the generator for the secondary reserve is denotes
as secondary reserve. Secondary reserve consists of spinning reserve (e.g. hydro
or thermal plants in part load operation) and standing reserve (e.g. rapidly starting
gas turbine power plants and load shedding). Also, the activation of the secondary
reserve can be done through a real-time market where the participants can propose
bids for up or down-regulation. The details about these markets are given in section
2.1. The time constant relative to this control is in the order of a few minutes. A
third category of reserve is sometimes denoted as “tertiary reserve” or long term
reserve. Such reserve is similar to the secondary reserve, but with a time constant
in the order of 15 minutes.
The large scale integration of RES in a power system leads to unexpected vari-
ations of the overall electricity generation in the region where the RES units are
located, which increases the need of power reserves. This impact of RES units on
power reserves depends on the region size relevant for balancing, the initial load
variations and how concentrated or distributed the RES units are sited [25]. The
costs resulting from the increase of the reserve need will depend on the marginal
costs of the units which provide regulation for the power system. Such cost is some-
times denoted as “intermittency cost”, and is cited as an argument from opponents
to the large scale integration of RES [31]. Also, these additional costs resulting from
the integration of RES generation can lead to a reduction of the competitiveness of
the power producer if the latter is responsible for balancing of its generation. This
important point is discussed in the next section.
1.3.3 Challenges related to the participation of renewable genera-
tion in electricity markets
With the liberalization of the electricity sector, power producers have the possibility
to trade their production in electricity markets. This section presents the main
challenges related to the trading of RES production in these markets. Contrary to
the previous section which focused on the consequences of RES integration on the
management of the power system, this section describes the consequences from the
power producer’s point of view.
When participating in an electricity market, the power producers are economi-
cally responsible for the regulation costs, which result from any imbalance between
the contracted energy in the market and the delivered energy. Such market parti-
cipants are said to be balance responsible parties. For trading in an electricity
market, participants have to make decisions about their energy contracts before the
delivery. Consequently, power producers which include RES units in their genera-
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tion portfolio have to consider the specific characteristics of these units for market
participation. In particular, the limited predictability and controllability of RES
units make them particularly sensitive to regulation costs. This issue is the main
driving force of the research work in this thesis.
The regulation costs which are applied to the power producer as a penalty for its
imbalance between the contracted energy and the delivered energy, result from the
costs of the activation of the control mechanisms presented in the previous section
1.3.2. More precisely, an imbalance between the contracted and delivered energy
corresponds to a perturbation of the equilibrium between generation and load, and
the regulation cost is the cost of the power reserve used by the TSO to maintain the
equilibrium. In other words, the balance responsibility of the power producer can
be interpreted as an economic responsibility of some of the technical impacts of the
RES units on the power system management.
Finally, it has to be noted that this main challenge about the competitiveness
of RES in electricity markets arises in the case of full integration of RES generation
in these markets. This means that RES generation is treated on equal terms with
other conventional producers regarding balance responsibility. More details on this
hypothesis are given in the discussion in section 2.2.1.
1.4 Objectives of the thesis
The main purpose of the thesis is related to the challenging participation of re-
newable generation in electricity markets. This can be formulated as the proposi-
tion of methods for the management of uncertainties related to the renewable power
production under electricity markets. Details are given in the three following points:
• The first objective is to list and model the different existing solutions for the
management of renewable generation in electricity market. More precisely,
the list of solutions should consider both physical solutions, which are relative
to the management of the delivered energy by the RES units, and financial
solutions, which are relative to the management of the contracted energy by
the market participant operating the RES units. Each one of these solutions
enables the power producer to reduce its imbalance penalty resulting from an
imbalance between the contracted and delivered energy. Also, the aim is to
develop a model of the imbalance penalty that is generic enough for taking
into account the different solutions.
• The second objective is to propose a decision-making method, which can be
used by a power producer with renewable generation for making decisions
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about its optimal participating in electricity markets. Such a decision-making
method has to be generic enough for taking into account the different phys-
ical and financial solutions. From a theoretical point of view, the aim is to
formulate a decision-making problem as an optimization problem, where the
variables of the problem are the decisions to make. The proposed advanced
decision-making approach is applied to the financial solution consisting in a
combined participation in day-ahead and intraday markets. The same method
is also applied to the physical solution which aims at strategically combining
a RES unit with a storage device for managing the imbalance penalties.
• Finally, the third objective is to generalize this decision-making method for
trading renewable generation in electricity markets, so that it can take into
account the uncertainty related to the renewable generation. The general pro-
blem is denoted as a decision-making under uncertainty problem. The
proposed approach is a risk-based method, where the risk is related to the
imbalance penalties. Such risk is derived from the uncertainty related to re-
newable generation and measured with methods taken from the financial do-
main. This risk measure is then integrated in the decision-making method.
The physical and financial imbalance management solutions are seen as hedg-
ing methods which reduce the risk related to the imbalance penalties. The
benefits related to the consideration of the risk in the decision-making method
are evaluated from simulations based on real world data.
It is important to notice that the above objectives are related to the problem-
atic of the power producer, which aims at managing the uncertainty related to its
electricity generation. Also, this objective is only related to the economic challenge
regarding the competitiveness of a renewable portfolio in electricity markets, and not
to other technical challenges related to the large scale integration of RES in power
system, presented in section 1.3.2. However, as it was explained before, this specific
challenge can be related to the economic responsibility for some of the technical
challenges.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The present thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents the management of renewable generation in electricity mar-
kets. A detailed description of the electricity markets is first provided. This
presentation permits to better understand what “participating in an electri-
city market” means for a given power producer including renewable generation.
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This chapter also defines the key concepts of an independent power producer
(IPP) and balance responsibility, which are used throughout the thesis. Then,
we propose a classification of the different existing solutions for the manage-
ment on renewable generation in electricity markets. This overview of the state
of the art distinguishes the financial and the physical solutions: financial
solutions are related to the contracted energy resulting from the participation
in consecutive electricity markets, while physical solutions are related to the
management of energy delivered by the power producer. The concept of virtual
power plants (VPP) is presented as a framework for the physical solutions.
• In chapter 3, we propose a generic formulation of the imbalance penalty
model δ for an IPP including renewable generation. This formulation is based
on a reference case which is related to the participation of a reference RES
unit in a day-ahead electricity market. Then, the different financial and phys-
ical solutions, which have been classified in the previous chapter, are modeled
from the reference case. In particular, a generic model for a commercial VPP
is proposed for modeling the physical solutions. A discussion about the simi-
larities between the financial and physical solutions is provided. The last part
of this chapter presents the application of the generic formulation of imbalance
penalty to three physical solutions, which are three different configurations of
a generic VPP model. Each one of the configurations is based on a reference
RES unit. A real-world test case is considered for this purpose. Also, for
the coherence of the results, this reference wind farm is the same one which is
used for all the case studies presented in this thesis.
• Chapter 4 focuses on the decision-making problems relative to the management
of renewable generation in electricity markets. Initially, the decisions which
an IPP has to make when using financial or physical solutions are presented:
the financial solutions require bidding decisions, while the physical solutions
require scheduling decisions. Then, a generic decision-making method
which is valid for both types of decision is proposed. This chapter explains
that such method is based on a loss function λ, which is constructed from the
generic imbalance penalty model δ given in the previous chapter. The method
also relies on estimates of renewable generation and market prices given by
forecasting methods. Although these methods are of high importance in the
thesis, they are presented in the appendix sections so that the focus in this
chapter is on the derivation of the decision-making method. Results from the
application of the method for the strategic trading in intraday markets (i.e.
financial solution) and for the strategic operation of the combined wind-hydro
power plant (i.e. physical solution), are presented.
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• Chapter 5 extends the methodology proposed in the previous chapter to ac-
count for the uncertainty associated with the decision-making problem. The
two sources of uncertainties (i.e. renewable generation and market prices)
related to the present problem, are examined. Also, this chapter presents gen-
eral definitions and approaches from the state of the art, for modeling the
uncertainty. Particular attention is paid to the probabilistic models. These
models are used for representing the uncertainty associated with the proba-
bilistic forecasts of renewable generation or market prices. Then, the chapter
proposes an overview of the state-of-the-art methods for decision-making under
uncertainty. Focus is given to risk-based approaches and different risk measures
are explained. Following this review, the chapter proposes a formulation for
a risk-based method adapted to the general problem of participation of
renewable generation in electricity markets. This approach is based on a pro-
babilistic loss function, which is an extension of the loss function given in the
previous chapter. Also, in this approach, the financial and physical solutions
correspond to risk hedging methods. Chapter 5 illustrates this hedging in
the case of a given physical solution (i.e. combination with storage device).
Finally, the chapter gives numerical results relative to the application of the
risk-based decision-making approach for the trading of wind generation in a
day-ahead market. The different results presented in this chapter include sen-
sitivity analysis results, which permit to better understand the coherence of
the proposed methodology.
• Finally, chapter 6 presents the general conclusions of this work as well as some
of the main perspectives for further research resulting from this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
Solutions for the Management of Renewable Energy
Sources in Electricity Markets
Chapter overview
This chapter presents the challenges related to the management of renewable
generation in electricity markets. First, this chapter gives an overview of the electri-
city markets, and adds some precisions about short-term electricity markets which
are considered in the rest of the thesis. The next section of this chapter presents
the main concepts of independent power producer and balance responsibility. Spe-
cial attention is paid to the imbalance penalization. The chapter finally provides
a state of the art about existing solutions for the management of imbalance penal-
ties. These solutions are classified into two categories: financial solutions are related
to the contracted energy resulting from the participation in consecutive electricity
markets, while physical solutions are related to the management of energy delivered
by the power producer.
2.1 Electricity markets
The main goal of this section is to present the electricity markets which will be con-
sidered for the rest of the thesis. First, the general principles of electricity markets,
resulting from the liberalization of the electricity sector, and the different market
types, are described. The different market structures are then explained, and the
main market clearing processes are detailed. Such general definitions about market
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principles and structures are essential for understanding the challenges related to
the participation of renewable generation in such markets. Finally, the distinction
between the markets which take place before the delivery and the real-time markets
is explained. The operation of these markets is modeled in the next chapter.
2.1.1 Liberalization of the electricity sector
History of the electricity sector
This section first presents a short summary of the history and evolution of electric
power systems for better understanding the actual context. This summary is based
on the analyses presented in [32] and [33].
From, 1870 to 1885, the first electric power systems were small hydropower and
thermal power units under 100 kW. These first units were Direct Current (DC) ones
directly connected to the consumption units. In 1884, Tesla invented the electric
alternator which is an electric generator which produces Alternative Current (AC).
The first transmission line was a 175 km long and 25 kV line and was constructed in
1891. From then, electrical power plants and transmission gradually enlarged under
centralized system. After the second World War, in many countries, for strategic
reasons, the electricity industry was gathered in a single, national company. This
situation was common in Europe and Latin America. The electric industry used to
vertically integrate production, transmission and distribution.
Process of liberalization
A restructuration of the electricity sector has been observed for the past decades
[32]. The sector has been gradually deregulated. Utilities have been unbundled to
introduce competition, and vertical integration has been replaced by competitive
markets comprising multiple players. Under such competition, the interaction of
many buyers and sellers yields a market price which equals the production cost of
the last unit sold. Electricity is treated as a tradable commodity like any other
market commodity. In the European Union, the competition has been introduced
with accordance to the EU directive 96/92/CE relative to electricity market rules [2].
The following points are some of the reasons for restructuring electricity sector:
• New generation technologies, such as combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT),
have reduced the optimal size of an electricity generator [34]. In particular,
the installation of distributed units, which may be based on renewables or not,
is increasing significantly.
• Information technologies and communication systems make possible the ex-
change of huge volumes of information needed to manage electricity markets.
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• Electricity is a primary input for many industries, and the competitive global
economy requires input cost reduction. In this context, privatization is con-
sidered as a way to increase the efficiency of the response of the sector to
economic and technological change [32].
• Competition is seen as a necessary condition for increasing the efficiency of elec-
tric energy production and distribution, offering a lower price, higher quality
and secured supply. It puts downward pressure on the profit margin of market
participants, which attempts to keep costs and prices down. [35]
However, electricity is a specific commodity which cannot be stored to a large ex-
tent: at any time, the total amount of produced electricity must meet consumption.
Despite the consensus to introduce competition into wholesale and retail markets
by deregulating generation and opening retail, regulation is still needed regarding
network activities. Transmission, distribution and system operation exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics and must be regulated or remain government monopo-
lies [32]. Also, as mentioned in [35], liberalization is more a process than an event,
and governments which started deregulation are continuously revising their regula-
tions.
2.1.2 Electricity market types
With the liberalization of energy markets, generation and supply have become de-
coupled from grid operation. The competitive markets which replace the vertically
integrated systems are related to different functions of the power system manage-
ment. Energy market, ancillary services market and transmission market are the
three main power markets [36].
System ancillary services are services required to ensure that the system opera-
tor meets its responsibilities in relation to the safe, secure and reliable operation of
the interconnected power system. These services are provided by generation, trans-
mission and control equipment [37]. In particular, ancillary services are included in
balancing services which are used to ensure balance between supply and demand in
real time through reserve mechanisms, as detailed in section 1.3.2. In the regulated
industry, ancillary services are bundled with energy and are mandatory services. In
the restructured industry, ancillary services may be procured through market, such
as in some States in the USA.
Transmission markets are markets where the traded commodity is a transmission
right. Such right can be the right to transfer power, the right to inject power into
the network or the right to extract power from the network. The importance of the
transmission right is mostly observed when congestion occurs in the transmission
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network. Such markets are already active in the USA for example. However, in most
European countries, transmission networks are managed by a Transmission System
Operator (TSO), responsible for the secure and efficient operation of the network.
The TSO is also responsible for open access to the grid; it ensures that all network
users (generators, traders, suppliers, customers) can have non discriminatory access
and use the network to move their power.
The energy market is where the competitive trading of electricity occurs. It is
a centralized mechanism that facilitates energy trading between buyers and sellers.
The energy market’s prices are reliable prices indicators, not only for market par-
ticipants but for other financial markets and consumers of electricity as well. The
energy market has a neutral and independent clearing and settlement function.
Energy markets can be considered as the main power markets, where the traded
commodity is electricity. Ancillary services and transmission markets are related
to the secure and reliable operation of the power system. In the following sections,
focus is given only to energy markets.
2.1.3 Overview of the electricity markets
Electricity market structures
Two main structures for electricity markets can be found in the literature [36]: pool
markets and bilateral markets. These two structures are illustrated in Figure 2.1,
and described as follows:
Pool 
markets
Seller Buyer
Bilateral 
markets
Figure 2.1: Overview of an electricity market model showing the flow between the market
participants.
• Pool markets: A pool market is defined as a centralized marketplace which
clears the market for buyers and sellers. Sellers and buyers submit bids to the
pool for the amount of power that they are willing to trade in the market, as
shown in Figure 2.1. Sellers compete for the right to supply energy to the grid,
and not for specific customers. If a market participant bids too high, it may
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not be able to sell. On the other hand, buyers compete for the buying power,
and if their bid is too low, they may not be able to purchase.
• Bilateral markets: In bilateral markets, also called Over-The-Counter (OTC)
markets, buyers and sellers trade directly with each other, as shown in Fi-
gure 2.1. Bilateral contracts are negotiable agreements on delivery and receipt
of power between the two traders. The bilateral market structure is very flex-
ible as trading parties specify their desired contract terms, regarding prices,
quantities, duration or quality. However, its main disadvantages are the high
cost of negotiating and writing contracts, and the risk of creditworthiness of
counterparties.
A hybrid structure is mentioned in [36]. It combines various features of the
previous two models.
Physical and financial markets
The value of electricity within a network is a variable depending on the time and the
location. Uncertainty arises from a wide range of contingencies such as equipment
failure, external factors like weather, or behavior of market participants. Electricity
markets are designed according to this uncertainty. In particular, the liberalized
electricity sector uses a combination of physical and financial markets to manage
the short-term uncertainty and network costs [38]. Two kinds of contracts can
be traded on such markets. Contracts which cover the real physical delivery of
electricity are traded in physical markets. These contracts entail physical and cash
delivery on expiry. The hub is the grid. The schedules of all the deliveries relative
to physical contracts must be approved by the Transmission System Operator, to
prevent constraints. Also, the real-time deliveries relative to physical contracts may
lead to differences between feed-ins and take-outs which have to be managed to
ensure the operation of the grid.
Alternatively, some contracts can entail only cash delivery on expiry. These
contracts are denoted as financial contracts and are traded in financial markets. Such
financial products are based on an index which is the price obtained in the physical
power exchange. They were designed for market participants to hedge against the
risk related to high variability of this index. The negotiated products are similar
to those traded in other commodity markets. They include, among others, futures,
forwards, swaps and options. These products can be combined to construct either
contracts at fixed prices, contracts indexed to electricity prices, with cap and floor,
or contracts indexed to other commodity prices. Usually, supplier of these combined
products manages a portfolio including the different available products. Because
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financial products do not entail physical delivery on delivery, the volumes traded
in financial markets can exceed the physical volumes. For example, in the Nordic
countries, the financial volumes traded in the NordPool electricity market reached
150% of the yearly consumption in 2003 [39].
It is important to note that the type of settlement does not predetermine the
aim of the contract. For example, a generator can hedge its production with a
financial contract. The dispatch of the plant is not modified by the contract and
this contract only fixes the incomes of the plant. Also, a trader can speculate with
physical contracts. They only need capacity to deliver power into the grid or to have
signed an additional back up physical contract with a physical agent.
Market clearing processes
For participating in a pool-based market, buyers and sellers propose bids. Sellers
propose bids to sell a given amount of energy at a given price, and buyers propose
bids to purchase a given amount of electricity at a given price. The market settlement
results in contracts for both buyers and sellers. Buy and sell contracts consist in
a given amount of electricity at a given price. Two main mechanisms are used
for market settlement: the single price market clearing process and the pay-as-bid
market clearing process [40, 41].
Single price market clearing process Markets which are based on a single
price clearing process are organized in power exchange sessions. Participants in
such markets have to submit their quantity-price bid during the period between the
gate opening and the gate closure time. The time delivery scope may vary depending
on the considered market. The bid time unit is often denoted as Program Time Unit
(PTU).
For the market settlement, all bids are aggregated to form a curve for purchases
and a curve for sales for each PTU. The point at which the two curves intersect
within each PTU determines the Market Clearing Price (MCP), also called system
price or spot price, which in turn establishes the trading result for each participant
for that PTU. This process is described in Figure 2.2.
Once the market clearing price is determined, all bids to sell with offer prices
lower than or equal to the MCP and all bids to purchase with offer prices greater
than or equal to the MCP are accepted. All bids to sell with higher offer prices or
bids to purchase with lower offer prices are rejected. Regarding contract prices, all
the sellers receive the MCP for their electricity, even if their bid price is lower than
the MCP price and all buyers pay the MCP, even if their bid price is higher than
the MCP price.
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Figure 2.2: Single price market clearing process
Such single price market clearing process is based on marginal pricing of electri-
city. The participation of a generation unit in such market will be beneficial only
if the MCP is higher than its marginal cost. Therefore, the price bid is based on
the marginal cost. Marginal pricing is considered as a way to reach the lowest total
cost to generate a given amount of electricity. For markets including different re-
gions, regional spot market prices are derived from system prices taking into account
transmission bottlenecks [42].
Pay-as-bid market clearing process A second alternative is to design the sys-
tem to pay bidders the price they bid, rather than to pay them the MCP. Such
trading mechanism takes place in a central exchange where standard products are
traded on a “first come first serve” basis: the first matching offer to a bid (or vice
versa) is rewarded and fixed into two bilateral transactions between the seller and
the buyer. Such a pricing mechanism is denoted as pay-as-bid pricing which takes
place in a power exchange continuous mechanism.
Generation units under the pay-as-bid system are remunerated at their bid price.
Consequently, their bid price has to be higher than their marginal cost for the
participation to be beneficial. However, a bid with a price too high will not be
matched by any purchasing bid. The highest price of the matched bids is called
the cut-off price. If all participants could guess the cut-off price perfectly, each
participant whose marginal cost is lower than the cut-off would bid the cut-off price
and each would be paid the cut-off price. The cut-off price would then be the same
as the market-clearing price. However, this analysis is based on a “perfect guessing”
hypothesis.
In real world, the pay-as-bid system may increase the total cost of generating
electricity and can therefore be less efficient than a one-price market-clearing system.
A discussion about the efficiency of the pay-as-bid market clearing process is given
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in [43].
Finally, it is important to note that the decision relative to the bid in an electri-
city market depends on the clearing process of the considered market. The difference
in terms of decision for these two clearing processes will be explained later in this
thesis, more precisely in section 4.5.
2.1.4 Electricity market operation
Most of the electricity markets are organized in a succession of markets that adjust
the balance between production and demand. This section describes the general
time frame for the operation of electricity markets. A main distinction is made
between markets which take place prior to the delivery and real-time markets [44].
Markets prior to delivery
Long term markets The largest energy volume is traded in long-term markets.
In these markets, large blocks of electrical energy are traded for periods ranging
from several days to several years. These periods correspond to the time between
the contract settlement and the real delivery.
Most of these contracts are financial ones. More generally, they are market
derivatives. Derivatives are defined as financial contracts or instruments whose
values are derived from the value of an underlying [45]. An underlying can be
an asset, like a commodity, or index, like a rate, whose value is considered as a basis
for derivatives. In electricity energy markets, the underlying is electrical energy.
Derivatives are mainly used to mitigate the risk of economic loss arising from
changes in the value of the underlying. This activity is known as hedging. In
particular, regarding electricity markets, derivatives are used by market parties as
methods to manage the risk relative to the price variability on the real-time market
[40]. Also, derivatives can be used by investors to increase the profit arising if the
value of the underlying moves in the direction they expect. This activity is known
as speculation, and is not considered in the present work. The interested reader
may refer to [45] for further details. The main derivatives in electricity markets are
forward contracts, future contracts and options:
• Forward contract is an agreement between two parties, e.g. between two
financial institutions or between a financial institution and one of its clients, to
buy or sell electricity at a certain future point in time for a certain price [45].
Forward contracts are bilateral agreements settled in bilateral markets.
• Future contract, also called a future, is a standardized agreement between
two parties on an exchange to buy or sell electricity at a certain price at
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a certain time in the future. Futures contracts are thus similar to forward
contracts, but instead of being traded in bilateral markets, they are traded on
an exchange. This explains why futures are standardized products.
• Options are contracts that give the owner the right, but not the obligation, to
buy (in the case of a call option) or sell (in the case of a put option) electricity.
The price at which the sale takes place is known as the strike price, and is
specified at the time the parties enter into the option. The option contract
also specifies a maturity date. In the case of a European option, the owner
has the right to require the sale to take place on (but not before) the maturity
date; in the case of an American option, the owner can require the sale to
take place at any time up to the maturity date. The buyer (holder) of the
option pays the seller (writer) an option premium for this right. The option
writer’s obligation is to complete the transaction if the holder so demands
(exercises the option). The option writer has received a premium for taking
on the obligation.
Day-ahead markets Most electricity markets include a day-ahead market, which
is a physical market where the bids are submitted and the market is cleared on the
day before the actual delivery. Most day-ahead markets are based on a single price
market clearing process. The resulting spot price is often used as a reference for
financial markets.
Day-ahead market participants (sellers and buyers) have to propose before gate
closure time in the day d their quantity-price bids for the different delivery periods
of the following day d+ 1. Delivery periods are often referred to as Program Time
Unit (PTU). Generally, the PTU is one hour, and the bids can be either hourly bids
or block bids when they cover a number of successive hours. More precisely, block
bids allow the participation of generation units with starting ramp.
Based on a single price market clearing process as described in section 2.1.3, the
bids are all matched through a single auction process for determining the market
clearing price (also referred to as spot price) and the program of the participants for
each PTU, which is the volume being sold or purchased during each PTU, for each
participant.
Each day-ahead market has its own rules, defining the way electricity is to be
sold or purchased, how the prices are settled, and the obligations the participants
are committed to. The specific trading rules regarding European day-ahead markets
can be found in [46,47].
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Intraday markets Due to the long time span between the settlement of contracts
on the day-ahead market and the physical delivery, exchanges sometimes offer an
intra-day market, also referred to as hour-ahead or adjustment market. An intraday
market is defined here as a physical market, which gives the possibility for transac-
tions between market parties between the day-ahead market gate closure time and
the final notification [41]. This notification is the last moment in time where a mar-
ket party is allowed to change the energy program which will form the basis of the
imbalance calculation. Intraday markets gate closure time occurs between half an
hour and two hours before time of delivery.
The participation in intraday markets enables the participants to improve their
balance of physical contracts in the short term. In particular, they can take into
account non-scheduled outages, updated load forecasts and updated forecasts of RES
generation. This justifies why these markets are often called adjustment markets.
These markets can be based on single price or pay-as-bid market clearing pro-
cesses. An overview and a classification of the European intraday markets is given
in [41].
Real-time markets
At gate closure time, all trading for the physical delivery of electrical energy ceases:
at that point, market parties have their final energy schedules fixed. At the same
point, the control over the power system is passed to the Transmission System
Operator (TSO) which is responsible for the continuous balance between supply
and demand, including possible import/export from neighboring grids.
In open electricity markets, the real-time market is the physical market whose
main function is to provide reserve power by market parties to the TSO through a
bidding process. Only the TSO manages the demand of the real-time market and
the actors on the supply side of the real-time market can be both producers and
consumers.
Two kinds of bids can be proposed from a market party in the real-time market.
Bids can first consist in a proposition of a price required to increase its generation
or decrease its consumption for a specific volume immediately. Alternatively, bids
can also consist in a proposition of a price offered to take the opposite action,
which is to decrease its generation or increase its consumption for a specific volume
immediately (i.e. in the following minutes). The first type of bid will be activated
when demand exceeds supply while the second when supply exceeds demand. Such
balancing services are part of ancillary services. The following paragraph describes
the example of the real-time market operated by TenneT in Netherlands [48]: up
to one hour ahead of operation, market parties may offer bids for regulating and
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reserve power to TenneT. TenneT will use as much regulating and reserve power
as is needed in order to maintain or restore the system balance. Units providing
upward or downward power are remunerated at the price of the highest bid used for
balancing the system, with a different price for upward and downward power. This
price is the penalty price that the parties responsible for imbalance have to pay for
their energy imbalance.
The term balancing market generally combines the real-time market with the
imbalance penalty rules [44]:
• Balancing market first refers to the balancing mechanism which defines the
features of the real-time market, such as the bidding rules, the constraints or
the requirements on the balancing market participants, the way of payment to
the bidders or the constraints on the TSO. A market entity providing balancing
power/energy to a TSO is denoted as “balancing market participant”.
• Balancing market may also refers to the rules defining the way the TSO de-
termines the price for the market parties responsible for the imbalance bet-
ween demand and supply. Market parties which are financially responsible for
balancing their injections and withdrawals (including possible purchases and
selling) of energy are denoted as balancing responsible parties.
Imbalance pricing arrangements can be used to encourage market players to max-
imize their efforts to be in balance. Balancing markets therefore form an integral
part of the overall wholesale electricity trading arrangements and timetable. Balanc-
ing markets represent the transition from a rule-based mechanism to a market-based
mechanism. Although the TSO will be a single purchaser in such mechanism, efforts
have been made to base the procurement of capacity required to balance the system
in real-time on market-based actions whenever possible [49]. It is seen as a way
to ensure the transparency and the competitiveness of the mechanism. Some grid
operators in Europe have already started to procure capacity required to balance
the system in real-time via a real-time market, and balancing markets are expected
to become increasingly integrated in the near future.
Summary of the electricity market operation
Figure 2.3 summarizes the electricity market operation considered. The long-term,
day-ahead and intraday markets are illustrated as a possibility for market parties
to trade electricity prior to delivery. The participation in one of these markets is
related to the proposition of a bid. This is illustrated by the vertical line which
precedes the trading period (represented by the rectangle). In opposition to these
markets prior to delivery, the balancing market is a real-time market which occurs
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Figure 2.3: Time frames of different markets
at delivery. This market is related to the difference between the energy contracted
by the different market parties and the actual delivered energy. The TSO is the
main participant of this later market.
2.2 Description of participation in an electricity market
This section explains in what a participation in an electricity market consists from
the power producer point of view. The regulatory framework of the renewable energy
sources is first recalled, and the hypothesis relative to the participation of renewable
generation in electricity market is discussed. Then, the electricity markets conside-
red in this thesis are specified, and the participation in these markets is presented
through the concept of independent power producer(IPP). The following key
concept which is defined is the one relative to the balance responsibility of the
IPP.
2.2.1 Renewable energy sources and regulatory framework
In the EU Directive (2001/77/EC) on the promotion of electricity produced from
Renewable Energy Sources (RES), each Member State is expected to reach a given
share of its production based on RES in 2010. This specific share is based on the
percentage of each country’s consumption of electricity. In order to achieve these
goals, support mechanisms may be used to promote the large scale integration of RES
in each Member State’s power system. Morthorst in [50] proposes an analysis and an
evaluation of the different mechanisms used in EU to promote RES. Overviews of the
current support schemes to promote RES are given in [28, 51, 52] by the European
30
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
Transmission System Operator (ETSO), the International Energy Agency (IEA),
and the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), respectively.
The main goal of support schemes is to bring the RES technology development
to a stage in the future where RES no longer support is needed. More precisely,
most of RES technologies (excepting hydropower generation) are recent technologies
compared to conventional generation, and need additional research for decreasing
their generation cost. Also, most of the electricity markets today underestimate the
environmental cost of production related to conventional generation, which leads to
a competitive disadvantage for RES participating in the same markets. The aim
of support mechanisms is to recognize the additional benefits of renewable energies
such as support to rural economies and mitigation of environmental impacts, and
consequently to offset such competitive disadvantages.
Support mechanisms can be divided into two categories, as suggested in [53]:
• quantity-based mechanisms are systems where a quota for the level of renewable
energy that should be produced is set. The regulator defines a reserved market
for a given amount of RES and organizes competition between RES produc-
ers to allocate this amount. Electric utilities are then obliged to purchase
the electricity from the selected power producers. These mechanisms are de-
noted as tendering systems or competitive bidding systems. For example, the
Renewables Obligation (RO) mechanism in UK consists in an obligation on
licensed electricity suppliers to buy a certain percentage of their supply in each
1-year compliance period [54]. Another example of quantity-based mechanism
is the green certificate scheme, where a fixed quota of the electricity sold by
operators on the market has to be generated from RES.
• price-based mechanisms are systems that are relative to the payment of the
RES production. Payment mechanisms can be viewed as compensation for the
lack of internalization of external costs in the production costs of the producing
companies. The level of the payment incentive depends on the RES production
cost compared to other technologies and the market prices for electricity. More
precisely, the market price for electricity settled by conventional technologies
might be too low to make RES competitive. Two main payment mechanisms
are predominant in Europe [50,55]: the feed-in tariffs and the feed-in premium:
– the feed-in tariff scheme involves an obligation for a given electric utility
to purchase the electricity produced by renewable energy producers in
their service area at a tariff determined by the public authorities and
guaranteed for a specified period of time.
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– the feed-in premium is an incentive paid on top of the market price to the
RES producers. This premium can be either independent of the market
price, or limited in case of high market price. The aim of the feed-in
premium is to introduce upper and lower boundaries for the renewable
energy price.
A comparison of the feed-in tariff and the feed-in premium is proposed in [55] for
the wind power in Germany and Spain respectively. Regarding price-based mech-
anisms, feed-in tariff and feed-in premium schemes correspond to two different at-
titudes towards the integration of RES generation in electricity market [51]. The
feed-in tariff mechanism consists in setting special conditions for RES generation and
providing relief from market risks. On the contrary, the feed-in premium mechanism
consists in supporting the costs related to the market integration. Feed-in premiums
can thus be seen as a transition to a full market integration, where support mecha-
nisms are removed. Full market integration would be possible if the RES generation
is competitive with conventional generation. This can be achieved either with a de-
creasing cost of the RES technology or with the integration of additional products
in the current market mechanisms, such as carbon credits regarding environmental
issues.
The present work aims at proposing methods for RES generators for the manage-
ment of their production in electricity markets. More precisely, the proposed method
aims at managing the risk related to the balance responsible RES generators when
they are integrated in electricity markets and responsible for their production. Re-
garding support mechanisms, the proposed method is not valid for RES generators
under feed-in tariffs, but the method would remain valid for RES generators under
feed-in premiums. The hypothesis to consider renewable generation integrated in
electricity markets is justified by the temporary nature of support mechanism: as
stated in their definition, a support mechanism is designed to support a technology
development to a stage in the future where the technology no longer needs support.
Moreover, a number of feed-in tariff mechanisms have been switched to feed-in pre-
mium mechanisms in recent years [52]. This observed trend confirms the transition
to the situation where RES generators are responsible for their generation.
2.2.2 Electricity markets considered in this study
In the present work, the RES production is supposed to be sold in a competitive elec-
tricity market. A relatively high number of participants is supposed to participate
in the market.
The considered RES generation is traded ahead of delivery, via bilateral contracts
or on the power exchange. Focus is given on the day-ahead market, which is most of
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the time the reference market for all forward trades. The participation in intraday
markets is also considered. Day-ahead and intraday markets are denoted as short-
term electricity markets.
The participation in long-term electricity markets is not considered in this work.
Such markets are forward markets, where the transactions relate to distant deliv-
eries which can range from the following month to several years in advance. The
assumption to participate only in markets for which the period between the trans-
action and the delivery does not exceed the one relative to the day-ahead is justified
by the RES generators characteristics: the limited predictability of the renewable
production makes its trading difficult in long term contracts.
Also the participation in real-time market is not considered. Generators partic-
ipating in such markets propose a price required to increase their generation. This
bid can be activated by the TSO to regulate the grid and consequently, must be
reliable. Consequently, the uncertainty associated to the RES generation and its
limited dispatchability limits its participation in real-time markets. However, recent
improvements in very short-term RES power forecasting models could overcome this
limit.
2.2.3 Participation of renewable units in electricity markets as in-
dependent power producers
Definition of an independent power producer
An Independent Power Producer (IPP) is an electricity generator delivering power in
a deregulated structure [40]. The concept of IPP appears as soon as the electricity
generation industry structure is not a vertically integrated monopoly. The IPPs
are indeed competing generators. They can sell their generation either to a single
buyer or a wholesale market. The second case is considered as a fully competitive
generating sector.
IPPs are generating companies, also called GENCOs in the US [36]. They oper-
ate and maintain existing generating plants. An IPP may own a plant or interact on
behalf of plant owners with the short-term market. An IPP can include RES units.
IPPs have the opportunity to sell electricity to entities with which they have
already negotiated sales contracts through bilateral contracts; they may also opt to
sell their generation in short-term electricity markets. IPP may offer electric power
at several locations that will ultimately be delivered through the transmission or
distribution networks. Since an IPP is an entity which exists in the liberalized
framework, its selling price is not regulated. Finally, the IPPs’ objective is to max-
imize profits. To achieve such a goal, IPPs may choose to take part in whatever
market. It is the IPP’s own responsibility to consider possible risks.
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Interaction of an independent power producer with other entities of the
power system
In the context of a fully competitive generating sector, the IPPs have the possibility
to trade their generation in wholesale electricity markets. As explained in section
2.2.2, only the participation in short-term electricity market (i.e. day-ahead and
intraday) is considered.
When participating in such markets, IPPs interact with other market entities.
First, the Independent System Operator (ISO) is the leading entity in a market
and determines the market rules [36]. The ISO administers transmission tariffs,
maintains the system security and coordinates maintenance scheduling. The ISO
should function independently of any market participants, such as generators or
end-users, and should provide non-discriminatory open access to all system users.
Two options can be found regarding the relationship between the system opera-
tor and the transmission owner [40]. A first option is to have an ISO which combines
ownership of the transmission with system operation. The ISO is then called Trans-
mission System Operator (TSO). The TSO is a regulated company. The second
option separates the system operator (ISO) from transmission companies which are
independent entities which own the transmission network. Transmission companies
transmit electricity using a high-voltage transport system from generators to distri-
bution companies for delivery to customers. Transmission companies have the role
of building, owning, maintaining, and operating the transmission system in a certain
geographical region for providing services for maintaining the overall reliability of
the electrical system. A detailed comparison of the two options can be found in [40].
The second option is more common in the US power system while the TSO option
can be found in most of EU countries.
Other market entities include distribution companies, retail companies, aggre-
gators, brokers, marketers and customers [36]. Distribution companies distribute
electricity to the customers in a certain geographical region. These customers are
the end-users of electricity. They can be connected to the distribution system in
the case of small consumers and to the transmission system in case of bulk cus-
tomers. Retail companies are legally able to sell retail electricity. The retailers can
either deal directly with end-user customers or through aggregators, who combine
customers into a buying group. Brokers of electric energy services are entities that
act as middlemen in a marketplace in which these services are priced, purchased and
traded. They facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers. Finally marketers
are entities that buy and re-sell electric power but do not own generating facilities.
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2.2.4 Details of the description of the participation of an indepen-
dent power producer in electricity markets
General definition of the participation of an IPP in electricity markets
In the competitive framework, the IPP is responsible for trading its generation.
More precisely, the IPP has to “decide on the amount of each electricity service that
should be supplied, at which moment it should be produced, at what price it should
be sold, and by which units it should be provided” [56].
The market participation consists in designing hourly offer curves that are sub-
mitted to the auctions relative to the different markets. Quantity-price pairs are
examples of offer curves, where a given amount of energy is proposed at a corre-
sponding price. These offer curves are based on short-term generation scheduling.
More precisely, the decision about the quantity-price bids has to take into account
technical constraints of the generation units such as ramps. These units might be
profitable to operate if they received at least a certain level price for a large period.
The operation of the same unit only for a short period may not be profitable since
the fixed costs of ramping up may be greater than the profits earned during the pe-
riod [43]. In order to take into account these features, market parties can use block
bids, which consists in a series of n bids relative to n consecutive market period
units.
The market participation of the IPP can be interpreted as a shift of the respon-
sibility of the power system management from the central operator to the market
players. This view is defended in [57]. In that book, Rau explains that unit commit-
ment generally done by the central operator for the next days or weeks “contravenes
deregulation philosophy”, in which the power system is managed through the mar-
ket. The dispatch is shifted to the perspective of market players, and becomes a
question of determining the optimal bidding strategies as related to maintenance,
risk of forced outage and loss of revenue, and decision to start and stop generators.
This position assumes a reliable operation of the market.
Price taker versus price maker
In the case of a market with a single price clearing process, as defined in section
2.1.3, two different approaches of bidding can be observed for the IPP:
• The first approach consists in submitting quantity-price bids which indicate
how much electricity the IPP is prepared to deliver at a given price. Then,
the market clearing price and clearing volume for the considered IPP, result
from the aggregation of the offer and demand curves. The IPP is said to be a
price maker.
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• In the approach, the IPP submits price-independent bids. The bid energy
quantity is constant for the whole range of possible prices. The IPP is said
to be price taker. For the market settlement, this bid is taken at zero price
when aggregating the offer curves. The bid quantity is always traded in the
market as a result of the zero price, and the IPP receives, or “takes”, the
market clearing price.
Renewable generation units have low marginal costs, since their production is not
based on a fuel consumption. Consequently, the market participation for a IPP
including renewable power units aims at trading as much as energy as delivered by
the renewable units. Consequently, the considered IPP in the study is taken to be
a price taker.
2.2.5 Balance responsibility
Definition of balance responsible party
Balance responsibility is considered as a way to enable the functioning of the market
while keeping technical integrity of the system in a decentralized way. Under this
mechanism, market parties are economically responsible for their imbalance.
A balance responsible party (BRP) is a market party which is “responsible for
keeping the net balance on all the connections within its control and [which] faces
the liability consequences if this is not achieved. The liability in case of imbalance
involves the payment of an imbalance charge to the operator of the market area who
is responsible for keeping the balance in the area. The imbalance charge consists of an
imbalance price for every MWh of imbalance that has occurred during a predefined
settlement period” [41].
Imbalance is generally defined per balance responsible party per settlement pe-
riod as the difference between net programmed values and metered values of feed-ins
and take-outs on the set of connections the party is responsible for, corrected with net
programmed trade with other program responsible parties. If the set of connections
is empty the imbalance is per definition equal to the net programmed trade [41].
Imbalance settlement for an independent power producer
The imbalance settlement is made a posteriori to production and consumption, and
is based on metered data. It often involves an imbalance penalty which is determined
by multiplying the imbalance energy volumes with the imbalance price. This section
gives the definition of the imbalance volume and price, which are formulated in the
next chapter 3.
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Imbalance volume The imbalance volume of a balance responsible party is the
difference between the metered delivered energy and the net contracted energy. Such
volume can be positive or negative. The contracted energy results from the partici-
pation in electricity markets prior to delivery as described in section 2.2.2.
Positive energy imbalance occurs when the delivered energy is greater than the
contracted energy, while negative energy imbalance occurs when the delivered energy
is lower than the contracted energy and negative energy.
Imbalance price The real-time regulation operated by the TSO results from the
sum of the imbalance volumes from all the BRPs in the TSO control zone. In
order to ensure the equilibrium between production and consumption, the TSO
counterbalances the total real-time imbalance by applying secondary reserve and
tertiary reserve. These secondary and tertiary reserves may be obtained from the
real-time market as described in sections 1.3.2 and 2.1.4. If the real-time imbalance
is positive, production exceeds consumption and down-regulation is activated. If
the real-time imbalance is negative, production is lower than consumption and up-
regulation is activated.
BRPs are responsible for the payment of the energy traded in the real-time mar-
ket by the TSO for adjusting its own energy imbalance. Many options exist for the
design of the imbalance price mechanism. First, the payment of providers of im-
balance service and the charge of users can be done through a fixed regulated price
or a real-time market-based price [40]. Also, when the imbalance price is based on
real-time, the imbalance price can be based either on a dual pricing mechanism,
where a different price is applied to positive and negative imbalance volumes respec-
tively, or on a single pricing mechanism, where a single imbalance price is used for
all imbalance volumes. Finally, imbalance pricing based on real-time market can
consider either the average or the marginal price of energy balancing actions [41].
When a dual pricing mechanism is used, a distinction is made between BRP
imbalance volumes which are in the same direction as the TSO regulation and BRP
imbalance volumes which are in the opposite direction. A BRP has its imbalance
in the same direction as the TSO regulation when its imbalance volume is positive
while the TSO is down-regulating, or negative while the TSO is up-regulating.
The different imbalance pricing options generally lead to a penalization of the
imbalance volumes, which reduces the IPP’s market revenue. More generally, the
imbalance settlement mechanism is designed to encourage market participants to
minimize energy imbalances. This is done through price signals for the imbalance
energy. Figure 2.41 describes the dual price mechanism in the Western Denmark
1Note that, due to editing problems, the currency unit eis denoted as eur. This remark is valid
for all the figures of the present thesis.
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area, with the up regulation, day-ahead market and down regulation prices during
the 24 h of the 5th of October 2003. The up regulation price is the “main” price for
generators being “short” (i.e. which have their production lower than their contract).
Such up regulation price is higher or equal to the day-ahead market price, which is
the “reverse” price. In other words, they are required to pay the “missing” energy
at a price higher than the spot price. Similarly, the down regulation price is the
“main” price for generators being “long”. Such up regulation price is higher or equal
to the day-ahead market price, which is the “reverse” price.
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Figure 2.4: Day-ahead electricity market price in the Elspot market for the Western Den-
mark area, the 05/10/2003, and the associated up and down regulation price for the same
area.
In a dual pricing mechanism, the energy imbalance in the “right” sign for the TSO
are not penalized. For very infrequent periods, the energy imbalance in the “right”
sign for the TSO may even be remunerated. This situation may happen during
down-regulation from the TSO, where negative imbalances are then remunerated
at a price greater than the day-ahead market price. These situations can also be
associated to negative prices for positive imbalance. Electricity in this condition
becomes a “waste good” [58]. This phenomenon happens very infrequently. It is
explained by the “must-run” character of some inflexible generators [59]. For these
power suppliers, the costs of a shutdown period are generally higher than the loss
resulting from negative price, which explains why they accept these negative prices.
More generally, imbalance prices are highly variable and hardly predictable [60].
Such characteristics will be further discussed in section C. The high variability and
low predictability contribute to discourage power producers to plan imbalances and
to prevent from speculation in these markets [61].
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Balance responsibility and renewable generation
The balance responsibility is particularly critical for IPP with RES units in their
generating portfolio. More precisely, when participating in a market, the IPP has to
propose bids prior to the delivery, taking into account the limited predictability of
the RES units. Energy contracts are thus based on an estimation of the future energy
generation. At delivery time, the errors relative to these generation estimations and
the limited dispatchability of the RES units may lead to significant energy imbal-
ance, which in turn make them particularly sensitive to imbalance penalties. This
sensitivity reduces the competitiveness RES-based portfolios in electricity markets
and lead to financial risks [62].
This sensitivity is a reason why RES have benefited from support mechanisms,
which counterbalance the reduction of competitiveness resulting from imbalance
penalties due to the limited predictability of RES generation. The feed-in tariff
mechanism completely eliminates the balance responsibility. The feed-in premium
mechanism modifies the market price perceived by the IPP, which distorts the mar-
ket price seen by the RES units, reducing the influence of the imbalance costs on
the RES units operation [38]. Specific support mechanisms reducing the balance
responsibility for RES have also been settled. In Belgium for example, offshore wind
energy can enjoy specific tolerance margins [63]. If the imbalance volumes are lower
than 30% of their nominal power per PTU, the negative and positive imbalance
prices are levelled out by the TSO at prices of respectively 110 or 90 % of the day-
ahead spot market price [63]. For deviations beyond these margins, the prices are
determined according to the TSO’s imbalance tariff.
The present work considers the participation of an Independent Power Producer
operating RES generation as a balance responsible Party. Under these conditions,
the management of the uncertainty related to renewable generation is a cornerstone
for improving the integration of RES in electricity markets.
2.2.6 Summary
Figure 2.5 summarizes the sequence of the participation of an IPP in an electricity
market, and the interaction with other entities of the power system. In a first step,
the IPP proposes bids in the day-ahead and eventually in the intraday electricity
markets. The bids are submitted to the market operator. They result in energy
contracts for the IPP, which in turn are considered as energy programs by the TSO.
The second step is the real-time operation. At this time, the IPP delivers elec-
tricity to the grid. The TSO operates the real-time market and maintains the equi-
librium of the grid. Regulation is activated by the TSO with electricity available
from the real-time market.
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Figure 2.5: Model of the participation of a balance responsible IPP an electricity market.
Finally, the imbalance penalties are applied to the IPP by the TSO for the
difference between the contracted and delivered energy.
The imbalance penalization will be formulated in the next chapter. The next
section presents the state of the art of existing solutions to manage the imbalance
penalties for an IPP including RES units.
2.3 State of the art of existing solutions for the manage-
ment of renewable generation in electricity markets
The following section proposes to classify the solutions which reduce imbalance
penalties into two categories: the financial solutions which are relative to the man-
agement of the contracted energy, and the physical solutions which are relative to
the management of the delivered energy. It reminded that the imbalance penalties
depend on the difference between the delivered energy and the contracted energy.
2.3.1 Financial solutions for the imbalance management
The aim of this section is to present the financial solutions available from the litera-
ture for the management of imbalance penalties. These solutions are relative to the
management of the contracted energy, which refers to the total amount of energy
which has been traded through different markets or bilateral contracts before deliv-
ery. Energy traded in the real-time market for balancing the position of the IPP is
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not included in the considered contracted energy. The participation in day-ahead
and intraday markets, as well as the trading of market derivatives, are presented.
The particular role of renewable generation forecasting in the financial solutions is
also explained.
Renewable generation trading in short-term electricity markets
Short-term electricity markets include day-ahead and intraday markets. For trading
their generation in these markets, IPPs must propose their energy quantity-price
bids during a period which ends at the gate closure time. The proposed bids are
then settled by the market and result in energy contracts which are notified to the
TSO as expected physical position at real time. The imbalance energy at delivery
time is calculated as the difference between the delivered and the contracted energy
from the IPP. Since most imbalance settlement mechanisms are designed to penalize
imbalance energy, the total contracted energy should be as close as possible to the
delivered energy in order to avoid imbalance penalties. In some systems only, IPPs
are allowed to self-balance after gate closure time [41]. However, this possibility is
normally prohibited or is subject to an information imbalance charge.
The participation in the day-ahead market. A day-ahead market, as its name
implies, operates one day in advance of the delivery. The participation of renewable
units in such market necessitates the use of short-term forecasts of the output of
these units. Numerous studies consider the participation of IPP including wind
power in day-ahead markets in European countries. For example, the participation
of a wind farm in the OMEL day-ahead market in Spain is considered in [64–66].
The participation of a wind farm in the APX day-ahead market in Netherlands is
considered in [67]. In [68], the participation of a wind farm in the NordPool Elspot
day-ahead market in Denmark is described. In United Kingdom, the participation of
a wind farm in the NETA day-ahead market is considered in [62]. The participation
of wind power in the Italian day-ahead market is simulated in [69].
Moreover, the day-ahead market is considered as a reference market for the im-
balance pricing mechanisms. In particular, for dual imbalance pricing regime, the
price for imbalance volumes in the same direction as the TSO regulation measure is
the day-ahead price for many European countries [41]. In other words, imbalance
volumes which help the TSO to guarantee the equilibrium between load and genera-
tion are paid the day-ahead price. If the imbalance volume is relative to a day-ahead
energy contract, this means that the penalty associated to such imbalance volume
is null.
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Additional trading in intraday markets. Intraday markets offer the possibility
for IPPs to get additional trade and a change of position after the day-ahead market
gate closure time. Participation in the intraday market can be done using updated
power forecasts which are generally more accurate than the ones used for trading in
the day-ahead market. This forecasting error reduction is explained by the reduction
of the period between the prediction and the operation time in the case of intraday
market. Consequently, more recent inputs, such as measurements and numerical
weather predictions, can be used for generating updated forecasts.
Participating in an intraday market using updated power forecasts can thus be
considered as a solution for reducing imbalance penalties. The benefits from the
participation in such a market have been verified in [70] for the Spanish market.
For the NordPool market, the possibility to reduce imbalance penalties through the
intraday market participation has been studied in [71].
Trading strategies for managing imbalance penalties. For an IPP, market
participation consists in determining the amount and the price of the bids which it
proposes to the market. This quantity and price will determine the total contracted
energy and the resulting energy imbalance. As a consequence, the strategy adopted
by the IPP for trading in the market is crucial regarding their competitiveness
towards the other market participants.
The problem relative to strategic bidding refers to both decision making about
the quantity-price bid and market clearing models. A wide range of approaches can
be found in the literature. A general framework is proposed in [72] for strategic
bidding in electricity spot markets under uncertainty. This study is based on a wide
review of the state of the art. In particular, the different spot market mechanisms
are described, as well as some approaches used to model bidding strategies, and
different representations of the generation system. Examples of strategic bidding
studies can be found in [73–75].
Management of imbalance penalties with market derivatives: the case of
options
In electricity markets, options are financial market derivatives which give the owner
the right, but not the obligation, to buy (in the case of a call option) or sell (in
the case of a put option) electricity. Regarding IPPs including RES, call options
can be used to manage negative imbalance: call options can be exercised when the
delivered energy is lower than the contracted energy. Similarly, put options can be
used to manage positive imbalance: they can be exercised when the delivered energy
is greater than contracted energy.
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For using options to manage short-term energy imbalance, the IPP has to be able
to trade options which are relative to the delivery of electricity for a short period,
such as several hours. However, the existing option purchasing markets may not
be adequate for managing energy imbalance from wind power. For example, in the
Nordic Power Exchange, the proposed power options are based on season forward
contracts and year forward contracts [76]. No option relative to short-term contracts
is proposed.
As already mentioned, long-term contracts are not considered in this work due to
the limited predictability of RES generation. However, the development of derivative
products aiming at reducing the risk related to the market participation is fast, and
short-term options or similar products could appear rapidly in electricity markets.
Thus, using option for managing imbalance penalties remains theoretical now, but
may soon appear for real cases.
The role of renewable generation forecasting in the financial solutions
The financial solutions are related to the trading of energy volumes in electricity mar-
ket. This participation in markets generally consists in the proposition of quantity-
price bids prior to delivery, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Due to the limited pre-
dictability of the renewable generation, forecasting methods are often used. In this
case, the forecast of the renewable generation is used as a basis to determine the
energy bid volume. This results in a decrease of the imbalance penalty. This re-
duction of imbalance penalty, and the resulting revenue increase, is thus a measure
of the value of the RES generation forecast. The following paragraphs gives the
example of the value of wind generation forecast in electricity markets.
Usaola and Angarita [65], in a simulation study, used the OMEL Spanish market
example to demonstrate the value of forecasting: he draws a relation between the
accuracy of wind power prediction tools and the resulting revenue. The case of
the Spanish electricity market is also examined in [64] where the authors show
that the prediction error would cost roughly 10% of the wind farm’s revenue from
electricity market when using a wind power forecasting model. The reduction of
imbalance penalties from using short-term forecasting for trading wind energy in
the UK electricity market is shown in [77].
In a study described in [67,78], the authors present the simulation of the partic-
ipation of a wind farm in the Dutch APX electricity market. The authors compare
the imbalance penalties from using an advanced wind power forecasting model with
the ones obtained using persistence. The persistence, in this case, consists in using
the latest available wind power measurement as a forecast for the future production.
When using the persistence model, imbalance penalties represent a reduction of 21 %
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of the revenue which could be obtained by using perfectly accurate forecasts, with
null imbalance. Using the advanced wind power forecasting model decreases the im-
balance penalties to 13% of the revenue obtained with perfectly accurate forecasts.
2.3.2 Physical solutions for imbalance management
This section presents the physical solutions available from the literature for the
management of imbalance penalties related to renewable generation. These solutions
concern the management of the delivered energy by the IPP which includes the
considered renewable generation. The first solution is the control of the generation
from the RES unit itself. The three following solutions consist in combining the RES
unit either with other RES units (i.e. aggregation), with energy storage devices
or with conventional units. The general concept of virtual power plant is finally
presented from the literature. This concept corresponds to the framework for the
three power system combinations previously given.
Control of the renewable generation
RES generation based on solar plants and wind farms result from the conversion
of solar irradiation and wind respectively, which are non-controllable resources. As
a result, the dispactchability of RES units is low, as already discussed in section
1.2.2. Such dispatchability has been improved with the development of new RES
technologies.
In this work, the automatic control of electrical machines is distinguished from
the control possibilities which permit to increase the dispatchability of the RES
plant output. This distinction is illustrated with the case of wind power. For modern
wind turbines, the automatic power control can be realized with pitch control, which
gives the possibility to turn the blades out or into the wind as the power output
becomes too high or too low, respectively [79]. Another automatic control is the
active stall control, which consists in pitching the blades slightly into the direction
opposite to the pitch control in order to decrease high power fluctuations, and to
compensate variations in air density. The second control, which permits to increase
the dispatchability of the RES plant output, is denoted as generation control.
Such control includes for example the possibility for a wind farm to reduce its total
generation output. This generation control can be a request from the TSO for
avoiding grid congestion in case of high wind power production. This control is
sometimes denoted as down-regulation. Technically, the output reduction can be
achieved either by shutting down a single wind turbine of the wind farm, or by
limiting the output generation of each wind turbine of the wind farm.
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In the present work, focus is given to the generation control, and the possibil-
ity to use this control for reducing the imbalance penalties. The automatic power
control is more related to the electrical machine functioning, and is thus not consi-
dered in this work. Regarding generation control, the “down-regulation” techniques
presented in the previous paragraph are solutions for reducing the positive energy
imbalance of the IPP. They are described as the generation management concept
in [80]. For negative energy imbalance, two solutions are proposed in [80] for re-
ducing them: reducing the wind power feed-in permanently below the technical
optimum or shutting down a single wind turbine in advance just of being in position
to switch it on in case of negative imbalance. However, a large share of available
wind power is wasted when applying such solutions.
An example of technical implementation of generation management can be found
in the patent description in [81]. This solution is a wind power management system
for monitoring performance of wind turbine generators.
Aggregation of renewable units
The aggregation of RES units consists in combining different RES units. In this
case, the concerned IPP (or other actor that acts as an aggregator) operates the
aggregated RES units as a single unit. The energy imbalance for this IPP is defined
as the difference between the energy delivered by the different generation units of
the IPP and the energy contracted by the IPP in the electricity markets.
Such energy imbalance for aggregated RES units is smaller or equal than the
sum of the energy imbalance relative to the different unit. More precisely, aggregat-
ing RES units offers the possibility to smooth out the energy imbalances from the
different units. For example, a positive energy imbalance from a RES unit taken
individually may be compensated by a negative imbalance from another unit taken
individually, and vice versa. The reduction of energy imbalances has already been
studied from a forecasting problem point of view. For example, the reduction of
the wind power forecasting error resulting from wind farm aggregation is described
in [82]. The imbalance reduction resulting from the aggregation of wind farms that
are spread over a large area is also mentioned in [83]. This compensation results
from the decorrelation of the individual outputs.
One way to consider decorrelated RES outputs is to consider RES units spread
over a large geographical area. The link between the distance between the RES
units and the RES output decorrelation has been analyzed in [11]. However, the
decorrelation of the wind farm outputs is reduced for offshore aggregation: large
ocean fronts regularly stretch for hundreds of kilometres, so a wider geo-spread is
necessary before output correlation reduces. Another way to consider decorrelated
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RES outputs is to consider RES units based on different renewable resources, such
as the combination of wind and photovolta¨ıc power plants. However, the different
aggregated technologies have to be of the same order of magnitude regarding energy
delivery.
In addition to the compensation of opposite energy imbalances, the RES unit
aggregation permits to decrease the aggregated output variability [84]. This vari-
ability reduction is denoted as the smoothing effect and is quantified and analyzed
in [11]. The reduction of the fluctuations of the output from a wind farm aggre-
gation in time intervals ranging from a few seconds to five minutes are analyzed
in [85]. The smoothing effect relative to the aggregation of RES units based on
different renewable resources is described in [84]. On a seasonal basis, combining
photovolta¨ıc power plants with wind farms is a way to decrease the aggregated out-
put variability: the wind energy production is generally higher in winter due to high
wind, whereas the photovolta¨ıc production is higher in summer as a consequence to
higher solar irradiation in summer. In other studies mentioned in [84], in the United
Kingdom for example, wave and wind power time series have been found to have a
low correlation on a daily basis. This combination could be interesting for reducing
short-term variability, for the time periods ranging from around one to four hours
before delivery.
Combination with energy storage devices
The energy delivered by RES unit is hardly predictable and hardly controllable.
These characteristics make them sensitive to imbalance penalties. A solution to
reduce this sensitivity is to combine the RES units with other units which are able
to compensate this lack of controllability. The Energy Storage Devices (ESDs) are an
example of power units which reduce the sensitivity of IPPs including RES towards
imbalance penalties [84].
ESDs are power units which can store a given amount of electrical energy. More
precisely, ESDs can be charged in case of positive imbalance (when RES delivered
energy is greater than the contracted energy) and discharged in case of negative
imbalance (when the delivered energy by the RES units is lower than the contracted
energy). As a result, the energy imbalance from the combined RES and ESD units
can be reduced. From the system operator point of view, ESD can reduce operating
costs and improve the operating flexibility of power systems because they are able
of providing non-spinning reserve to the utility system [84].
Whichever technology is considered, common characteristics can be defined for
the existing storage technologies [86]. In particular, the maximum amount of energy
that can be stored is denoted as the storage capacity. When charging, the ESD
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is converting the electrical energy into another form of energy, such as potential
energy, kinetic energy or chemical energy, which is storable. When discharging,
the stored energy is converted back to electrical energy. Each conversion implies
energy losses; the charging efficiency is defined as the ratio of stored energy over the
absorbed electrical energy and the discharging efficiency is defined as the ratio of
the delivered electrical energy over the consumed energy.
Different ESD technologies are suitable for different applications [86]. The stor-
age time, which is defined as the time to discharge the storage device starting from
full capacity, at nominal rate, is a way to classify the different technologies. A stor-
age time of less than one minute tends to be required for power quality improvement,
and transmission grid stability. Contribution to spinning reserve and frequency and
voltage regulation requires a storage time in the range of minutes, whereas load lev-
eling, peak shaving and imbalance management may require hours to days worth of
energy storage. A complete description of the existing ESD technologies is provided
in [87,88] and the benefits of the combination of ESD with wind power is discussed
in [89]. The present work will only consider technologies suitable for imbalance
management (i.e. storage time from hours to days). Examples are given below.
• Pumped-hydro storage has long been established as the primary type of energy
storage plant for electric utilities, and its operations and economics are well
understood. They offer storage time from hours to days with charging and
discharging rates which can be up to several thousands of MWh/h, depending
on location. Their response time is fast and their operating costs are relatively
low.
• Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) systems consist in compressing air in
geologic structures under the ground, such as coal mines or salt domes, and
releasing when necessary. A number of projects have been developed in the
USA and Europe for the purpose of energy management, where the aim is
to store energy during non-peak hours and release during peak hours. The
storage time varies between hours to days.
• Batteries are based on the conversion of electrical to chemical energy. Their
technical feasibility for electric utilities has been demonstrated. However, no
commercially viable solutions for large-scale battery storage has been demon-
strated to the market yet. Till now, batteries used to be operated on small-
scale systems, such as photovolta¨ıc systems. Using hydrogen obtained from an
electrolyzer to store energy is a promising way [90].
Beyond pumped-hydro storage, there has been very few commercially available
storage technologies that operate on today’s electricity grids [8]. This can be ex-
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plained by their high operating costs. An analysis of the cost per kWh of stored
electricity is proposed in [91]. In this study, the cost added to electricity stored and
discharged is evaluated for various battery technologies and compared with the cost
of conventional pumped-hydro storage. The cost relative to the different batter-
ies considered is between 3 to 12 times the pumped-hydro storage costs. However,
the different storage technology maturation is evolving rapidly. The development
of renewable generation and market liberalization itself acts as powerful incentives
to intensify R&D efforts in this field. For example, batteries which charging and
discharging power rate is in the order of a few MW have been recently installed
in some island systems which include a large share of renewable generation. The
transition to balance responsibility for IPP including RES units could lead to the
development of ESD solutions for reducing the imbalance penalties. Also, the full
pricing of emissions of conventional units providing energy in the balancing market
would improve the relative economics of storage as an alternative.
The combination of a wind farm with an ESD for reducing the imbalance costs
when participating in an electricity market has already been considered. In [90] a
method for scheduling and operating an energy storage system coupled with a wind
power plant under market conditions is proposed. In [92] an algorithm is proposed
for calculating the optimal short-term dispatch of an energy storage facility coupled
with a wind farm with the objective of minimizing the expected imbalance penalties
incurred by the wind farm owner. In [93,94] an optimization approach was proposed
for determining the most probable range of the output production of a wind farm
coupled with a hydro power plant containing a water pump system and a small
reservoir. The main motivation of such works was to use the hydro storage facility
for increasing the controllability of the wind farm and maximize profits. In [95]
some technological aspects of energy storage devices are discussed and the storage
is used to filter the erratic power output of a stochastic power source (e.g.: wind
power generator). In other words, the work developed in [95] aims at increasing the
controllability of the wind power source. The same idea is described in [83]. Finally,
in [66] two methods are proposed for minimizing the penalties due to imbalances of
the wind farm power output. The first one considers the wind farm to bid alone in
the day-ahead market trying to minimize the risk of the bid based on a statistical
analysis of the expected production probability. The second couples a hydro power
plant containing a water reservoir to the wind farm for minimizing the imbalance
costs incurred by the wind farm owner.
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Combination with a conventional generation unit
Another solution to reduce the sensitivity of the IPP including RES units towards
imbalance penalties is to combine the RES units with dispatchable conventional
generation units. When combined with RES units, dispatchable conventional units
can increase or decrease their output for reducing negative or positive imbalance,
respectively.
The case of distributed generation (DG) conventional units have been conside-
red by utilities as a solution for peak shaving [96, 97]. By definition, operating a
unit for peak shaving consists in running it for reducing the system peak demand,
which reduces the stress on the utility network and eases the loading of the utility
generators. Combining a conventional DG unit with a RES unit for reducing imbal-
ance is a similar problem to the peak shaving one: the unit is used by the IPP only
when negative imbalance occurs. The strategic combination of a conventional DG
unit with wind power for reducing balancing costs has already been studied in [98].
The considered units have to be flexible enough to be dispatched according to the
RES imbalance. If a dispatchable source is switched on to counterbalance RES
negative energy imbalance, the time period to get the unit fully operational, also
called start-up time, has to be low enough. Also, the imbalance penalty reduction
resulting from the combination depends on the costs associated to these conven-
tional units. More precisely, the marginal operation costs of these units have to be
lower than the avoided penalties. An overview of the main DG unit characteristics
is given in [96]. The compared DG units are diesel engines, natural gas engines, gas
turbines, microturbines, fuel cells and Stirling engines.
The two commonly used technologies are distributed generation units based on
gas turbines and diesel engines. Gas turbine generators are available in the size
range from 3 to 200 MW, and require about ten minutes to one hour to be brought
online. Diesel generators are generally much smaller than gas turbines, typically in
the size range from 0.05 to 5 MW, and can be connected in less than a minute [97].
Such a low starting time is of particular importance for the imbalance minimization
problem. Diesel engine technology has progressed in the past few years, and has
greatly improved with respect to efficiency and emission standards. A recent deve-
lopment is the option to fuel modern diesel gen-sets on biodiesel, a renewable and
sustainable alternative to fossil diesel.
Concept of a virtual power plant and state of the art of the related
research
Definition of the concept Combining RES with other DG units into a single
independent power producer is a method for reducing the imbalance penalties which
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potentially may improve the competitiveness of the RES units in electricity markets,
as described in the previous section. More generally, the limited size of DG units
makes their individual market participation difficult. For example, most individual
DG units have to use specific bilateral contracts with an energy trader, because their
rated power does not reach the threshold for the electricity pool participation. A
large-scale integration of DG units in electricity markets may thus encourage the
combination of DG units.
In such context, the concept of Virtual Power Plant (VPP) was introduced
by Awerbuch in 1997 [99]. The author uses the term Virtual Utility to describe
the concept. It is defined as “a framework to enhance the visibility and control
of distributed energy resources to system operators and other market actors by
providing an appropriate interface between these system components”. It consists
in a flexible collaboration of independent and market-driven entities which efficient
energy services in a more efficient way.
The concept of Virtual Power Plant (VPP) can be described as a generalization
of the aggregation of DG units. VPPs are described in [100] as the highest level of
aggregation of DG units:
• The reference level is the case without aggregation, where each local generation
plant output power is regulated through bilateral contracts;
• The first level is the simple aggregation of DG plants. Considering RES units,
this level corresponds to the combination described in section 2.3.2. Such
aggregation is a way to reduce the imbalance penalties and the intermittency
of the RES output power.
• The following level is the aggregation of different types of Distributed Energy
Resources (DER) units into VPP. The considered DER can be either genera-
tors or controllable loads connected to the network [15]. In this context, con-
trollable electrical loads, which are combined with generation units, improve
the controllability of the whole system; they are thus viewed as distributed
“energy resources”.
It is important to note that the term of Virtual Power Plant can be used in the
power system area with a different meaning. In particular, it is also used to denote
the access provided by predominant utilities of generation capacity to competitors.
For example, such access to competitors is a measure that was asked to EDF by the
European Union, which judged EDF to be anti-competitive in the French electricity
market. For further details, the interested reader may refer to [101]. Similarly, in
Belgium, antitrust authorities obliged the incumbent to sell financial Virtual Power
Plants, while in the Netherlands regulators have been discussing the use of physical
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Virtual Power Plants [102]. The sense given to the concept of VPP is different from
the one given by [99], which is the one adopted for the present work.
Integration of a virtual power plant in electricity markets From the def-
inition in the previous section, a VPP can be described as an IPP having a port-
folio which includes a number of Distributed Energy Resources (DER). DER can
be DG units and controllable load units. The DER aggregation into VPP takes
place through Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The significant
developments in ICT have led to new forms of DER control and electricity market
interfaces; advanced ICT architectures are now able to cope with the increasing
complexity of interaction required to facilitate decentralized system management
and VPP activity.
Two different aspects of the VPP are considered in [20]. The VPP can first be
used to facilitate DER trading in wholesale energy markets. This activity relative
to market participation is denoted as commercial VPP activity. The VPP can also
facilitate the technical integration of DER in power systems. This activity relative
to system management refers to the technical VPP.
• The general goal of a technical VPP is to manage DER for providing as much
ancillary and network management services as the conventional generators do.
Such services include various types of reserve, frequency and voltage regulation.
The technical VPP activity consists in internally dispatching power and energy
flows from the units included in the VPP, for providing these ancillary services
in an efficient way, and also for managing technical issues which can arise when
integrating DER in power systems. These issues include for example network
congestions and voltage variations.
• A commercial VPP is a representation of a portfolio of DER that can be used
to participate in energy markets as a single IPP, and which thus facilitates the
participation of DG units in the electricity markets. Characteristics from the
combined DER, such as generation schedules, generation limits or operating
costs, are aggregated into a single profile of characteristics. Commercial VPPs
reduce the imbalance risk associated to individual participation in the market
and benefits from diversity of resource and increased capacity achieved through
aggregation. In the framework associated to such VPP, the energy imbalance
has to be considered for the whole portfolio, and not for the individual units.
The energy imbalance of individual units can be internally compensated, which
reduces the imbalance management cost, and thus increases the revenue. Also,
within a commercial VPP, DER units can achieve economies of scale in market
participation and benefit from intelligence on market participation to maximize
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revenue opportunities. An illustration of the concept of commercial VPP is
given in Figure 2.6. In this scheme, the VPP includes several RES units, an
energy storage device and a conventional generation plant.
Electricity 
markets
Virtual 
power plant
Grid
Grid Grid
~~
storage
conventional
unit
WF-1WF-2
Figure 2.6: Description of a commercial VPP which includes RES
A commercial VPP can combine DER from any geographic location in the
system if the contracts do not consider any locational constraints. However,
for locational marginal pricing-based markets or for market where a zonal
approach is considered, the CVPP portfolio will be restricted to include only
DER from the same distribution network area or transmission network node.
The VPP concept fits in with the different solutions relative to the management
of the delivered energy, which have been described in section 2.3.2. The combination
of the RES units with either other RES units, storage units or conventional DG units
can be considered as three distinct VPP configurations.
However, many questions still remain open about the practical business opera-
tion of a VPP: the concept of unit aggregation to participate in a market is described
but there is still some uncertainty about contractual issues. The commercial and
regulatory framework is not clearly defined. Controllability and compulsory ser-
vices offered by VPP needs to be clarified. Most VPP projects are still research or
demonstration projects.
Research and demonstration projects about virtual power plants Several
research and development projects and demonstration projects about VPP have
been carried out in the last years.
The FENIX project is a R&D European collaborative project, partly funded
by the European Union within the 6th Framework Programme for Research [20,
103]2. The aim of this project is to design and demonstrate a technical architecture
2The acronym FENIX stands for Flexible Electricity Networks to Integrate the eXpected energy
evolution.
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and commercial framework which would enable DER based systems to be further
integrated in power systems. The FENIX approach is to fully integrate a large
number of different DER technologies, responsive loads and storage devices using
the concept of a large-scale Virtual Power Plant. A large-scale VPP has a resulting
flexibility and controllability similar to large conventional power plants.
The Imbalance Reduction System (IRS) is a project which was developed to
minimize the energy imbalance of a VPP [104]. The VPP portfolio considered con-
sists of two wind farms combined with DER which are industrial and residential
consumers and producers: Combined Heat and Power (CHP) for district heating,
residential heat pumps, industrial cold store, emergency generators. The two wind
farms operate on the day-ahead market using wind power prediction. Imbalance
energy between the delivered wind energy and the contracted energy are balanced
(when possible) by the DER. IRS uses the PowerMatcher concept, which is a co-
ordination system for supply and demand of electricity. It is a multi-agent system
which combines microeconomic principles [105]. The benefits in terms of reduction
of imbalance are presented in [104].
The Renewable Combi-Plant is a demonstration project carried out by the Ger-
man Renewable Energy Agency [106]. This VPP aggregates and controls the power
generation of distributed wind farms, photovolta¨ıc plants, biogas-fired CHP and a
pumped-hydro storage device in such a way that the output matches a specified load
at each time. The generation of the different plants is balanced with a typical energy
demand for Germany. The difference between the load and the generation mix of
wind farms and photovolta¨ıc plants is compensated by fast controllable biogas-fired
CHP plants and the pumped-hydro storage device. The wind farms are controlled
to avoid extreme gradients and generation peaks. The algorithms created for the
concept were verified and a prototype of this VPP is in operation since May 2007.
The scenarios, concepts, algorithms and the results of the pilot phase are described
in [107].
2.4 Conclusions
Physical and financial solutions are two approaches with a common goal: reducing
the imbalance penalty.
The physical solutions impact the real power system and the delivered energy by
the generation units. Each physical solution is related to a technical solution: the
control of the RES output is related to the technology of the RES unit; the RES
aggregation and the combination with storage or with a conventional unit consists
in including additional generation units in the generation portfolio. Also, the virtual
power plant concept offers this possibility to manage a portfolio of renewable units
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as a conventional unit. In the past, renewable generation used to benefit from
exceptions in order to facilitate its development. These exceptions are technical,
such as the exclusion of some requirements regarding grid codes, or economic such as
the establishment of feed-in tariff as a support mechanism. However, the large scale
integration of renewable generation forces the renewable generation to be treated as
conventional power plants [83].
Financial solutions leave the physical system unchanged. These solutions consist
in modifying the contractual position of the IPP. Instead of modifying the power unit
portfolio for providing services to integrate the renewable generation characteristics,
financial solutions consist in buying this service from other market participants
through electricity markets. The investment related to technical solutions is avoided.
A comparison between physical and financial solutions for the management of
imbalance is proposed in [108]. In this study, the solution consisting in combining
a wind farm with pumped-hydro storage is compared to the solution consisting in
using call options. The study demonstrated the similarities between the physical
and the financial solutions for the management of imbalance, from an IPP point of
view.
Following this classification of solutions in this chapter, the aim is then to define
a unified formulation of the imbalance penalty resulting from each of these solutions.
This is proposed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Development of a Generic Model for the Participation of
Renewable Generation in Electricity Markets
Chapter overview
This chapter proposes a formulation of the imbalance penalty model for a power
producer including renewable generation. The case of participation in an electricity
market as a balance responsible party is considered. The formulation of the imbal-
ance penalty is first given for the reference case of the participation in a day-ahead
market. The imbalance settlement is modeled as a penalization function. Then,
the financial and physical solutions for managing the imbalances, which have been
presented in the previous chapter, are modeled as a modification of the reference
penalization function in the sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. In particular, a generic
model of commercial virtual power plant is proposed for the physical solutions. The
proposed model relies on a generic formulation which is valid for both physical and
financial solutions, and which can be extended to a combination of these solutions.
The imbalance reduction relative to the use of each solution is assessed through a
case study using real-world data.
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3.1 Formulation of the imbalance penalty
3.1.1 Main hypotheses
Hypotheses about the Independent Power Producer
The Independent Power Producer (IPP) considered hereafter includes Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) generation units in its portfolio. More precisely, it is supposed
to include a main RES unit with stochastic output. This unit can be a wind farm
or a PV power plant. This is denoted as “reference unit”. Different generation units
can be combined with the reference unit; each combination results in a specific IPP
configuration.
In the thesis, “the reference unit” which will be used for the evaluation of the
proposed formulations and methods, is taken to be a wind farm. This can be justified
by the fact that wind power has been the fastest growing RES and, consequently,
specific attention is paid to the management of uncertainties related to the power
generation from this specific RES. However, it is important to note that the general
approach followed in this thesis is generic, and can thus be directly applied to other
renewable energy sources, such as PV.
The reference configuration is when the IPP is only composed of the main RES
unit. The IPP is in this case the wind farm or PV plant operator, which partici-
pates in the electricity market for trading its production. When the reference unit
is combined with other units, the resulting unit combination is considered as a com-
mercial Virtual Power Plant (VPP) as described in section 2.3.2. The IPP is then
the operator of such VPP. Three VPP configurations are considered, corresponding
to three proposed physical solutions for the management of imbalances in section
2.3.2. The first VPP configuration is the aggregation of RES units, the second is
the combination of the reference RES unit with an energy storage device, and the
third is the combination of the reference RES unit with a conventional dispatchable
unit.
Hypotheses about electricity markets
The participation of the IPP in the day-ahead market is taken as the reference
participation. In general, the electricity market is assumed to include an intraday
market and market derivative trading. The participation in the intraday market and
the trade of options are considered as two alternatives and correspond to the two
proposed financial solutions for the management of imbalances presented in section
2.3.1. The additional trading in the intraday market or the additional option trading
will be evaluated as a function of the reference case which is the participation only
in the day-ahead market.
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The management of the real-time operation of the power system is ensured by
the Transmission System Operator (TSO). Imbalances on the TSO’s control area are
counterbalanced through a real-time market. The imbalance settlement is assumed
to be based on a dual pricing mechanism, where a different price is applied to positive
imbalance volumes and negative imbalance volumes (as explained in section 2.2.5).
The IPP does not propose any bid for participating in the real-time market. How-
ever, the IPP is a Balance Responsible Party and is thus economically responsible
for the regulation measures taken by the TSO to counterbalance its imbalance.
3.1.2 Formulation of the participation in the day-ahead market
Formulation of the reference penalization function
The revenue of an IPP which participates in an electricity market can be formulated
as the sum of the incomes from the contracts on the day-ahead and intraday mar-
kets, and of the incomes from the real-time market; the contracts are established in
markets which take place prior to the delivery. Such market revenue decomposition
can be found in [62,67,68]. It is important to note that this revenue is related to the
participation in the electricity market, and does not include any other income such
as the ones that could be associated with the supply of ancillary services. Also, the
operating and maintenance costs, as well as the investment costs are not included
in the market revenue.
For a given market time unit Ti, the energy contract resulting from the day-
ahead market participation consists in an energy volume EDATi traded at a price Π
DA
Ti
.
Also, in the real-time market, the price for positive imbalance for the same time
unit Ti is Π
+
Ti
and the price for negative imbalance is Π−Ti . The imbalance volume
at the delivery is defined as the difference between the energy E˜Ti delivered during
the period Ti and the contracted energy E
C
Ti
. In the reference case, the contracted
energy is the energy contract volume in the day-ahead market ECTi = E
DA
Ti
. However,
such contracted energy more generally includes all the contracted volumes prior to
real-time delivery. Consequently, the revenue RDATi relative to the time period Ti
can be written as the sum of the income which results from the day-ahead trading
of the energy volume EDATi at the price Π
DA
Ti
and the income which results from the
imbalance volume (E˜Ti − E
C
Ti
) in the real-time market.
RDATi = E
DA
Ti ×Π
DA
Ti + (E˜Ti − E
C
Ti)×Π
+/−
Ti
(3.1)
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with Π
+/−
Ti
= Π−Ti ⇐ E˜Ti < E
C
Ti
(negative imbalance)
Π
+/−
Ti
= Π+Ti ⇐ E˜Ti ≥ E
C
Ti
(positive imbalance)
(3.2)
In order to simplify the mathematical expressions, the index which refers to the
considered time period Ti is omitted in the following equations. Also, the contracted
energy EC equals the day-ahead energy contract EDA in this case, and the revenue
RDA can be rewritten as:
RDA = EDA ×ΠDA + (E˜ − EDA)×Π+/− (3.3)
= E˜ ×ΠDA + (EDA − E˜)×ΠDA + (E˜ − EDA)×Π+/− (3.4)
= E˜ ×ΠDA︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
+(E˜ − EDA)× (Π+/− −ΠDA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
(3.5)
In the formulation given in Equation 3.5, the market revenue is formulated as
the sum of the income resulting from the delivered energy E˜ (part a) and a func-
tion of the imbalance volume (part b). In this second part of the formulation, the
imbalance volume is multiplied by the difference between the imbalance price and
the day-ahead price, also called spot price. The interest of this formulation is re-
lated to the design of the balancing market. In the so called dual-price imbalance
price settlement, a different price is applied to positive and negative imbalance
volumes, and the price for positive imbalance is lower than the spot price while the
price for negative imbalance is higher than the spot price, as explained in section
2.2.5. Consequently, for such balancing market design, when the imbalance volume
is positive, the difference between the imbalance price and the spot price is negative
((Π+ − ΠDA) ≤ 0), and, when imbalance volume is negative, the difference between
the imbalance price and the spot price is positive ((Π−−ΠDA) ≥ 0). Also the part b
of the formulation given in Equation 3.5 is always negative. From this analysis, the
market revenue can be formulated as:
RDA = E˜ ×ΠDA − δ
DA
(
E˜, EDA
)
(3.6)
where δ
DA
is a function of the delivered and contracted energy
(
E˜, EDA
)
which
is formulated as:
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δ
DA
(
E˜, EDA
)
=

(
E˜ − EDA
)
× (ΠDA −Π−)⇐ E˜ < EDA(
E˜ − EDA
)
× (ΠDA −Π+)⇐ E˜ ≥ EDA
=
∣∣∣E˜ − EDA∣∣∣×∆Π (3.7)
with
∆Π =
∆Π− = Π− −ΠDA ⇐ E˜ < EDA∆Π+ = ΠDA −Π+ ⇐ E˜ ≥ EDA with Π+ ≤ ΠDA ≤ Π− (3.8)
In this formulation, the price ∆Π is positive and, consequently, the function δ
DA
is positive. This can be interpreted as the penalization function of the real-time
imbalance relative the participation in the day-ahead market. This penalization is
coherent with balancing market design aiming at encouraging market participants to
minimize imbalance energy volumes. Also, in case of no imbalance, this penalization
function equals zero and the market revenue equals the contract income.
System down–
regulation:
System up–
regulation:
Π+<ΠDA Π+=ΠDAΠ- =ΠDA Π- >ΠDA
EEDA EEDA 
~~
δDA (E , EDA)δDA (E , EDA)
Figure 3.1: Examples of the penalization function δ
DA
in the case of a dual-price imbalance
price settlement.
A graphical example of the function δ
DA
is given in Figure 3.1 in the case of dual-
price imbalance price settlement. The values of the function δ
DA
are represented for
a constant contracted energy EDA and a variable delivered energy E˜. Consequently,
the represented function δ
DA
is a function of only one variable E˜. A distinction
is made between TSO up-regulation and down-regulation states: when the TSO is
down-regulating, only positive imbalance are penalized. These imbalances are said
to be “in the direction” as the TSO regulation state. Conversely, when the TSO is
up-regulating, the imbalances in the direction as the TSO regulation state, are the
negative ones and are thus penalized.
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Main properties of the penalization function
If the price for negative imbalance is higher than the spot price and the price for
negative imbalance lower than the spot price, the imbalance penalization function
δ
DA
can be written as:
δ
DA
(x, y) =
a× |x− y| ⇐ x < yb× |x− y| ⇐ x ≥ y (3.9)
with a, b ≥ 0.
The function δ
DA
: R2 → R is a real-valued function on R2 satisfying the following
properties:
• Non-negativity: for all (x, y) ∈ R2, δ
DA
(x, y) ≥ 0;
• Homogeneity: for all (x, y) ∈ R2, and all λ ≥ 0,
λ · δ
DA
(x, y) = δ
DA
(λ · (x, y)) = δ
DA
(λ · x, λ · y);
• Triangle inequality: for all (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ R2,
δ
DA
((x1, y1) + (x2, y2)) ≤ δ
DA
(x1, y1) + δ
DA
(x2, y2),
where (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x1 + x2, y1 + y2).
The first two properties are straightforwardly derived from Equation 3.9. The
triangle inequality property is demonstrated by considering all the different possible
values of x1, y1, x2 and y2. These properties characterize the function δ
DA
as an
asymmetric seminorm, as defined in [109]. If a > 0 and b > 0, the function δ
DA
has
the following additional property:
• Positive definiteness:
δ
DA
(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y.
When this additional property is verified, the function is a norm, while when it
is not verified, the function is a seminorm. The concept of asymmetric norms or
seminorms is a generalization of the concept of a norm.
In addition to being an asymmetric seminorm, the function δ
DA
has also the
following property, denoted as anti-symmetry:
• Anti-symmetry:
for all a ∈ R, δ
DA
(x+ a, y) = δ
DA
(x, y − a).
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3.2 Modeling the imbalance management based on fi-
nancial solutions
3.2.1 Formulation of the sequential participation in day-ahead and
intraday markets
This section proposes a formulation of the market revenue of an IPP who participates
sequentially in the day-ahead market and in the corresponding intraday market. In
this case, the market revenue is the sum of the incomes from the contracts established
in the day-ahead and intraday markets and the incomes from the real-time market.
The additional energy contract in the intraday market consists in an energy volume
EID traded at the price ΠID. Consequently, the energy contract volume is the sum
of the energy volumes from both the day-ahead and the intraday markets: EC =
EDA + EID. The revenue RDA
ID
is formulated as:
RDA
ID
= EDA ×ΠDA + EID ×ΠID + (E˜ − EC)×Π+/− (3.10)
The revenue can be reformulated as:
RDA
ID
= E˜ ×ΠDA + EID × (ΠID −ΠDA) + (EDA + EID − E˜)×ΠDA
+(E˜ − EC)×Π+/−
= E˜ ×ΠDA − EID × (ΠDA −ΠID)
−(E˜ − EC)×ΠDA + (E˜ − EC)×Π+/−
= E˜ ×ΠDA − EID × (ΠDA −ΠID)
−(E˜ − EDA − EID)× (ΠDA −Π+/−)
= E˜ ×ΠDA − EID × (ΠDA −ΠID)− δ
DA
(E˜, EDA + EID) (3.11)
Finally, the revenue from the combined participation in the day-ahead and in-
traday markets can be written in a similar formulation as Equation 3.6:
RDA
ID
= E˜ ×ΠDA − δ
DA
ID
(E˜, EDA) (3.12)
with
δ
DA
ID
(E˜, EDA) = EID × (ΠDA −ΠID) + δ
DA
(E˜, EDA + EID) (3.13)
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Figure 3.2: Imbalance penalization for the combined participation in the day-ahead and
intraday markets, in the case of a dual-price imbalance price settlement, when the TSO is
down-regulating.
From Equation 3.13, the additional participation in the intraday market can
be interpreted as a modification of the reference penalization function δ
DA
. The
modification of the penalization function is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The presented
example corresponds to a dual-price imbalance price settlement, where the TSO is
down-regulating. The functions δ
DA
(E˜, EDA) and δ
DA
ID
(E˜, EDA) are functions of the
delivered energy E˜. In the case of the participation only in the day-ahead market,
only positive imbalance volumes are penalized, as described with the function δ
DA
.
The modification of the penalization function comports two aspects: the first term
EID× (ΠDA−ΠID) is a constant cost added to the function δ
DA
and the second term
δ
DA
(E˜, EDA + EID) corresponds to a variable change of the δ
DA
function, which is
represented as a shift by EID. Reducing the imbalance penalty can be graphically
interpreted as getting the function δ
DA
ID
lower than δ
DA
. Such reduction is illustrated
in Equation 3.13 for a delivered energy E˜Ti at a given time Ti. The penalty δ
DA
Ti
obtained when participating only in the day-ahead market is reduced to δ
DA
ID,Ti with
the intraday participation. It is important to note that the sign of the constant
cost depends on the contracted volume and the price in the intraday market. In
Equation 3.13, the energy contract EID is taken positive, and the intraday market
price is taken lower than the day-ahead market price ΠDA < ΠID, which results to a
positive constant cost.
The figure 3.2 shows a reduction of imbalance for a delivered energy E˜Ti . How-
ever, the combined participation in the intraday market leads to an increase of the
imbalance penalty for negative values of delivered energy, where the red plot is higher
than the pink plot. More generally, Figure 3.3 presents the impact of the participa-
tion in intraday market on the reduction of imbalance as a function of the contracted
volume EID and the price ΠID in the intraday market. This figure aims at deter-
mining the (ΠID, EID) combinations which reduce the imbalance penalty resulting
from the day-ahead market participation. Note that these combinations (ΠID, EID)
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Figure 3.3: Imbalance penalty reduction resulting from the combined participation in the
day-ahead and intraday markets: δ
DA
− δ
DA
ID
.
result from the intraday bid, and are thus established prior to delivery, when the
IPP does not know if the system will be down or up regulating. The imbalance
reduction is measured through the difference between the imbalance penalty from
the day-ahead participation and the imbalance penalty obtained in the combined
participation in day-ahead and intraday markets: δ
DA
−δ
DA
ID
. The (ΠID, EID) combi-
nations corresponding to a positive reduction (δ
DA
ID
≤ δ
DA
) are represented in green.
Conversely, the combinations corresponding to a negative reduction (i.e. penalty
increase: δ
DA
ID
≥ δ
DA
) are represented in red. A distinction is made between up and
down regulation from the TSO, and also between positive and negative imbalance
between the delivered energy and the day-ahead contract E˜ − EDA. These distinc-
tions lead to four cases. In each case, the intraday contract volume is taken positive
when energy is sold in the market and negative when energy is bought from the
market.
As a first general comment, it can be observed that the participation in intraday
market can result to either a decrease or an increase of the imbalance penalties.
The volume EID and price ΠID combinations resulting in imbalance penalty increase
correspond to a decrease of revenue, and have to be avoided. The two main positive
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areas are:
• The case of positive imbalance in a down-regulation system state (top left).
In this case, the intraday market offers the possibility to sell energy when the
delivered energy is expected to be higher than the day-ahead energy contract;
• The case of negative imbalance in a up-regulation system state (down right).
In this case, the intraday market offers the possibility to buy energy when the
delivered energy is expected to be lower than the day-ahead energy contract.
3.2.2 Formulation of the trading of electricity market derivatives:
the case of options
As already mentioned in section 2.3.1, options are market derivatives which give the
owner the right to adjust its contractual position. They may be complex derivatives,
but they usually contain the following specifications [45]:
• Options can be call options when the option holder has the right to buy, or
put options when the option holder has the right to sell;
• Options are relative to a quantity of a given underlying. Here, the underlying
is electrical energy, and the quantity is denoted as EOp;
• The strike price ΠK , also denoted as the exercise price, is the price at which
the underlying transaction will occur upon exercise;
• The premium ΠP is the price paid by the holder of an option to get the option.
An option is said to be exercised when the holder uses his right to buy (sell) elec-
tricity in the case of call (put) option. Also, options have an expiration date, or
expiry, which is the last date the option can be exercised. If the option is exercised,
the traded volume EOp,∗ equals the underlying quantity EOp: EOp,∗ = EOp. If the
option is not exercised, the traded volume is zero: EOp,∗ = 0.
Call options can be used to manage negative imbalance: they can be exercised
when the delivered energy is lower than the contracted energy. The underlying
quantity EOp is taken positive when the IPP buys electricity in the option market.
Similarly, put options can be used to manage positive imbalance. The underlying
quantity EOp is then negative.
The benefits from option trading for an IPP are formulated here considering as
reference the day-ahead market participation. The revenue RDAOp from the combined
option trading and day-ahead trading can be formulated as:
RDAOp = E
DA ×ΠDA −ΠP + EOp,∗ ×ΠK + (E˜ − EC)×Π+/− (3.14)
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where the energy contract volume is the sum of the energy volumes from both
day-ahead trading and option trading: EC = EDA + EOp,∗. In a similar way as in
Equation 3.11, this revenue can be reformulated as:
RDAOp = E˜ ×Π
DA − δ
DA
Op(E˜, E
DA) (3.15)
with
δ
DA
Op(E˜, E
DA) = ΠP + EOp,∗ × (ΠDA −ΠK) + δ
DA
(E˜, EDA + EOp,∗) (3.16)
EE
DA EDA+EOp Eti
ΠP + EOp×(ΠDA – ΠK)
δDA
~
Op,ti
δDA
ti
δDA
Op,ti
ΠP
Option exercised:
EOp,* = EOp
Option not exercised :
EOp,* = 0
δDA (E , EDA)
δDA (E , EDA)
Figure 3.4: Imbalance penalty for the participation in the day-ahead market with a call
option.
From the last Equation 3.16, the option trading can be also interpreted as a
modification of the penalization function δ
DA
. The additional constant cost equals
ΠP + EOp,∗ × (ΠDA −ΠK) and the function δ
DA
is shifted by EOp,∗.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the modification of the penalization function resulting from
the trading of a call option in a down-regulating system, with a constant contracted
energy EDA. The strike price is taken inferior to the day-ahead price. Two cases
are presented, depending on if the option is exercised or not. In the example, the
delivered energy at a given time Ti is E˜Ti , which is higher than the contracted energy
in the day-ahead market EDA. The resulting imbalance is positive. When the option
is exercised, the resulting imbalance penalty δ
DA
Op,Ti is reduced. On the contrary, the
imbalance penalty is increased by the premium ΠP if the option is not exercised.
However, in the case of negative imbalance, the penalty is higher when the option is
activated compared to when the option is not activated. The premium is the price
to pay by the IPP for having the possibility to reduce its imbalance penalty just
before delivery.
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The imbalance reduction depends on the energy quantity EOp, the premium ΠP
and the strike price ΠK . The influence of these three parameters on the imbal-
ance penalty reduction could be represented similarly to Figure 3.3 for the intraday
market participation.
The proposed formulation of the option trading for reducing the imbalance penal-
ties is based on the assumption that these derivatives are available in the market.
However, today, the proposed options only refer to long-term contracts, and are con-
sequently not adapted to the short-term imbalance management problem. Conse-
quently, the solution relative to the option trading remain theoretical, which explains
why this solution is not further considered in the present thesis.
However, short-term options or similar products could rapidly appear in elec-
tricity markets as possible tools for the management of stochastic generation in
electricity markets. Also, the general concept of premium, which quantifies the ad-
ditional cost for having the right to activate a solution, can be extended to the
case of physical solutions for reducing the imbalance penalties. These similarities
between financial and physical solutions are further detailed in the next sections.
3.3 Modeling the imbalance management based on phys-
ical solutions
This section proposes a generic formulation of the solutions relative to the man-
agement of the delivered energy which reduce imbalance penalties for an IPP
operating RES units. These solutions are physical solutions, as opposed to the fi-
nancial solutions formulated in the previous section for the contracted energy. As
already detailed in section 2.3.2, they include the control of the RES generation, the
aggregation of RES units as well as the combination of RES units with an energy
storage device or with a dispatchable generation unit.
3.3.1 Formulation of the control of renewable generation
The control of renewable generation consists in the possibility to decrease or increase
the renewable generation and is a solution for reducing the imbalance penalties.
Generation control methods have been presented in section 2.3.2.
The formulation of the imbalance penalty when using the generation control
solution is given for the participation of reference RES unit with a contracted volume
EC and a delivered volume before control E˜. The delivered energy E˜ is considered
as the available output energy which can be obtained from the RES plant given the
meteorological conditions and technical constraints, for a given market time unit.
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Two cases are examined: the decrease and the increase of the renewable gen-
eration. In the case of generation decrease, also called down-regulation, the RES
generation is reduced from E˜ to E˜− E˜dw, where E˜dw is positive. Regarding the case
of generation increase, it has been explained in section 2.3.2 that such an increase is
possible only if the production has already been previously decreased. For example,
it is possible to increase the production from a wind farm either if at least one of the
turbines was shut down so that it can be switched on for increasing the production,
or if the generation output from some of the turbines was limited so that it can be
increased. The limited delivered energy is denoted as E˜l and is lower than the energy
delivered in the reference case E˜. Then, the generation increase consists in increas-
ing the generation to E˜l + E˜up, where E˜up is positive. Such increased generation
E˜l + E˜up is inferior to E˜, which gives:
0 ≤ E˜up ≤ (E˜ − E˜l) (3.17)
In other words, a generation increase of E˜up in case of limited energy E˜l is equivalent,
in terms of delivered energy, to a generation decrease E˜dw,eq given by:
E˜ − E˜dw,eq = E˜l + E˜up ⇔ E˜dw,eq = E˜ − (E˜l + E˜up) (3.18)
Consequently, the generation increase is taken as a particular case of down-regulation
for the following formulation.
The revenue from the market participation in the day-ahead market in case of
down-regulation can be written as:
RDAdw = (E˜ − E˜dw)×Π
DA − δ
DA
(E˜ − E˜dw, E
DA)
= E˜ ×ΠDA − E˜dw ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(E˜ − E˜dw, E
DA)
= E˜ ×ΠDA − δ
DA
dw(E˜, E
DA) (3.19)
with
δ
DA
dw(E˜, E
DA) = E˜dw ×Π
DA + δ
DA
(E˜ − E˜dw, E
DA) (3.20)
The RES generation control can thus be formulated as a modification of the
reference penalization function δ
DA
. When replacing the delivered energy E˜ by the
delivered energy using generation control (E˜−E˜dw) in Equation 3.7, the penalization
function δ
DA
dw can be rewritten as:
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δ
DA
dw (E˜, E
DA) = E˜dw ×Π
DA +
{
(E˜ − E˜dw − E
DA)× (ΠDA −Π−)⇐ (E˜ − E˜dw) < E
DA
(E˜ − E˜dw − E
DA)× (ΠDA −Π+)⇐ (E˜ − E˜dw) ≥ E
DA
=
{
(E˜ − EDA)× (ΠDA −Π−) + E˜dw ×Π
− ⇐ (E˜ − E˜dw) < E
DA
(E˜ − EDA)× (ΠDA −Π+) + E˜dw ×Π
+ ⇐ (E˜ − E˜dw) ≥ E
DA
= δ
DA
(E˜, EDA) +
{
E˜dw ×Π
− ⇐ (E˜ − E˜dw) < E
DA
E˜dw ×Π
+ ⇐ (E˜ − E˜dw) ≥ E
DA
(3.21)
The energy quantity E˜dw is taken positive in this formulation, and consequently,
the imbalance with generation control δ
DA
dw will be lower than the reference imbalance
δ
DA
only for negative prices of electricity in the real-time market. Negative values
of price for positive imbalance may occur, as already discussed in section 2.2.5, but
very seldom. Consequently, control of renewable generation in general increases the
imbalance penalties, which explains why this solution is not further considered in
the present thesis.
However, generation control reduces the imbalance energy volumes, which can
be a solution for other issues related to large scale integration of RES units in power
systems described in section 1.3.2.
3.3.2 Generic model of a Virtual Power Plant
The other three physical solutions, which are the aggregation of RES units and
the combination of RES units with an energy storage device or with a dispatchable
generation unit, are modeled in the frame of a Virtual Power Plant (VPP), defined
in section 2.3.2. The VPP is a framework for enhancing the visibility and control
of distributed energy resources to system operators and other market actors by
providing an appropriate interface between the involved system components. This
concept is thus well suited to physical solutions. More precisely, focus is given to
the Commercial activity of the VPP (CVPP). The CVPP is defined in section 2.3.2
as a representation of a portfolio of DER that can be used to participate in energy
markets as a single IPP.
In the present work, different configurations of a VPP are considered, with each
configuration corresponding to a specific physical solution. First, the reference con-
figuration of the VPP includes only one reference RES unit. This unit has a stochas-
tic output, and can be a wind farm or a PV plant for example. Then, three config-
urations are defined based on the combination of the reference RES unit (1) with
other RES units in the case of aggregation, (2) with an energy storage device and
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finally (3) with a dispatchable generation unit.
EEDA 
δDA
vpp vpp
~
Day-ahead market
Reference 
wind farm
1) aggregated 
wind farms 
2) energy
storage device
3) conventional 
generation unit
~
~
Virtual power plant (vpp)
Figure 3.5: The proposed VPP model: three VPP configurations for participating in the
day-ahead market.
In order to evaluate the benefits of each solution in terms of imbalance penalty
reduction, all the VPP configurations are assumed to participate only in a day-
ahead electricity. Figure 3.5 describes the three configurations of the VPP which
participate in the day-ahead electricity market. Thus, similarly to section 3.2, the
day-ahead market is taken here too as a reference. It is important to note that each
configuration considers only one combination, in order to evaluate the imbalance
reduction relative to each combination. Also, for each combination, a single-node
model is used and the different generation units are assumed to be in the same bus.
This model is also known as an HL1 (i.e.: Hierarchical Level 1) model [110] where
the power system is analyzed from the generation facilities viewpoint.
In the frame of the VPP, there is only one day-ahead contract volume EDA
VPP
for
all the units included in the VPP. The energy E˜VPP delivered is the sum of the
delivered energy by each generation unit. The aim of the next paragraphs is to
model the physical solutions corresponding to the three VPP configurations as a
modification of the reference penalization, as this has already been done for the
financial solutions. These three configurations correspond to:
• The aggregation of RES unit;
• The combination of a RES unit with an energy storage device;
• The combination of a RES unit with a conventional unit.
3.3.3 Formulation of the imbalance penalty resulting from aggre-
gation of RES units
The aggregation of RES units is the first VPP configuration considered in this thesis.
In this case, the VPP is composed in total of n RES units, including the reference
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RES unit. The energy E˜VPP delivered by the VPP is the sum of the energy E˜i which
would be individualy delivered by the RES units. Also, the VPP energy contract
EDA
VPP
of the aggregation is assumed to be the equal to the sum of the contracts EDAi
that the RES units would establish if they participated individually in the day-ahead
market.
E˜VPP =
n∑
i=1
E˜i, and E
DA
VPP
=
n∑
i=1
EDAi (3.22)
The following formulation demonstrates the reduction of imbalance penalties
when the aggregated RES units participate as a single VPP in the day-ahead market,
compared to the case where each RES unit participates individually. Then, this
comparison will be used to derive the reduction of imbalance relative to only one of
the RES unit (the reference one) which is included in the aggregation.
The revenue from the VPP is denoted as RDA
VPP
while the sum of the revenues
from individual units is denoted as RDAind.
RDA
VPP
= E˜VPP ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
) (3.23)
RDAind =
n∑
i=1
(
E˜i ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(E˜i, E
DA
i )
)
(3.24)
Consequently, the difference between the revenue from the aggregation and the
one obtained when each RES unit participates individually in the market is given
from Equation 3.23 and Equation 3.24 and from the definition of E˜VPP and E
DA
VPP
in
Equation 3.22.
RDA
VPP
−RDAind =
n∑
i=1
δ
DA
(E˜i, E
DA
i )− δ
DA
(E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
) (3.25)
=
n∑
i=1
(
δ
DA
(E˜i, E
DA
i )
)
− δ
DA
(
n∑
i=1
E˜i,
n∑
i=1
EDAi
)
(3.26)
Equation 3.26 shows that the revenue improvement in the case of aggregation is
the difference between the sum of the penalties related to each RES unit imbalance
and the penalty related to the sum of the imbalance. The sign of this difference
depends on the penalization function properties. In section 3.1.2, the penalization
δ
DA
has been characterized as an asymmetric seminorm. One of the properties of a
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asymmetric seminorm is the triangle inequality. Consequently, the quantity derived
in Equation 3.26 is always positive, which means that the imbalance penalty in the
case of aggregated units is always lower than the imbalance penalty relative to each
unit taken individually.
The aim of the formulation is to derive the reduction of imbalance penalty for
a given unit j when this unit is aggregated in the VPP. First, the part of the VPP
revenue which is relative to the generation of the unit j is denoted as RDAj,agg. Note
that this revenue could be more generally written as RDAj,VPP, but the VPP is in
this case an aggregation, which explains why the index V PP is changed to agg. In
the present formulation, the revenue from the aggregated units is allocated to the
different units with respect to their delivered energy volume:
RDAj,agg = αj ×R
DA
VPP
, with αj =
E˜j
E˜VPP
,
∑
αj = 1 (3.27)
Consequently, the revenue relative to the generation of the unit j is formulated
as:
RDAj,agg = αj ×
(
E˜VPP ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
)
)
= αj × E˜VPP ×ΠDA −αj × δ
DA
(E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
)
= E˜j ×Π
DA −αj × δ
DA
(E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
) (3.28)
In the considered VPP, only generation units are aggregated; consequently, the
delivered volume E˜j is positive for each unit j andαj is positive for all j. Considering
the homogeneity property of the function δ
DA
detailed in section 3.1.2, the second
term in Equation 3.28, which is relative to the imbalance penalty, can be written as
follows:
αj × δ
DA
(E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
) = δ
DA
(αj ×
(
E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
)
)
= δ
DA
(αj × E˜VPP, αj × EDAVPP)
= δ
DA
(E˜j , αj × EDAVPP) (3.29)
Finally, the revenue RDAref,agg from the participation of a reference unit aggregated
in a VPP is derived by combining Equation 3.28 and Equation 3.29, for the case of
the reference unit : (j : ref):
RDAref,agg = E˜ref ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref,αref × EDAVPP
)
(3.30)
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with αref = E˜ref/E˜VPP.
In comparison, the revenue from the individual participation of the reference
unit is denoted as RDAref and is formulated as follows:
RDAref = E˜ref ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
(3.31)
By comparing Equation 3.30 and Equation 3.31, the aggregation solution for a
reference RES unit is formulated as a modification of the contracted energy from EDAref
to αref ·EDAVPP. However, the aggregation of RES units has been presented in section
2.3.2 as a physical solution which gives the possibility to internally compensate the
delivered energy. Consequently, it is more logical to model the aggregation solution
as a modification of the delivered energy. From Equation 3.29, and by considering the
anti-symmetry property of the function δ
DA
explained in section 3.1.2, the imbalance
penalty relative to the reference unit can be reformulated as follows:
δ
DA
(
E˜ref,αref × EDAVPP
)
= δ
DA
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref + (αref · E
DA
VPP
− EDAref )
)
= δ
DA
(
E˜ref − (αref · EDAVPP − E
DA
ref ), E
DA
ref
)
= δ
DA
(E˜ref + (E
DA
ref −αref · E
DA
VPP
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
eagg,ref
, EDAref ) (3.32)
This energy eagg,ref, which can be positive or negative, quantifies the energy
compensation volume relative to the reference unit. Also, the volume (E˜ref+eagg,ref)
is the equivalent production of the reference unit when this unit is aggregated.
It is important to note that this equivalent generation is not the real generation,
which still equals E˜ref. The equivalent generation models the repartition of the
imbalance reduction between the several wind farms included in the aggregation. It
is important to note that this proposed repartition model based on the delivered
energy by each unit is one possibility for modeling the equivalent generation. Other
possibilities, such as the distribution the VPP revenue based on the nominal power
of each unit, are possible, but they are not considered in this work.
The proposed repartition model is illustrated in the following example where
two wind farms, WF1 and WF2, are aggregated. The aggregated wind farms are
denoted as (WF1 + WF2). For each of the wind farms taken individually and for
the aggregation, Table 3.1 presents an example of the contracted energy EDA, the
delivered energy E˜, the resulting imbalance volume d and the imbalance penalty δ.
In the example, only negative imbalances are penalized, and the penalty price for
negative price is set to 2 e/MWh.
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EDA (MWh) E˜ (MWh) d (MWh) δ (e)
WF1 14 10 -4 8
WF2 8 10 2 0
(WF1 + WF2) 22 20 -2 4
Table 3.1: Example of the aggregation of two wind farms WF1 and WF2 and resulting
imbalance penalties.
In the example given in Table 3.1, the sum of the imbalance penalties relative
to WF1 and WF2 equals 8 e. In the case of aggregation, the resulting imbalance
penalty is reduced to 4 e, since the surplus production from WF2 compensates the
shortage from WF1.
EDA (MWh) α eagg (MWh) E˜ + eagg (MWh) d (MWh) δ (e)
WF1agg 14 0.5 3 13 1 2
WF2agg 8 0.5 -3 7 1 2
Table 3.2: Example of the repartition of the imbalance volume and imbalance penalty bet-
ween the two aggregated wind farms, derived from the previous formulation.
Then, Table 3.2 shows the parameter α, defined in Equation 3.27, and the bal-
ancing volume eagg for each of the two aggregated wind farms WF1agg and WF1agg.
The resulting imbalance volume d and imbalance penalty δ are also presented. In
this case, both wind farms produce the same amount of energy and, consequently,
the α ratio which models the revenue repartition equals 0.5 for both wind farms. It
is interesting to note that the same ratio models the repartition of the imbalance
penalty. In this example, the 4 e penalty is distributed equally between the two
wind farms. This is actually a more general result. If we consider a given unit j,
this unit is responsible for the proportion αj of the VPP imbalance:
E˜j + eagg,j − E
DA
j = αj ×
(
E˜VPP − E
DA
VPP
)
(3.33)
Also, it has to be noted that, although the total imbalance penalty is always
lower in the case of aggregation compared to the case of individual participation,
the imbalance penalty for a given unit is not always reduced. In the example,
the imbalance penalty for the WF2 is increased from 0 to 2 e. Further numerical
examples of the reduction of imbalance penalties in the case of aggregation are given
in section 3.5.
Finally, by combining Equation 3.30 and Equation 3.32, the revenue RDAref,agg from
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the participation of a reference unit aggregated in a VPP is formulated as follows:
RDAref,agg = E˜ref ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref + eagg,ref, E
DA
ref
)
(3.34)
By comparing Equation 3.31 and Equation 3.34, the aggregation solution can be
modeled as a modification of the penalization function δ
DA
; the resulting penaliza-
tion function is δ
DA
agg.
δ
DA
agg
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= δ
DA
(
E˜ref + eagg,ref, E
DA
ref
)
(3.35)
3.3.4 Formulation of the imbalance penalty resulting from the com-
bination of renewable generation with energy storage
This section formulates the imbalance penalty function related to the second VPP
configuration considered here. In this case, the reference RES unit is combined with
an Energy Storage Device (ESD).
For modeling the combination of the ESD with the renewable units, the following
assumptions are made:
• The energy delivered by the ESD is denoted as E˜st. This variable is taken
positive when energy is delivered by the ESD (i.e. discharging), and negative
when energy is delivered by the ESD (i.e. charging);
• The storage capacity Capst is the maximum amount of energy that can be
stored in the device. The state-of-charge SOC is defined as the proportion
of energy charged in the device to the maximum storage capacity. At any
time of the operation the SOC is bounded by its minimum and maximum
levels, respectively SOCmin and SOCmax. These two levels correspond to the
minimum and maximum amount and energy which can be stored in the storage
device.
• The charging and discharging efficiencies are denoted as ηch and ηdis, respec-
tively. The round trip efficiency is denoted as η and defined as η = ηch × ηdis;
• The energy delivered or absorbed by the ESD is bounded by the storage nomi-
nal charging and discharging rates, respectively rnomch and r
nom
dis . Because E˜st is
positive when discharging and negative when charging, rnomch ≤ 0 and r
nom
dis ≥ 0.
The ESD technologies considered for the present work have to be suitable for
imbalance management. This means that the storage time constant, defined in
section 2.3.2 as the time to completely discharge at nominal rate the storage device
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starting from full capacity, is taken in the range of several hours. Also, the storage
nominal discharging rate is taken as non negligible compared to the nominal power
of the RES unit. A storage nominal discharging rate ranging approximately from
5 to 50% of the RES nominal power is reasonable for the management of energy
imbalances. The storage time, which is defined as the time to discharge the storage
device starting from full capacity, at nominal rate, has to be in the order of several
hours. For example, for wind farms with nominal power in the order of several tens
of MW, the combined storage unit will have a nominal discharging rate in the order
of several MWh/h and a storage capacity in the order of several tens of MWh. Such
storage units can be pumped-storage hydro or compressed air units, as described in
section 2.3.2. Further considerations about the choice of the storage technology are
out of the scope of the present work.
In the present work, the fixed costs of the storage unit, such as the investment
costs, are not taken into account in the formulation of the revenue from the partici-
pation of the combined RES and storage units in electricity market. This is coherent
with the reference formulation of the revenue from the reference RES unit in Equa-
tion 3.1 which does not consider the fixed costs relative to the reference unit. Also,
the operation of the storage unit is not based on the use of fuel, and the operation
costs are thus relatively low compared to the operation costs of a fuel-based con-
ventional generation. Consequently, the operation costs of the storage unit are not
considered in the proposed formulation. A possibility to consider these costs in the
formulation is to integrate them through a reduction of the charging and discharging
efficiencies, which increases the energy losses relative to the storage device.
When the reference RES unit, which delivers the energy quantity E˜ref, is com-
bined with an energy storage device which delivers the energy quantity E˜st, the VPP
composed of the combined RES and storage units is considered as a unique entity
delivering the quantity (E˜ref+ E˜st). Also, the storage unit is considered in this work
to be entirely devoted to the reduction of imbalance penalties, and as a consequence,
the storage device is not considered for the day-ahead trading. In other words, the
day-ahead energy contract for the VPP equals the one relative to the reference unit.
Then, the delivered energy E˜VPP by the VPP and the day-ahead energy contract
EDA
VPP
are written as:
E˜VPP = E˜ref + E˜st, and E
DA
VPP
= EDAref (3.36)
The VPP revenue RDA
VPP
is formulated from the generic formulation of the day-
ahead revenue in Equation 3.6, where the delivered energy is E˜VPP and the contracted
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energy is EDA
VPP
:
RDA
VPP
= E˜VPP ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
)
(3.37)
Such revenue can be reformulated as:
RDA
VPP
= (E˜ref + E˜st)×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref + E˜st, E
DA
ref
)
= E˜ref ×Π
DA + E˜st ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref + E˜st, E
DA
ref
)
(3.38)
= E˜ref ×Π
DA − δ
DA
st
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
(3.39)
with
δ
DA
st
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= −E˜st ×Π
DA + δ
DA
(
E˜ref + E˜st, E
DA
ref
)
(3.40)
From Equation 3.40, the influence of the combination of a storage unit with
a reference RES unit can be modeled as a modification of the reference penaliza-
tion function δ
DA
. The second term of Equation 3.40 corresponds to a shift of the
δ
DA
by the quantity E˜st which can be positive or negative. The additional cost is
C = − E˜st × Π
DA. Based on a positive day-ahead market price ΠDA, the cost
C is positive when the storage energy E˜st is negative (i.e. charging), and the cost
is negative for negative values of storage energy (i.e. discharging). This cost has a
cyclic value and depends on the storage unit operation cycles.
In order to assess the real cost relative to the operation of the storage unit,
regardless of the charging cycles, the proposed model consists in considering the
total storage cost Ctot over a large period τ including several storage cycles.
Ctot =
n∑
i=1
(−E˜st,Ti ×Π
DA
Ti ) (3.41)
where n is the number of market time units included in the considered operation
period τ .
Such total cost Ctot is then distributed for each market time unit Ti, based on
the use of the energy storage during the market time unit Ti. Such storage unit use
relative to the market time unit Ti is quantified by the absolute value of the storage
output energy |E˜st,Ti |. The resulting storage cost Ci relative to the market time unit
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Ti is derived as follows:
Ci =
|E˜st,Ti |∑n
i=1 |E˜st,Ti |
/× Ctot = |E˜st,Ti | ×Π
DA
Ti × Γst (3.42)
where Γst is a dimensionless quantity defined by:
Γst =
Ctot∑n
i=1 |E˜st,Ti | ×Π
DA
Ti
=
∑n
i=1 (−E˜st,Ti ×Π
DA
Ti
)∑n
i=1 |E˜st,Ti | ×Π
DA
Ti
(3.43)
In order to better understand the structure of the cost Ctot, this cost is calculated
for a cycle period including a charging phase during the market time unit Tch and
a discharging phase during the market time unit Tdis. The cost Ctot is then defined
as follows:
Ctot = −E˜st,Tch ×Π
DA
Tch
− E˜st,Tdis ×Π
DA
Tdis
(3.44)
= −(E˜st,Tch + E˜st,Tdis)×Π
DA
Tch
− E˜st,Tdis × (Π
DA
Tdis
−ΠDATch) (3.45)
The energy delivered by the storage E˜st,Tdis when discharging is the result from
the conversion of the energy which is stored when charging E˜st,Tch . The energy losses
during charge and discharge result to:
E˜st,Tdis = −η · E˜st,Tch (3.46)
Consequently, the total cost can finally be written as:
Ctot = −(1− η)× E˜st,Tch ×Π
DA
Tch
+ E˜st,Tdis × (Π
DA
Tch
−ΠDATdis) (3.47)
Equation 3.47 is a sum of two terms. The first term is positive because E˜st,Tch is
negative, and the round-trip efficiency η is lower than 1. This term corresponds to
the penalty due to energy losses. The second term is a function of the difference of
day-ahead market price between the charging and discharging phases. This term is
positive if the day-ahead market price is higher when charging than when discharg-
ing. This term formulates the benefits from using the storage unit to store energy
when the market price is low in order to sell it when the market price is high.
When the day-ahead market price during the charging phase equals the one
during the discharging phase ΠDATdis = Π
DA
Tch
= ΠDA, the cost Ctot is simplified to the
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following expression:
Ctot = −(1− η)× E˜st,Tch ×Π
DA =
(1− η)
η
× E˜st,Tdis ×Π
DA (3.48)
The cost relative to the charging period is then derived from combining Equa-
tion 3.42 with Equation 3.48 and Equation 3.46:
Cch = −
|E˜st,Tch |
|E˜st,Tch |+ |E˜st,Tdis |
× (1− η)× E˜st,Tch ×Π
DA (3.49)
=
1− η
1 + η
×ΠDA × |E˜st,Tch | (3.50)
Similarly, the cost relative to the charging period is derived from combining Equa-
tion 3.42 with Equation 3.48 and Equation 3.46:
Cdis =
|E˜st,Tdis |
|E˜st,Tch |+ |E˜st,Tdis |
×
(1− η)
η
× E˜st,Tdis ×Π
DA (3.51)
=
1− η
1 + η
×ΠDA × |E˜st,Tdis | (3.52)
When considering Equation 3.50 and Equation 3.52, the formulations of the cost are
identical for the charging or discharging state of the storage. For both cases, the
quantity Γst defined in Equation 3.42 can be written as:
Γst =
1− η
1 + η
(3.53)
and the imbalance penalty resulting from the storage combination can be written
as:
δ
DA
st
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= Γst ×Π
DA × |E˜st|+ δ
DA
(
E˜ref + E˜st, E
DA
ref
)
(3.54)
The final discussion is related to the comparison between the imbalance penalty
resulting from the storage combination δ
DA
st and the reference imbalance penalty
δ
DA
. For analyzing the difference between these two quantities, the example of
a negative imbalance energy from the reference RES unit is taken, with an up-
regulation state regarding the TSO. The delivered energy by the storage E˜st is
taken as positive in this example. This energy storage reduces the absolute value of
the reference imbalance energy. The resulting imbalance energy when considering
the storage combination is considered to be still negative or zero. In this situation,
the reference imbalance penalty δ
DA
and the imbalance penalty in the case of the
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storage combination δ
DA
st are formulated from Equation 3.7 as:
δ
DA
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= −(E˜ref − E
DA
ref )×∆
Π
− (3.55)
δ
DA
st
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= Γst ×Π
DA × E˜st −
(
E˜ref + E˜st − E
DA
ref
)
×∆Π− (3.56)
The difference between the imbalance penalty resulting from the storage combi-
nation and the reference imbalance penalty is given by :
δ
DA
st (E˜ref, E
DA
ref )− δ
DA
(E˜ref, E
DA
ref ) =
(
Γst ×Π
DA −∆Π−
)
× E˜st (3.57)
Because E˜st is positive, the sign of this difference depends on the difference between
Γst×Π
DA and ∆Π−. More precisely, this difference will be negative (i.e. the imbalance
penalty will be reduced) if:
Γst ×Π
DA ≤ ∆Π− (3.58)
In order to compare Γst × Π
DA and ∆Π−, the formulation of Γst is simplified. Γst
is written as a function of u = (1 − η). The efficiency η is considered to be close
to 1, and consequently, u is closed to 0. The simplification of Γst then consists in
neglecting the orders of u greater than 1:
Γst(u) =
u
2− u
=
u
2
×
1
1− u/2
(3.59)
≈
u
2
× (1 +
u
2
) ≈
u
2
(3.60)
which gives Γst ≈ (1−η)/2. Finally, from the previous assumptions, the combination
with the storage device will reduce the imbalance penalty only if:
1− η
2
×ΠDA ≤ ∆Π− (3.61)
η ≥ 1− 2 ·
∆Π−
ΠDA
(3.62)
A similar analysis can be done in the case of positive imbalance in down-regulation
TSO state. Consequently, the condition on the storage efficiency can generally be
written as:
η ≥ 1− 2 ·
∆Π
ΠDA
(3.63)
This condition states that the combination of the RES unit with the storage de-
vice will reduce the imbalance penalties only if the price for positive (respectively
negative) imbalance is low (respectively high) compared to the day-ahead price.
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3.3.5 Formulation of the imbalance penalty resulting from the com-
bination of renewable with conventional generation
This section formulates the imbalance penalty related to the third VPP configura-
tion, where the reference RES unit is combined with a conventional dispatchable
unit. In order to formulate the impact of the combination for the reference RES
unit, the market revenue obtained when the units are combined is compared to the
market revenue which would be obtained without combination. It is important to
note that, in this case, the operation of the conventional unit is not entirely devoted
to the reduction of imbalance penalty from the reference unit, as opposed to the
storage device in the previous section. The part of the conventional unit devoted
to the reduction of imbalance is an adjustment delivered energy, which is possible
given the dispatchability of the unit.
If the RES and conventional units are considered as participating individually
in the day-ahead market, the revenue from the market participation of the reference
unit is denoted as RDAref,ind, and the one relative to the conventional unit as R
DA
cv,ind.
The participation of the conventional unit is supposed to be based on its variable
costs. The market price ΠDA is thus the cost per unit of the contracted generation
EDAcv . Since the unit is dispatchable, the delivered energy E˜cv is assumed to be equal
to the contracted energy EDAcv and the imbalance penalty is zero. In particular,
the possible limits regarding the availability and the reliability of the unit are not
considered.
RDAref,ind = E˜ref ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
RDAcv,ind = E
DA
cv ×Π
DA (3.64)
Also, when the RES and conventional units are combined in a VPP, the dis-
patchable generation may be adjusted to reduce the imbalance volume of the VPP.
The adjustment energy volume delivered by the conventional unit is ecv, and the
total energy delivered by the conventional unit is then (E˜cv + ecv). The marginal
operation cost of the conventional unit for the adjustment volume ecv is denoted as
Πcv. This quantity represents the operation costs for the generation of the energy
volume ecv, and its dimension is a cost per unit of energy, which is similar to a price.
This is why the notation Π is used.
The following equations first formulate the market revenue of the VPP, and then
distribute such revenue between the RES unit and the conventional unit. Even if
the methodology followed for deriving these equations is similar to the one proposed
in the previous sections, the derivation of the equations is detailed for clarity and
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precision. Considering the market participation of the VPP as a single entity, the
delivered and contracted energy is the sum of the energy delivered and contracted
by RES and conventional units :
E˜VPP = E˜ref + E˜cv + ecv (3.65)
EDA
VPP
= EDAref + E
DA
cv (3.66)
Consequently, the revenue relative to the participation of the VPP in the day-
ahead market is written as:
RDA
VPP
= E˜VPP ×Π
DA − δ
DA
(
E˜VPP, E
DA
VPP
)
(3.67)
=
(
E˜ref + E˜cv + ecv
)
×ΠDA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref + E˜
DA
cv + ecv, E
DA
ref + E
DA
cv
)
Regarding the conventional unit, the day-ahead energy contract equals the delivered
energy EDAcv = E˜cv, and the imbalance penalization in Equation 3.67 can be simplified
by using the anti-symmetry property of the δ
DA
function explained in section 3.1.2:
δ
DA
(
E˜ref + E˜
DA
cv + ecv, E
DA
ref + E
DA
cv
)
= δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref + E
DA
cv − E˜
DA
cv
)
= δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref
)
(3.68)
and consequently, the market revenue formulation is simplified as:
RDA
VPP
=
(
E˜ref + E˜cv + ecv
)
×ΠDA − δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref
)
(3.69)
Then, the aim is to model the repartition of the VPP revenue between the
reference and the conventional units. For this, the VPP revenue RDA
VPP
is reformulated
as follows:
RDA
VPP
= A+B (3.70)
with
A = E˜cv ×Π
DA + ecv ×Πcv (3.71)
B = E˜ref ×Π
DA + ecv × (Π
DA −Πcv)− δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref
)
The quantity A corresponds to the costs of the conventional unit associated with
the delivered energy E˜cv + ecv. This quantity can thus be considered as the equiv-
alent conventional unit revenue A = RDAcv,V PP . The second quantity B is then the
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equivalent reference unit revenue, which is rewritten as:
RDAref,VPP = E˜ref ×Π
DA + ecv × (Π
DA −Πcv)− δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref
)
= E˜ref ×Π
DA − δ
DA
cv
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
(3.72)
with
δ
DA
cv
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= ecv × (Πcv −Π
DA)− δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref
)
(3.73)
From Equation 3.73, the combination of a conventional dispatchable unit with a
reference RES unit can be modeled as a modification of the reference penalization
function δ
DA
. The additional cost ecv × (Πcv −Π
DA) depends on the energy volume
adjustment and on the difference between the marginal cost of the conventional unit
and the day-ahead market price. The second term of Equation 3.73 corresponds to
a shift of the δ
DA
by the quantity ecv which can be either positive or negative.
The quantity ecv is bounded by the technical limits of the unit. The operation
of most conventional units can be represented by two states, depending if the unit
is switched on or off. As a result, the operating constraints of the unit can be
formulated as follows:E˜cv = 0 and ecv = 0⇐ State: OFFEcv,min ≤ E˜cv + ecv ≤ Ecv,max ⇐ State: ON (3.74)
where Ecv,min and Ecv,max are the minimum and maximum energy output of the
conventional unit during a market time step. These limits correspond to the mini-
mum and maximum capacity the unit is authorized to operate (i.e. in order to be
in economically or technically acceptable limits). For example, some units can be
either switched off or operated between 50 % and 100 % of their nominal power.
The above formulation is valid for the combination of a RES unit with a large
conventional unit which can decrease or increase its production to reduce positive
or negative imbalances. In this case, the conventional unit is not entirely devoted
to the reduction of imbalance penalties. This unit participates in the day-ahead
market and the resulting day-ahead energy contract is EDAcv > 0. The adjustment
energy volume ecv can take positive or negative values.
The formulation is also valid for the combination of a RES unit with an conven-
tional unit which would be switched on only to reduce negative imbalances. In this
case, EDAcv = 0, and the total output of the conventional output is devoted to the
reduction of imbalance penalties. This corresponds to E˜cv = 0 and ecv = E˜cv in the
previous formulation. In the proposed model, the starting costs of the conventional
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unit are supposed to be integrated in the marginal costs and are not considered as
separate costs. If the starting costs were separated, the formulation should consider
a whole running cycle of the conventional unit from the time it is started to the
time it is switched off. Such formulation is not considered in the present work. An
alternative for taking into account these starting costs can be the settlement of a
minimum period duration during which the unit has to remain switched on. Such
minimum period is then taken as a constraint for the scheduling of the conventional
unit.
A final discussion is related to the comparison between the imbalance penalty
δ
DA
cv resulting from the combination with the conventional unit and the reference
imbalance penalty δ
DA
. This analysis is similar to the one proposed for the imbal-
ance penalty reduction resulting from the storage combination. For analyzing the
difference between δ
DA
cv and δ
DA
, the example of a negative imbalance energy from
the reference RES unit is taken, with an up-regulation state regarding the TSO. The
adjustment energy volume ecv is taken positive in this example, which reduces the
absolute value of the reference imbalance energy. The energy imbalance when con-
sidering the conventional unit combination is considered to be still negative or zero.
In this situation, the reference imbalance penalty δ
DA
and the imbalance penalty in
the case of the conventional unit combination δ
DA
cv are formulated from Equation 3.7
as:
δ
DA
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= −(E˜ref − E
DA
ref )×∆
Π
− (3.75)
δ
DA
cv
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= ecv × (Πcv −Π
DA)−
(
E˜ref + ecv − E
DA
ref
)
×∆Π− (3.76)
where ∆Π− is the difference between the price for negative imbalance and the day-
ahead price: ∆Π− = Π
− −ΠDA.
The difference between the imbalance penalty resulting from the conventional
unit combination and the reference imbalance penalty is given by :
δ
DA
cv (E˜ref, E
DA
ref )− δ
DA
(E˜ref, E
DA
ref ) = ecv × (Πcv −Π
−) (3.77)
In this case where ecv is taken positive, this difference will be negative if the marginal
cost of the conventional unit is lower than the price for negative imbalance. In other
words, in this situation, the combination with the conventional unit will reduce the
imbalance penalty only if (Πcv < Π
−). Similarly, in the case of a down regulation
TSO state and a negative energy adjustment volume ecv, the combination with the
conventional unit will reduce the imbalance penalty only if (Πcv > Π
+).
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3.3.6 Similarities between the formulations of the different physical
solutions for managing the imbalance penalties
In the previous sections, four different physical solutions for reducing the imbal-
ance penalty of a generation portfolio including RES, have been described. These
solutions are:
• the control of the RES generation;
• the aggregation of RES units;
• the combination of a RES unit with a storage device;
• the combination of a RES unit with a conventional dispatchable unit.
They have been modeled as a modification of the reference penalization function δ
DA
.
In all cases, this modification can be expressed by the following generic relation:
δ
DA
Sy
(
E˜, EDA
)
= Y + δ
DA
(
E˜ + y,EDA
)
(3.78)
where Sy indicates the considered physical solution. Y is the additional cost and
y is the energy volume associated with the physical solution. The energy volume
corresponds to the internal balancing volume. To summarize:

y = −E˜dw and Y = E˜dw ×Π
DA ⇐ generation control
y = eagg and Y = 0⇐ RES aggregation
y = E˜st and Y = |E˜st| ×Π
DA × Γst ⇐ combination with a storage unit
y = ecv and Y = ecv × (Π
DA −Πcv)⇐ combination with a conventional unit
(3.79)
Figure 3.6: Imbalance penalization when a physical solution is used.
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Further details about Equation 3.79 can be obtained by considering Equation 3.20,
Equation 3.35, Equation 3.40 and Equation 3.73. The modification of the penaliza-
tion function derived in Equation 3.78 is illustrated in Figure 3.6. In the given
example, the system is down regulating and only positive imbalance are penalized.
In this case, only negative internal balancing volumes y can reduce the imbalance
penalty.
3.4 Generalization of the imbalance penalty model to
the combination of solutions for the management of
imbalance penalties
In section 3.1.2, the penalization of the imbalance related to the participation of
a RES unit has been formulated by the function δ
DA
(
E˜, EDA
)
, where E˜ is the
delivered energy and EDA the energy contracted in the day-ahead market. This
imbalance penalty is taken as a reference for modeling the reduction of imbalance
penalty which results from the use of financial or physical solutions.
In section 3.2, the financial solutions for the management of imbalance have been
modeled as a modification of the reference penalization function δ
DA
. If Sx is a given
financial solution, which can be either the participation in the intraday market or
the use of option in trading, the imbalance penalty reduction related to the use of
Sx can be written as:
δ
DA
Sx
(
E˜, EDA
)
= X + δ
DA
(
E˜, EDA + x
)
(3.80)
where X and x are the additional cost and energy contract volume relative to the
financial solution Sx, which are given in Equation 3.13 and Equation 3.16 for the
participation in the intraday market and the option trading, respectively.
It is interesting to note that the reference penalty function relative to the partic-
ipation in the day-ahead market can be considered as a particular case of financial
decision, where the day-ahead energy contract is zero EDA = 0, the additional cost
is zero X = 0 and the energy contract volume equals the day-ahead contract energy
x = EDA. In this case, the financial solution is denoted as Sx : DA:
δ
DA
(
E˜, EDA
)
= δ
DA
DA
(
E˜, 0
)
= 0 + δ
DA
(
E˜, 0 + EDA
)
(3.81)
Similarly, the physical solutions modify the penalization function as already sum-
marized in section 3.3.6. For a given physical solution Sy, the imbalance penalty
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function can be written as:
δ
DA
Sy
(
E˜, EDA
)
= Y + δ
DA
(
E˜ + y,EDA
)
(3.82)
where Y and y are respectively the additional cost and the energy volume associated
with the physical solution Sy.
Consequently, both financial and physical solutions can be modeled as a func-
tion composition of the reference penalty function δ
DA
made of two steps: either a
translation of the contracted volume by x followed by the addition of the constant
X (i.e. financial solutions), or a translation of the delivered volume by y followed
by the addition of the constant Y (i.e. physical solutions).
From the anti-symmetry property of the function δ
DA
explained in 3.1.2, Equa-
tion 3.82 can be rewritten as:
δ
DA
Sy
(
E˜, EDA
)
= Y + δ
DA
(
E˜, EDA − y
)
(3.83)
Equation 3.83 demonstrates that a physical solution Sy with an energy volume y and
a fixed cost Y is equivalent to a financial solution with an energy volume −y and
a fixed cost Y . More generally, the financial and physical have a similar impact on
the reference imbalance penalty: they offer the possibility to reduce the imbalance
volume by x or −y with a fixed cost X or Y respectively.
Finally, all the solutions have been modeled by considering the use of only one
solution associated with the reference case. If we consider the use of two solutions
S = {Sx, Sy}, the resulting imbalance penalty is modeled by a composition of the
reference function relative to the solution Sx followed by a composition relative to the
solution Sy. The resulting function for the two solutions S consists in a translation
of the contracted volume by x followed by an addition by X, and a translation of the
delivered volume by y followed by an addition by Y . Finally, the resulting function
δ
DA
S for the two solutions Sx, Sy is formulated as:
δ
DA
Sx,Sy
(
E˜, EDA
)
= X + Y + δ
DA
(
E˜ + y,EDA + x
)
(3.84)
Consequently, the proposed model of the different solutions is valid when con-
sidering the combination of different solutions. The model can be generalized for
the use of m financial solutions SX = {Sxi} , i = 1..m and n physical solutions
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SY =
{
Syj
}
, j = 1..n:
δ
DA
SX ,SY
(
E˜, EDA
)
=
m∑
i=1
Xi +
n∑
j=1
Yj + δ
DA
E˜ + n∑
j=1
yj , E
DA +
m∑
i=1
xi
 (3.85)
For example, the combination of the participation in an intraday market Sx : ID
and the coupling with a conventional generation unit Sy : cv results to the following
imbalance penalization function:
δ
DA
ID,cv
(
E˜ref, E
DA
ref
)
= XID + Ycv + δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ycv, E
DA
ref + xID
)
= EID × (ΠDA −ΠID) + ecv × (Π
DA −Πcv)
+ δ
DA
(
E˜ref + ecv, E
DA
ref + E
ID
)
(3.86)
To conclude, the proposed generic formulation of the imbalance penalty is valid
for a combination of both physical and financial solutions. The next section gives
numerical results of this formulation for the physical solutions. Results of this for-
mulation for financial solutions are given in the next chapter, in the case of the
participation in the intraday market. Also, the generic imbalance penalty formula-
tion will be used for the definition of a generic decision-making method relative to
the management of RES generation in electricity market, in the next chapter.
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3.5 Application: Evaluation of the imbalance reduction
related to RES generation in the frame of virtual
power plant
This section presents the results obtained from the simulation of the participation
in a day-ahead electricity market of a reference RES unit which uses the physical
solutions for the management of the imbalance penalty. Three physical solutions
are presented: the aggregation of the reference unit with other RES units, the
combination of the reference unit with an energy storage device and the combination
of the reference unit with a conventional generation unit. These three physical
solutions are considered in the frame of a virtual power plant, described in section
2.3.2 and modeled in section 3.3. The results obtained are based on real world data.
They evaluate the reduction of imbalance penalty relative to each solution.
3.5.1 Presentation of the study
Simulation methodology
The simulation methodology is presented in Figure 3.7. The reference RES unit is in
this case a wind farm. The wind farm power generation is traded in the day-ahead
market, and the wind farm operator is considered to be a balance responsible party.
This participation is based on available wind power forecasts, and results to the
contracted energy EDA. The aggregation case consists in combining other wind farms
for participating in the day-ahead market as virtual power plant (VPP). Similarly,
the reference wind farm can be combined with a storage unit or a conventional
generation unit for participating as a single entity (VPP). The energy E˜VPP delivered
by the VPP results from the operation of the units in the VPP.
Description of the case study
In the present study, the reference RES unit is a 18 MW wind farm located in
Western Denmark. The wind farm generation is traded in the NordPool market
during the period between the 01/10/2003 and the 31/06/2004. In NordPool, the
contracts for the coming day are traded on the day-ahead market, named Elspot [42].
The market time step equals 1 h. The Elspot gate closure time is at 12:00 pm (local
time) of the preceding day. Hence, we used the last available wind power forecasts
(11:00 am of the same day) as input to day-ahead market participation module.
Forecast horizons are selected in order to get the forecasts for 24 hours of the next
day.
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Figure 3.7: Schematic representation of the overall simulation scheme of the participation
of the virtual power plant in the day-ahead electricity market.
The wind power forecasts are obtained from a statistical forecasting method,
denoted as the “Regressive Power Curve (RPC)” model [111]. This method uses
Hirlam Numerical Weather Predictions, as well as measured wind power as inputs.
The tuning of the model is done on the first nine months of the year 2003. Details
about the wind power forecasting model are given in the next chapter in section
B.2, and the trading approach in day-ahead market from power forecasts is further
detailed in section 4.4.
The reference case corresponds to the participation of only the reference wind
farm in the day-ahead market.
For the aggregation case, 20 wind farms are considered, including the reference
one. These wind farms are also located in Western Denmark and their nominal
power ranges between 1.6 and 23.4 MW. Consequently, the reference wind farm can
be combined with n other wind farms, with n varying between 0 (reference case)
and 19. This corresponds to 524288 potential cases of aggregation.
The storage unit considered in this study is a pumped-hydro storage. In order to
evaluate the impact of the storage energy capacity and storage round-trip efficiency
on the results, different values of these two characteristics are considered. The
energy capacity ranges between 0 and 30 MWh, and the efficiency ranges between
70 and 95 %. The nominal charging rate is determined so that the time period for
charging the storage from the empty state to full capacity at nominal charging rate
equals 5 hours. Storage units with this time constant are appropriate for imbalance
management, as explained in section 2.3.2. Similarly, the nominal discharging rate
is determined so that the time period for discharging the storage from full capacity
to empty state at nominal discharging rate equals 5 hours. This corresponds to
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nominal charging and discharging rates ranging from 0 to 1/3 of the reference wind
farm nominal power.
The conventional generation unit considered in this study can be a diesel gener-
ator or a small gas turbine unit. This unit is completely devoted to the reduction
of the energy imbalance relative to the trading of the generation from the reference
unit in the day-ahead market. Consequently, this unit does not participate in the
day-ahead market by itself. In order to evaluate the impact of the nominal power
and the marginal operation cost of the unit on the results, different values of these
two characteristics are considered. The nominal power ranges between 0 and 3 MW,
and the marginal cost at nominal power ranges from 25 to 30 e/MWh.
3.5.2 Description of the VPP operation
This section presents the operation relative to the three proposed VPP configura-
tions. Each configuration gives the possibility to balance internally the VPP. More
precisely, the delivered energy by the reference unit is E˜ref in the reference case,
while it is E˜ref,Sy = E˜ref + y when a physical solution Sy is used. The quantity
y depends on the solution and is detailed in the following paragraphs. Note from
the fourth graph that, for this example, the day-ahead market price equals the
down-regulation price, which corresponds to an up-regulation state for the TSO, as
explained in section 2.2.5.
Internal balancing in the case of aggregation
This paragraph describes the internal energy balancing for the first VPP con-
figuration (i.e. RES aggregation). In section 3.3.3, the aggregation of n wind farms,
including the reference wind farm, has been modeled as an additional internal energy
balance quantity from the point of view of the reference wind farm, denoted as
eagg,ref:
E˜ref,agg = E˜ref + eagg,ref (3.87)
with eagg,ref = E
DA
ref −αref × E
DA
VPP
and αref = E˜ref/E˜VPP.
The energy E˜VPP is the energy delivered by the aggregated wind farms and equals
the sum of the delivered energy by each aggregated wind farm. Also, EDA
VPP
is the
energy contract relative to the aggregated wind farms, and equals the sum of the
energy contracts relative to each aggregated wind farm.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the internal balancing in the case of two aggregated wind
farms during the 24 hours of the day 29/10/2003. The reference wind farm is
denoted as WF1 and the aggregated wind farm is denoted as wind farm WF2. The
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nominal power of WF1 and WF2 is respectively 18 and 16.5 MW. The distance
between the two wind farms is 84 km. From the first two graphs on the left, we
can observe that during the period between hour 9 and 12, the delivered energy is
greater than the contracted energy for WF1, whereas it is the contrary for WF2.
The period between hour 9 and 12 is illustrated in Figure 3.8 as the period between
the two vertical dashed lines. Consequently, during this period, the imbalance for
the aggregated wind farms (WF1+WF2) is close to 0, as shown in the bottom left
plot. During this period, the energy balance volume for WF1 denoted as eagg,1 is
negative. This corresponds to the equivalent production of WF1 when aggregated
with WF2 lower than the WF1 production, as shown in the top right plot.
The imbalance penalty for WF1 is not always reduced when WF1 is aggregated
with WF2. For example during the period between hour 1 and hour 4, the energy
imbalance after aggregation is greater than before aggregation, as shown in the top
right plot. This increase of imbalance energy results from the repartition model of
aggregated imbalance, which distributes the aggregated energy imbalance according
to the delivered energy.
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Figure 3.8: Energy imbalance resulting from the aggregation of wind farms
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Operation model of the combination with a storage device
The energy delivered by the reference wind farm combined with a storage unit, for
a market time unit Ti, is written as:
E˜ref,st,Ti = E˜ref,Ti + E˜st,Ti (3.88)
In this example, the operation mode applied to the storage unit consists in a “filter”
mode, where the role of the storage device is to reduce the instantaneous absolute
energy imbalance between the delivered energy E˜ref,Ti + E˜st,Ti and the contracted
energy EDATi . Consequently, the energy delivered by the storage during the period Ti
is formulated as the following optimization problem:
E˜st,Ti = argmin
Est
∣∣∣E˜ref,Ti + Est − EDATi ∣∣∣ , subject to Cst,Ti (3.89)
where Cst,Ti are the technical constraints related to the operation of the storage for
the period Ti and are expressed as:
Cst,Ti :
r
nom
dis ×∆t ≤ E˜st,Ti ≤ r
nom
ch ×∆t
SOCmin ≤ SOCTi ≤ SOCmax
(3.90)
where ∆t is the time duration of the market time unit. rnomdis and r
nom
ch are the
nominal discharging and charging rates respectively. SOCmin and SOCmax are the
minimum and maximum state-of-charge respectively. The state-of-charge SOCTi
at the end of the period Ti is derived from the state-of-charge at the end of the
previous time period Ti−1 and the energy delivered by the storage unit during Ti.
The charging and discharging cases are distinguished as follows:
SOCTi = SOCTi−1+
1/ηdis × E˜st,Ti/CapESD (discharging : E˜st,Ti < 0 )ηch × E˜st,Ti/CapESD (charging : E˜st,Ti ≥ 0) (3.91)
where CapESD is the nominal energy capacity of the storage unit; ηdis and ηch
are the storage discharging and charging efficiencies, respectively. The round trip
efficiency η is defined by η = ηdis × ηch.
Figure 3.10(a) illustrates the operation of the combination of the reference wind
farm with a storage unit during the 24 hours of the day 29/10/2003. The round-trip
efficiency of the considered storage unit is 75 %; the storage capacity is 15 MWh
and the charge and discharge rate equal respectively −3 and 3 MWh/h. The initial
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state-of-charge is close to 20 %, and is the result from the operation of the storage
unit the day before. The limited capacity of the storage is illustrated in the operation
of the unit between hour 2 and hour 10. Between hour 2 and hour 7, the storage
unit is discharged for reducing the negative imbalance, until it is completely empty.
Between hour 7 and hour 10 the storage unit is completely empty and cannot reduce
the negative imbalance anymore.
Note that the operation defined by Equation 3.89 corresponds to an optimization
per timestep. More advanced operation strategies, where the temporal correlation
on the decisions can be taken into account, can be envisaged .
Operation model of the combination with a conventional unit
In this example, the conventional considered unit is operated only for reducing the
energy imbalance relative to the reference unit. As explained in section 3.3.5, this
corresponds to ecv = E˜cv in the formulation of the imbalance penalty given in
Equation 3.73. Then, the energy delivered by the reference wind farm combined
with a conventional generation unit, for a market time unit Ti, is written as:
E˜ref,cv,Ti = E˜ref,Ti + E˜cv,Ti (3.92)
In this study, the conventional unit is operated for reducing the absolute energy
imbalance between the delivered energy E˜ref,Ti + E˜cv,Ti and the contracted energy
EDA,Ti , similarly to the storage device operation. Consequently, the energy delivered
by the conventional unit during the period Ti is formulated as :
E˜cv,Ti = argmin
Ecv
∣∣∣E˜ref,Ti + Ecv − EDATi ∣∣∣ , subject to Ccv,Ti (3.93)
where Ccv,Ti are the technical constraints related to the operation of the conven-
tional unit for the period Ti. In this study, the conventional unit is supposed to be
switched on permanently, and its output power can vary between a minimum output
power and the nominal power Pnomcv . The minimum output power is defined as the
proportion αcv of the nominal power. Consequently, the technical constraints of the
unit are formulated as follows:
Ccv,Ti : αcv × P
nom
cv ×∆t ≤ Ecv,Ti ≤ P
nom
cv ×∆t (3.94)
where ∆t is the time duration of the market time unit.
Also, we propose to model the marginal cost of the conventional unit as the
function of the delivered energy by this unit. Such marginal cost will be used in the
evaluation of the imbalance penalty given in Equation 3.73. The aim of the cost
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model is to take into account the increase of the marginal cost when the conventional
unit is operated at partial load, which reduces the unit efficiency. The simplest
approach is to consider a linear variation of the marginal cost for any variation of
delivered energy E˜cv. The marginal cost Πcv for a given delivered energy E˜cv is then
given by :
Πcv = Π
∗
cv ×
(
1 + βcv ×
(
1−
Ecv
Pnomcv ×∆t
))
(3.95)
where Π∗cv is the marginal cost at nominal power and βcv is a price parameter which
is greater than zero for accounting the unit efficiency reduction when operating at
partial load. Such model is illustrated in Figure 3.9, with αcv = 0.5 and βcv = 0.5.
Ecv
Π
0 PnomxΔtα xPnomxΔt
Π
Π(1+β )
~
Figure 3.9: Proposed model for the conventional unit marginal cost.
Figure 3.10(b) describes the operation of the combination of the reference wind
farm with a conventional unit during the 24 hours of the day 29/10/2003. The
nominal power of the considered conventional unit is Pnomcv = 2 MW; the marginal
cost at nominal power is Π∗cv = 25 e/MWh. The coefficient αcv defining the output
power range of the unit is set to 0.5. Also the marginal cost coefficient is taken equal
to 0.5.
Between hour 3 and hour 10, the negative energy imbalance relative to the trad-
ing of the wind farm generation is reduced by the output energy of the conventional
generation. Similarly, the negative imbalance is reduced between hour 14 and hour
17. However, the output generation from the conventional unit cannot be reduced
lower than 1 MWh for each hour, and consequently, the VPP energy imbalance is
increased when the generation from the wind farm is greater than the contracted
energy. This happens for example between hour 1 and 2 and between hour 10 and
13. Also, in the bottom figure, two levels of conventional unit marginal cost can
be observed. The marginal cost equals 25 e/MWh when the unit is generating at
nominal power (2 MWh/h) whereas the marginal cost equals 31.25 e/MWh when
the unit is generating 1 MWh/h. This later level of generation corresponds to the
minimum generation given by αcv = 0.5, and the corresponding marginal cost results
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from the price model given by Equation 3.95.
3.5.3 Imbalance penalty results and sensitivity analysis
The imbalance penalty δ
DA
Sy resulting from the participation of the reference unit in
the day-ahead electricity market with a physical solution Sy has been generically
formulated in Equation 3.78 and Equation 3.79 as follows :
δ
DA
Sy
(
E˜ref, E
DA
)
= Y + δ
DA
(
E˜ref + y,E
DA
)
(3.96)
where Y and y are the additional cost and the energy volume associated with each
physical solution given by:
y = 0 and Y = 0⇐ reference case
y = eagg and Y = 0⇐ wind farm aggregation
y = E˜st and Y = |E˜st| ×Π
DA × Γst ⇐ combination with a storage unit
y = E˜cv and Y = E˜cv × (Π
DA −Πcv)⇐ combination with a conventional unit
(3.97)
The function δ
DA
models the penalization of the energy imbalance between the
delivered and contracted energy. Such penalization is based on the difference bet-
ween the day-ahead market price and the up or down regulation price. The function
is formulated in Equation 3.7.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the energy volume y, the additional cost Y and the imbal-
ance penalty δ for the reference case, and for the three considered physical solutions
for reducing imbalance penalties. The same day used for the illustration of the op-
eration of the VPP in the previous figures is also considered, that is the 29/10/2003.
• For the aggregation case, the additional cost Y is zero. The imbalance penalty
is reduced when the energy imbalance is reduced, for example between hour
14 and hour 17.
• In the case of the combination with a storage unit, the additional cost Y cor-
responds to the penalization of the energy losses during the storage operation
and the difference of day-ahead market price between charging and discharging
phases, as already explained in subsection 3.3.4. The results for the storage
case illustrate the difference between the energy imbalances and the imbalance
penalties. First, the energy imbalance resulting from the storage combination
is always lower than the one without storage. However, from the third plot, it
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Figure 3.10: Operation of the combination of the reference wind farm with an energy
storage device (top) or with a conventional generation unit (bottom) during the day of
29/10/2003.
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Figure 3.11: Analysis of the imbalance penalty in the cases of aggregation, combination
with a storage unit and combination with a conventional unit, during the day of 29/10/2003.
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can be observed that the imbalance penalty is most of the time increased com-
pared to the reference case, for these 24 hours. This is particularly true in the
two periods between hour 10 and hour 14 and between hour 17 and hour 22.
This is explained by the fact that during these periods, the TSO is only penal-
izing negative energy imbalances. This can be deduced from the fourth graph
where the up regulation price is greater than the day-ahead market price and
the down regulation price equals the day-ahead market price. During these two
periods, the storage is operated for reducing the positive imbalances, but these
imbalances are not penalized by the TSO. Consequently, the operation of the
storage increases the resulting imbalance penalty due to the energy losses (i.e.
additional cost Y ). Such a situation could be avoided if the storage unit was
operated from an advanced schedule which takes into account the regulation
state of the TSO. Actually, in the later case, the storage would be operated
only for reducing the energy imbalances which are penalized by the TSO. Such
strategic operation of the storage device is described in the next chapter.
• Finally, in the case of combination with a conventional unit, the additional cost
Y is positive during the first 6 hours and negative during the following hours.
This is explained by the sign of the difference between the day-ahead market
price and the conventional unit marginal cost. During the first 6 hours, the
day-ahead price is lower than the marginal cost, as described in the bottom
graph of figure 3.10(b), and conversely for the following hours. The dashed
red curve in the second plot of Figure 3.11 shows that the additional cost
Y is further lower during the period when the unit is generating at nominal
power, since its marginal cost is lower during these periods. These periods are
between hour 6 and 9 and between hour 14 and 17.
The results of the imbalance penalty presented in Figure 3.11 refer to only one
day of simulation. Consequently, these results are highly dependent on the specific
conditions during that day, such as the regulation state of the TSO and the day-
ahead market prices. In order to evaluate in the long term the imbalance penalty
reduction, the operation of the three VPP configurations has been simulated for a
period of 274 days between the 01/10/2003 and the 30/06/2004. The results are
presented in Figure 3.12. The three plots give the total imbalance penalty obtained
during the simulation period, normalized by the imbalance penalty obtained in the
reference case (i.e. of the reference wind farm trading by itself). The total reference
imbalance penalty relative to this period equals 45.370 ke and represents 6.98 % of
the revenue which would have been obtained without imbalance penalty.
The first graph 3.12(a) is relative to the aggregation case. This graph describes
the influence of the number of aggregated wind farms on the total normalized imbal-
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ance penalty. For a given number of aggregated wind farms n > 1, all the possible
combinations of the reference wind farm with n− 1 wind farms among the 19 other
wind farms are simulated. For example, the case of aggregating 9 wind farms with
the reference one gives
(
19
9
)
= 92378 possibilities. Totally, 524288 simulations are
represented on the graph. In addition to all the combinations described as green
points, the black squares give the mean imbalance penalty obtained for all the possi-
ble combinations with the same number of aggregated wind farms. From the results
in the figure, it is firstly concluded that the imbalance penalty resulting from ag-
gregation is in general lower than the reference one. However, when aggregating
2, 3 or 4 wind farms, there are some cases when the resulting imbalance penalty
is greater than the reference one. Also, the range of normalized imbalance penalty
decreases when the number of aggregated wind farms increases. The mean imbal-
ance penalty is reduced when the number of aggregated wind farms increases. It
rapidly decreases from 100 % of the reference penalty to 81 % when 5 wind farms are
aggregated. Then, it slowly decreases till 75 % when 20 wind farms are aggregated.
The lowest imbalance penalty is obtained when aggregating a given combination of
7 wind farms with the reference one, and the resulting imbalance penalty is then
reduced to 68 % of the reference one.
The second graph 3.12(b) is relative to the combination with an energy storage
unit. This graph is the result of a parametric analysis and describes the combined
influence of the storage energy capacity and of the round-trip efficiency η on the
total normalized imbalance penalty. The graph shows that, in this case study, the
imbalance penalty is highly dependent on the storage round-trip efficiency. More
precisely, for efficiencies lower than 0.8, the storage combination increases the im-
balance penalty, whatever the storage capacity is. This increase of penalty is due
to the high additional cost Y related to the energy losses for the storage operation.
In these cases, this additional cost Y is higher than the benefits related to the re-
duction of the energy imbalance from the storage energy y. When the efficiency is
greater than 0.8, the additional cost is reduced and the imbalance penalty δ
DA
st is
thus reduced. This reduction increases as the storage capacity increases. For the
simulation η = 0.8, the resulting imbalance penalty is higher than the reference one
for storage capacity lower than 20 MWh, and lower than the reference one for storage
capacity greater than 20 MWh. In section 3.3.4, a condition has been formulated
on the storage efficiency for the reduction of imbalance penalties:
η ≥ 1− 2 ·
∆Π
ΠDA
(3.98)
This condition is based on hypotheses which are detailed in section 3.3.4. The mean
penalization factor ∆Π/ΠDA during the simulation period is 7.51 %. Consequently,
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the efficiency condition for reducing the imbalance penalty gives η ≥ 85 %, which is
coherent with the observations from the graph 3.12(b).
The third graph 3.12(c) is relative to the combination of the reference wind farm
with a conventional unit. This graph describes the combined influence of the
conventional unit nominal power and of the marginal cost at nominal power Π∗cv on
the total normalized imbalance penalty. These results have been obtained with a
coefficient αcv defining the output power range equal to 0.5. Also the βcv coefficient
referring to the marginal cost model equals 0.5. Similarly to the efficiency for the
storage case, this graph shows that, in this case study, the imbalance penalty is highly
dependent on the conventional unit marginal cost. The imbalance penalty increases
as the marginal cost increases. For the simulation with Π∗cv = 30 e/MWh, the im-
balance penalty is greater than the reference one whatever the nominal power is. For
marginal cost lower than 30 e/MWh, the imbalance penalty decreases as the nomi-
nal power increases till a minimum imbalance penalty is reached, and then increases
as the nominal power increases. For example, the minimum imbalance penalty ob-
tained when combining the reference wind farm with a conventional unit having a
25 e/MWh marginal cost is reached for a nominal power equal to 1.35 MW. This
minimum imbalance penalty equals 70 % of the reference penalty. These simulation
results depend on the day-ahead market and regulation prices over the simulation
period. In particular, the relative position of the conventional unit marginal cost
compared to the day-ahead market price highly influences the resulting penalty, as
already observed in Figure 3.11. Also, in section 3.3.5, it has been demonstrated that
a condition for the conventional unit combination to reduce the imbalance penalty
is to have the marginal cost lower than the price for negative imbalance: Πcv < Π
−.
During the simulation, the mean price for negative imbalance equals 31.08 e/MWh.
However, this theoretical condition is derived from considering only up-regulation
situations, where negative imbalance are penalized. Also, during down-regulation,
the conventional unit combination may increase the imbalance penalty. This ex-
plains why the presented results show a decrease of the imbalance penalty only for
marginal costs lower than approximately 29 e/MWh.
Finally, the combination of the three graphs in Figure 3.12 enables to compare
the imbalance penalty resulting from the different virtual power plant configura-
tions. For example, the mean imbalance penalty in the case of aggregating the
reference wind farm with 5 other wind farms equals 80 % of the reference imbal-
ance penalty. From the simulation results, the same imbalance reduction can be
obtained by combining the reference wind farm with a 26 MWh energy capacity and
0.9 round-trip efficiency storage unit. The same imbalance reduction can also be
obtained by combining the reference wind farm with a 1.3 MW nominal power and
26 e/MWh marginal cost conventional unit.
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This parametric analysis may even be used as a basis for comparing different
dimensioning options of a given VPP configuration. For example, regarding the
combination with storage, the reduction of imbalance penalty resulting from the
combination with a storage device having a 26 MWh energy capacity and 0.9 round-
trip efficiency, is equivalent to the one obtained from the combination with a storage
device having a 15 MWh energy capacity and 0.95 round-trip efficiency.
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(a) Aggregation of wind farms.
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Figure 3.12: Imbalance penalty resulting from the simulation of the participation of the VPP in the day-ahead market during the period
between the 01/10/2003 and the 30/06/2004.
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3.6 Conclusions
• In this chapter, we proposed a generic imbalance penalty model, which is valid
for both physical and financial solutions for reducing the imbalance penalty.
The physical and financial solutions are modeled as a modification of the refer-
ence imbalance penalty model. This reference model refers to the participation
of a reference RES unit in a day-ahead electricity market.
• For each solution, the modification of the reference imbalance penalty model
consists in an additional cost and an adjustment of either the delivered or the
contracted energy volume. Both the additional cost Y and the adjustment
energy volume y are formulated as as a function of the main quantities which
model each solution. For example, the values of the price and of the volume
for the intraday contract determine Y and y in the case of the participation in
intraday market. Similarly, the energy delivered by the storage unit determines
Y and y in the case of the combination with storage. These quantities may
be the results of a decision-making process, and the decision-making problem
relative to the use of these physical or financial solutions is the object of the
following chapter.
• Results relative to the physical solutions in the frame of the virtual power plant
have been presented. The models used for the operation of the storage unit and
the conventional unit are presented, and illustrated using real world data. The
results from a 9 month simulation of the participation in a day-ahead market
are presented. The imbalance penalties resulting from the different solutions
were compared. Finally it was illustrated how, through a parametric analysis,
the approach can be used for the general problem of unit dimensioning in the
context of virtual power plants.
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CHAPTER 4
Management of Renewable Generation in Electricity
Markets: a Decision-Making Problem
Chapter overview
The participation in an electricity market consists in proposing bids to the market
prior to the delivery, with imperfect knowledge about future energy and prices. In
case physical or financial solutions are applied for reducing imbalances, they have to
be activated before delivery. Regarding physical solutions, the strategic operation
of the virtual power plant is based on a schedule which aims to optimally operate
the virtual power plant for minimizing the imbalance penalties. This schedule is
determined before the operation of the virtual power plant. Also, the financial
solutions are based on the participation in additional markets, and also require to
propose bids prior to delivery.
This chapter presents the different types of decisions associated with both phys-
ical and financial decisions. A generic decision-making model, which is suited to the
different types of decisions, is proposed. This method is based on a cost function
which is derived from the generic penalization function model given in the previous
chapter.
The benefits from the decision-making method are demonstrated through the
example of the strategic participation in the intraday market, and the example of
strategic operation of the combination of a wind farm with a pumped hydro storage
unit.
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4.1 Description of the decisions relative to the trading
of renewable generation in electricity markets
4.1.1 General presentation of decision-making problems
A decision-making problem consists in choosing a single alternative among a set of
identified alternatives [112]. In complex decision-making problems, the first step
is to model the decision problem. The second step is the definition of a decision
process, which aims at determining the decision to make. The decision process is
based on a decision criterion, defined by the decision maker.
The decision criterion is a term defined in [112] as the “measures, rules, and stan-
dards that guide decision-making” and is composed of the attributes, the objectives
and the goals of the decision-making problem. An explanation and a distinction
between these three concepts are also given in [112]:
• The attributes are perceived as characteristics of concepts relative to the deci-
sion. The amount of energy imbalance or the imbalance penalty are examples
of attributes relative to a given participation in the electricity market.
• The objectives are a specification of the attributes to maximize or to minimize.
Objectives are not themselves attributes but they derive from one or more
attributes. Minimizing the imbalance penalties is an example of objective.
• The goal refers to the decision maker’s needs and desires. A goal can be
for example a specific level of the objective relative to the decision-making
problem.
Also, a distinction can be made between decision-aid problems and decision-
making problems [113]. In decision-aid problems, the decision process results in a
set of alternatives which are the ones which respond at best to the set of decision
criteria. Conversely, decision-making consists in determining a single best alternative
corresponding to the criteria. The choice between decision-aid or decision-making
approaches depends on the specificities and complexity of the decision problem, as
well as on the nature of the decisions to make.
The following sections describe the attributes of the decision-making problem
relative to the participation of renewable generation in short-term electricity mar-
kets.
4.1.2 The reference participation in the day-ahead market
In this section, the term “reference” refers to the participation of a reference RES
unit with stochastic generation in the day-ahead market. This reference case is taken
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as a basis for comparing the benefits in terms of imbalance penalty reduction related
to the physical and financial solutions, as already proposed in the previous chapter.
For participating in day-ahead electricity markets, an Independent Power Pro-
ducer (IPP) has to propose a bid during the period between the gate opening time
and the gate closure time at a day d for a period covering the whole following day
d+ 1. The bids covering the period of the day d+ 1 are given for each market time
unit of the period. Usually, the length of a market time unit is one hour.
Most day-ahead markets have a single price market clearing process, which is
explained in section 2.1.3. In this process, a generation bid consists of a set of
non-decreasing blocks of energy-price for each market time unit [26]. For a given
market time, the bid involves a decision-making problem since a decision has to be
made by the IPP on both the energy quantity to propose to the market and the
price at which this quantity is proposed. The participation in a day-ahead market
is in turn a decision-making problem about the quantity-price values to propose for
consecutive bids of the market periods of the next day.
A single market price is calculated from the aggregation of all the offer and buy
bids. Then, the contracted energy quantity following a bid depends on the position
of the bid price relatively to the market price.
4.1.3 Decisions associated with the physical solutions for imbalance
management
This section presents the decisions which are necessary for the operation of the three
physical solutions for reducing the imbalance penalty, which were presented in the
generic model of the virtual power plant. These three solutions are the aggregation
of RES units and the combination with either a storage unit or a conventional unit.
In order to obtain the maximum possible reduction of imbalance penalty, the
operation of the physical solutions has to be based on decisions such as scheduling
or economic dispatch, which are provided prior to the operation. These decisions
are then used as setpoints during operation. This advanced operation mode is said
to be “strategic”.
First, the reduction of imbalance penalties related to the aggregation of RES
units is based on the combination of units which are supposed to be non-dispatchable.
The imbalance reduction results from the compensation of individual imbalances, as
already presented in the previous chapter. No operating decision is thus considered
for this solution.
In contrast, storage units and conventional units are dispatchable units. Their
limited characteristics force the VPP operator to manage their operation for reducing
imbalance penalties. Two main kinds of decision-making problems are associated
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with this management:
• The unit commitment problem consists in determining, for a given generation
portfolio, which unit will be in operation at each time step of a given period.
This decision has to take into account the technical constraints, such as possible
ramps for increasing the production, or the minimum time each unit has to be
off.
• The economic dispatch consists in determining the level at which each unit has
to be operated for each time step of a given period. The decision is made with
the objective to maximize an economic benefit or minimize an economic cost.
An example of the economic dispatch problem relative to the participation of a
generation portfolio including renewable and conventional units in the NETA
market is given in [34].
In the solution based on energy storage, the energy delivered or absorbed by the
storage unit for a given time step depends on the amount of energy already stored in
the device which, in turn, depends on the delivered energy at the previous time steps.
In this case, the decision associated with the strategic combination of storage and
renewable units consists in determining the delivered energy by the storage unit or
the state-of-charge of the unit for the consecutive time steps of a given period, where
the objective is to minimize the imbalance penalties. When no strategic decision
is available, the reference operation mode for the storage unit consists in a “filter”
mode, where the storage energy output is set for reducing the instantaneous energy
imbalance of the RES unit. Such an approach was used for modeling the storage
operation in the previous section 3.5.
In the solution based on conventional generation, the ability to increase or de-
crease the conventional unit output, for reducing the imbalance penalty relative to a
RES unit, depends on the operating state of the conventional unit. If the considered
unit can be switched off, the decision to switch it on is a unit commitment problem.
Also, scheduling the output energy from the conventional unit enables the VPP op-
erator to dispatch the delivered energy with the objective of having operating costs
of the conventional unit lower than the avoided imbalance penalties. When no unit
commitment method is used, the reference operating mode consists in maintaining
the unit as a “must-run” unit, always switched on. The unit output then ranges
between the minimum and maximum power output. This reference operating mode
is the one which has been used for modeling the conventional unit operation in the
previous section 3.5. However, the operating costs associated with this reference
operating mode may be higher than the avoided imbalance penalties.
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4.1.4 Decisions associated with the financial solutions for imbalance
management
In section 3.2, the solution based on option trading has been formulated. In the
same section, it has been explained that this solution is still theoretical and is thus
not further considered in this thesis.
Regarding the participation in an intraday market, this solution consists in trad-
ing its generation in an additional electricity market. This market takes place after
the day-ahead one, and offers the possibility to adjust the IPP’s contractual position
relative to the day-ahead trading.
Intraday markets can be based either on a single price market clearing process,
as is the case in Spain where the intraday market consists in six sessions, or on a
continuous trading mechanism with pay-as-bid market clearing process, as is the
case for the Elbas market in the Nordic countries. If the intraday market is based
on a single price market clearing process, the decision-making problem is similar to
the one relative to the participation in the day-ahead market, already detailed in
section 4.1.2. In the case of the pay-as-bid process, the bid also consists in a set of
quantity-price values for each market time of the intraday market, and the decision
is therefore similar to the case of single price market clearing process.
4.2 Generic formulation of the decision-making problem
related to the management of renewable generation
in electricity markets
4.2.1 Formulation of the optimization problem
The reference participation in the day-ahead market and the use of financial solutions
refer to a decision-making problem, where the operator has to decide the quantity
and the price of the electricity bid it proposes to the markets. Also, the strategic
operation of the physical solutions is based on a schedule which is a decision about
the operation setpoints relative to the combined units.
The proposed physical and financial solutions are in general used by the inde-
pendent power producer for reducing the imbalance penalties. Consequently, in this
work, we consider that the decisions relative to these solutions are made with such
objective of reducing the imbalance penalties. Such objective is purely economic,
and is related only to the independent power producers’ point of view. Nevertheless,
the same physical and financial solutions, proposed here for reducing the imbalance
penalties, may be used as solutions for other issues related to the integration of re-
newable generation in power systems. For example, the combination of a wind farm
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with a storage unit can be used as a solution for both reducing the imbalance penal-
ties and managing the grid congestions which could be caused by the wind power
generation, as described in [114]. In this case, the scheduling of the storage unit could
be done with a combined economic objective of reducing imbalance penalties and
a technical objective of managing grid congestion. However, such multi-objective
decision-making process is out of the scope of the present work. Focus is given only
on the imbalance penalty management.
The decision variables of the considered problem are divided into two categories.
First, decisions related to the use of financial solutions have a decision variable, u,
which is related to the market participation. Similarly, decisions related to the use
of physical solutions have a decision variable v related to scheduling. Note that the
reference participation in the day-ahead market can be considered as a particular
case of financial solution, as explained in section 3.4, and the associated decision
variable is also denoted as u. For a given time period Ti, the decision variable uTi can
be for example the quantity-price bid in a day-ahead market uTi = (E
BDA
Ti
, ΠBDATi ),
or in an intraday market uTi = (E
BID
Ti
, ΠBIDTi ). The decision variable vTi can be the
scheduled state-of-charge of the storage unit vTi = SOC
sch
Ti
or the scheduled energy
from the conventional unit vTi = E
sch
cv,Ti
.
In a general way, the independent power producer may have to make a combined
decision at time td about market and scheduling variables (uTi , vTi). Also, the
decisions may not be for a single time period Ti but rather for n consecutive time
periods [T1, T2, ...Tn]. Such problems are defined in [115] as sequential or multistage
decision problems. For these problems, the interdependence between the consecutive
decisions has to be taken into account. The multistage decision approach proposed
in this thesis is presented in the case of the combination with storage in section 4.6.
The time td when the decision is made is taken prior to the beginning of the first
period T1. The decision vectors U and V , relative to the n consecutive periods, are
denoted as:
U = [uTi ]
n
i=1 = [uT1 , uT2 , ...uTn ]
V = [vTi ]
n
i=1 = [vT1 , vT2 , ...vTn ] (4.1)
Note that in the proposed formulation, the symbol t is used to represent a position
in time, while the symbol T is used to represent a period of time.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the decision vectors U and V . The vertical red lines repre-
sent the time td when the decision is made.
The imbalance penalty cost resulting from the decisions (U, V ) is derived through
a function Φ which gives a real number associated with the decisions. Finally,
the decision-making problem is formulated as an optimization problem, which
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d d+1 d+2
T1 T2 …       Tntd
: U = [uT1, uT2, … uTn] = [uTi]
:  V = [vT1, vT2, … vTn ] = [vTi]i =1
n
i =1
n
Figure 4.1: Description of the generic decision problem relative to the variables U and V .
d stands for the day.
consists in determining the decision variables values which minimize the imbalance
penalty cost:
(U∗, V ∗) = argmin
(U, V )
Φ (U, V ) , subject to CU,V (4.2)
where CU,V are the constraints related to the variables U and V . The constraints
relative to the decisions U for the use of financial solutions model the limits im-
posed by the market rules. Such constraints include for example the minimum and
maximum energy bid that a given IPP can propose for each time unit. Similarly,
the constraints relative to the decisions V for the use of physical solutions model
the technical limits imposed by the power units which are combined with the ref-
erence unit. The lower and upper bounds for the state-of-charge of a storage unit
is an example of technical constraints in the case of combination with storage. The
details of the constraints CU,V in the case of (1) the reference participation in the
day-ahead market, (2) the additional participation in the intraday market and (3)
the combination with a storage device, are given in the next sections.
Finally, the decision variables U and V considered in this thesis are supposed to
be continuous. In other words, they are allowed to take on any values permitted
by the constraints CU,V . By contrast, the decisions which are related to discrete
variables are not treated in this thesis. This discrete decision could be, for exam-
ple, the unit commitment decision concerning a conventional unit combined with
renewable generation, where two states ar possible: on or off. Consequently, the
general resolution of the optimization problem given in Equation 4.2 is solved with
coutinuous optimization methods.
4.2.2 Decision-making under uncertainty
The general decision-making problem presented in Equation 4.2 consists for the IPP
in determining alternatives which minimize the imbalance penalty cost. However,
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this cost depends on factors which are determined only after the decision, such as
the amount of delivered energy by the renewable power units and the market prices.
Consequently, at the decision time td, the IPP has make a decision about the
variables (U, V ) in order to minimize a cost which is not perfectly known at td. Such
decision-making problems are denoted as decision-making under uncertainty
problems [116], because the outcomes of each decision alternative are uncertain. At
the decision time td, the amount of delivered energy by the renewable power units
and the market prices are considered as random variables or stochastic variables,
and consequently introduce some amount of uncertainty associated with how the
future will be.
Decision-making problems under uncertainty are based on estimation of the fu-
ture outcomes. Such estimations are forecasts which are available at the decision
time. Generally, the term of deterministic forecast is used to describe a forecast
which simply consists in an estimation of the future value of the forecasted variable.
Conversely, the term probabilistic forecast is used to describe a forecast which in-
cludes uncertainty information of the future variable in addition to the estimation
of the future value.
Decision-making problems under uncertainty may disregard or consider the un-
certainty associated with the forecasts. In a first step of the present work, the
uncertainty associated with the forecasts is disregarded and the estimation of the
future value only is considered. The consideration of the uncertainty information
will be the focus of the next chapter 5.
4.3 Proposition of an approach based on a loss function
for the decision-making problem
This section focuses on the derivation of the objective function Φ from the optimiza-
tion problem given in Equation 4.2, which gives a real number associated with the
decisions [uTi ]
n
i=1 and [vTi ]
n
i=1. This function Φ models the objective of the decision
as defined in section 4.1.1. It maps a given alternative onto a real number repre-
senting the economic penalty associated with the alternative. The next paragraph
presents the general considerations used to develop the objective function Φ based
on the loss function concept.
4.3.1 Concept of loss function: relation between loss, utility and
regret
This paragraph presents the general concept of the loss function, and describes the
distinctions between this concept and two others related to decision-making, which
112
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
are the utility theory and the regret theory.
The concept of loss function is closely linked to the concept of utility. The utility
theory has been proposed by Bernoulli in [117] as a decision method for considering
the satisfaction of the decision maker relatively to an alternative. A utility function
is thus a measure of such satisfaction which integrates the preferences of the decision
maker. Under this principle, the best decision is taken as the one that maximizes
the utility of the decision maker [116]. Further details about the utility theory are
given in the next chapter, more precisely in section 5.2.2.
Contrary to the utility function which is maximized for a given decision, the
loss function inversely models the dissatisfaction associated with a decision and is
minimized for a given decision. A possibility to derive a loss function is to consider
the opposite of the utility function; however, the determination of the utility theory
for a given decision maker is usually a hard task [118].
Finally, regret theory is a particular case of the concept of the loss function [119].
In this case, the decision process is modeled as the minimization of a function of a
regret vector. This regret vector is a particular case of loss, and is defined as the
difference between the outcome yielded by a given choice and the best outcome that
could have been achieved in that state of nature.
In this thesis, the proposed method for the derivation of the loss function λ is
based on the modeling of the cost related to the decisions. The objective function
Φ is then derived from the loss function λ. The distinction between the objective
function Φ and the loss function λ is described in the formulation of the problem in
the next section.
4.3.2 Formulation of the proposed loss function
In order to formulate the loss function, the general cases of a financial solution Sx and
a physical solution Sy are considered. The decision relative to the financial solution
Sx is the vector U = [uTi ]
n
i=1 and the decision relative to the physical solution Sy is
the vector V = [vTi ]
n
i=1.
In chapter 3, and more precisely in Equation 3.84, the imbalance penalty pTi ,
for a given time period Ti, has been formulated as a function of the delivered energy
by the IPP E˜Ti and the contracted energy in the day-ahead market E
DA
Ti
:
pTi = δ
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti
(
E˜Ti , E
DA
Ti
)
(4.3)
where δ
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti is the imbalance penalty function relative to the solutions Sx and
Sy, derived in section 3.4, for the market time unit Ti. This function is given from
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the generic imbalance penalty model in Equation 3.84:
δ
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti
(
E˜Ti , E
DA
Ti
)
= XTi + YTi + δ
DA
Ti
(
E˜Ti + yTi , E
DA
Ti + xTi
)
(4.4)
The proposed decision-making approach is based on a loss function λ which gives
the imbalance penalty cost c relative to a given alternative (u, v). For a given time
period Ti, the cost cTi is formulated as:
cTi = λTi (uTi , vTi) (4.5)
The given formulation consists in defining the cost cTi relative to the loss function
λTi , from the penalty pTi relative to the imbalance penalty function δ
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti . At
the decision time td, the penalty pTi , which is based on the delivered energy volumes
and the observed market prices, is not perfectly known. The estimated penalty at
the decision time is denoted as p̂Ti , and is derived from the estimated penalization
function δ̂
DA
Ti and the estimated delivered energy ÊTi|td as follows:
p̂Ti = δ̂
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
DA
Ti
)
(4.6)
Then, the cost cTi is defined as the estimated penalty p̂Ti : cTi = p̂Ti . By com-
bining Equation 4.5 with Equation 4.6 and Equation 4.4, this gives:
λTi(uTi , vTi) = δ̂
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
DA
Ti
)
(4.7)
= X(hSx,Ti(uTi)) + Y (hSy ,Ti(vTi))
+ δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td + y(hSy ,Ti(vTi)), E
DA
Ti + x(hSx,Ti(uTi))
)
(4.8)
The details about the functions hSx,Ti and hSy ,Ti which model the consequences of the
decisions uTi and vTi on the energy volumes (xTi , yTi) and additional cost (XTi , YTi),
are explained in the section 4.3.4. Also, the derivation of the estimated imbalance
penalty function δ̂
DA
Ti and the estimated delivered energy ÊTi|td are detailed in the
next section.
Then, the proposed objective function Φ relative to the decision vectors (U, V )
is a norm N of the cost cTi associated with each time period Ti:
Φ (U, V ) = N
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
= N
([
λTi (uTi , vTi)
]n
i=1
)
(4.9)
A discussion about the norm N is also given in the following section 4.3.5.
Finally, the decision-making problem is modeled through the following optimization
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problem:[(
u∗Ti , v
∗
Ti
)]n
i=1
= argmin
[(uTi , vTi)]
n
i=1
N
([
λTi (uTi , vTi)
]n
i=1
)
, subject to CU,V (4.10)
The following paragraphs give some details for the derivation of the loss function
λ.
4.3.3 Estimation of the future imbalance penalty and energy pro-
duction
The penalization function δ
DA
Sx,Sy ,Ti in Equation 4.3 models the evaluation of the
imbalance penalty after delivery. At this time, the market prices which define the
quantity ∆ΠTi are known. Such market price difference is defined in Equation 3.8
and is used for the definition of the δ
DA
function. Also the delivered energy E˜Ti is
measured and the contracted energy EDATi is already settled. In contrast, the loss
function is designed for the decision-making problem prior to delivery. The decision
time is anterior to the beginning of the time period Ti and consequently, the delivered
energy and market prices for Ti are not perfectly known and are estimated through
forecasting methods. The hat operator ̂ is used to describe the different forecasts:
• ÊTi|td is the estimated value of the delivered energy during the period Ti; this
estimation is available at the decision time td. The considered IPP includes
renewable generation units and the estimation of future energy delivery is
obtained through forecasting models described in the appendix B.
• ∆̂ΠTi|td is similarly the estimation of the value of ∆
Π for the time period Ti
available at the decision time td. Such estimation is based on the estimation of
the difference between the day-ahead market price and the regulation prices.
A discussion about the price forecasting problem is proposed in the appendix
C.
The estimated reference imbalance penalty function δ̂
DA
Ti used in Equation 4.8 is
obtained from the definition of δ
DA
Ti in Equation 3.7 by replacing E˜ and ∆
Π by the
estimations ÊTi|td and ∆̂
Π
Ti|td
:
δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
DA
)
= |ÊTi|td − E
DA| × ∆̂ΠTi|td (4.11)
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4.3.4 Formulation of the consequences of the decisions on the im-
balance penalty
For any financial or physical solution, a distinction has to be made between the deci-
sion and the realization associated with such decision. Such distinction is described
for both financial and physical solutions:
• In the case of a financial solution Sx, the decision u is relative to market
participation and is a bid proposed to the market. The quantity-price contract
is a function hSx of the such bid u, where the function hSx models the market
settlement. The quantity-price contracts are denoted as u˜ = hSx(u). Also, the
impact of a financial solution on the imbalance penalty has been modeled in
section 3.4 through the quantities (x,X), and these quantities depend on the
realization u˜. In other words, the quantities (x,X) do not directly depend on
the bid u, but on the contract u˜.
x = x (u˜) = x (hSx(u)) (4.12)
X = X (u˜) = X (hSx(u)) (4.13)
• In the case of a physical solution Sy, the decision v is relative to the scheduling
of either a storage unit or a conventional unit. The operation variables are
the real outputs from units, and result from the application of the schedule.
In particular, additional technical constraints or a temporary modification of
the operation rules, may lead to a difference between the schedule v and the
resulting energy output denoted v˜. The relation between the schedule and the
real output is modeled through a function hSy and so, v˜ = hSy(v). Also, the
impact of a physical solution on the imbalance penalty is modeled through the
quantities (y, Y ), as explained in section 3.4, which depend on the realization
v˜ of the solution. In other words, the quantities (y, Y ) do not directly depend
on the schedule v, but on the real energy output v˜.
y = y (v˜) = y
(
hSy(v)
)
(4.14)
Y = Y (v˜) = Y
(
hSy(v)
)
(4.15)
Figure 4.2 summarizes the differences between the loss function λ and the pe-
nalization function δ. First, the loss function is based on an estimation of the future
energy delivery and price whereas the penalization function evaluates the realiza-
tions. Also, the loss function is a function of the decision variables whereas the
penalization function only considers the results of these decisions.
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Loss function λ: 
Estimation of the cost related
to the decision
• E , Δ : estimation of the future 
energy delivery and market prices; 
parameters of the loss function
• (u,v): decision variables
Penalization function δ: 
Evaluation of the imbalance penalty 
related to the real-time delivery
• E, Δ : measured delivered energy 
and market prices; 
variables of the penalization function
• ( u, v )  = (hSx(u), hSy(v)): parameters 
of the evaluation
~
~ ππ^
Ti
td
^
~
Figure 4.2: Comparison between the loss and penalization functions, in terms of parameters
and variables
4.3.5 Discussion about the norm relative to the optimization pro-
blem
The decision-making problem is formulated for n consecutive time periods in Equa-
tion 4.1. The proposed objective function is formulated in Equation 4.9 as a norm
N of the vector of the cost cTi relative to each time period Ti.
The considered norm here is a real-valued function on Rn satisfying the set of
properties which defines a function as a norm [109]. Using such norm, the objective
function Φ of the optimization problem becomes a real-valued function.
Some of the most frequently used norms are the p-norms [109,112]. For p ≤ 1 a
given real number, the p-norm Np of a vector [cTi ]
n
i=1 is defined as:
Np
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
=
(
n∑
i=1
|cTi |
p
)1/p
(4.16)
The most well-known p-norms are the so-called Manhattan norm, the Euclidian
norm and the Maximum norm which are obtained with p = 1, p = 2 and p → ∞
respectively:
N1
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
= |cT1 |+ |cT2 |+ ...+ |cTn | (4.17)
N2
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
=
√
|cT1 |
2 + |cT2 |
2 + ...+ |cTn |
2 (4.18)
N∞
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
= max(|cT1 |, |cT2 |, ..., |cTn |) (4.19)
The choice of the norm depends on the objective of the decision-making problem.
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For example, the norm N1 focuses on the total cost for the period [T1, T2, ..., Tn]
and is related to expectancy choice, as defined in [120]. Conversely, the last norm
N∞ is relative to robust choice. This norm is used in Robust Programming [121]
since it aims at selecting the alternative that better behaves in worst-case situations
or scenarios as shown in [122,123]. This norm is especially well-suited for single-shot
decision situations in which eventual bad outcomes of present decisions cannot be
overcome by good outcomes of further decisions.
In the present work, the influence of the different norms on the resulting decisions
is illustrated in the case study relative to the strategic combination of a RES unit
with storage, in section 4.6.
The following sections present the application of the generic decision-making
proposed in section 4.3.2 to three different cases: the reference participation in the
day-ahead market, the participation in the intraday market as a financial solution
and the combination with a storage unit as a physical solution.
4.4 Application of the decision-making method for trad-
ing renewable generation in the day-ahead market
This section focuses on the participation of an IPP in a day-ahead electricity market.
The generation units of the IPP are considered to be only renewable power sources.
The participation in the day-ahead market can be considered as a particular case
of financial solution where the decision UDA consists in a quantity-price bid for
each time period of the next day. For a given period Ti, the decision u
DA
Ti
is the
combination of the quantity bid EBDATi and the price bid Π
BDA
Ti
uDATi =
(
EBDATi , Π
BDA
Ti
)
, and UDA =
[(
EBDATi , Π
BDA
Ti
)]n
i=1
(4.20)
In most day-ahead markets, the time period Ti is one hour and the number of time
periods is thus 24.
4.4.1 Main hypotheses
Price-taker hypothesis
The day-ahead market is supposed to be based on a single price market mecha-
nism, where the market clearing price and traded volumes are determined through
marginal pricing. Also, the IPP is supposed to be “price-taker”. This notion has
been defined in section 2.2.4. When the IPP is a price taker, the bid is price-
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independent and the decision only deals with the energy quantity to propose:
UDAprice taker =
[
EBDATi
]n
i=1
(4.21)
Independence of the decisions
Also, the IPP is supposed to propose n consecutive energy bids relative to the n time
periods of the following day, where n is the number of time periods. In this case, the
IPP includes only RES units, whose generation is supposed to be non-dispatchable.
Also the generation ramps are not considered. Consequently, the energy bid for
a given time period Ti is supposed to be independent from the other energy bids
relative to the time periods Tj , j 6= i. In other words, the day-ahead market bidding
is supposed to be done independently for each market-time unit. Note that
the consideration of the temporal dependence between consecutive decisions will be
the main focus of section 4.6 relative to the operation of a storage unit combined
with RES unit.
Based on these hypotheses, the general decision problem relative to the quantity-
price bid for the nmarket times can be simplified to n independent decision problems
relative to the energy bid for one market time. For a given market time unit Ti, this
decision is denoted as UDATi and is derived as:
UDATi = u
DA
Ti = E
BDA
Ti
(4.22)
d d+1 d+212h00 00h00 24h00
Ti td
UTi = uTi =  ETi
BDADA DA
Figure 4.3: Example of the participation in the Elspot day-ahead market (NordPool).
Figure 4.3 presents the decision relative to the trading in the Elspot day-ahead
market, in the Nordic countries. This decision takes into account the price taker
hypothesis and the independence of the decisions. The gate closure time is the time
td when the decision is made. This time is at 12h00 the day d in the example. The
market time unit is one hour. The vertical red line represents the instant when the
decision is made.
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4.4.2 Formulation of the specific problem
The participation in the day-ahead market is considered as a particular case of
financial solution in the generic decision-making method. The loss function specific
to the day-ahead trading for a market time unit Ti is denoted as λ
DA
Ti and is derived
from the generic loss function λ given in Equation 4.8. In this case, the day-ahead
market participation is considered as a financial solution (i.e. Sx : DA) and no
physical solution is considered (i.e. Sy : {}), which leads to YTi = 0 and yTi = 0.
Also, in the particular case of the day-ahead market participation, the quantity
EDATi is taken as zero in Equation 4.8, in a similar way as already demonstrated in
Equation 3.81 for the derivation of the generic imbalance penalty function. Still
from Equation 3.81, the energy volume x and the additional cost X are set to:
XTi = 0, and xTi = E
CDA
Ti
(4.23)
where ECDATi is the energy contract in the day-ahead market for the market time Ti.
This contract is a function of the energy bid EBDATi . This function is denoted as hDA
and models the day-ahead market settlement. Also, in the case of price taker IPP,
the quantity bid is always traded and accepted in the market and consequently, the
day-ahead energy contract equals the day-ahead quantity bid:
ECDATi = hDA,Ti
(
EBDATi
)
= EBDATi (4.24)
Consequently, the loss functionλ
DA
Ti is derived from Equation 4.8, with uTi = E
BDA
Ti
,
vTi = 0, and the hDA,Ti function defined in Equation 4.24, as follows:
λ
DA
Ti (uTi , vTi) = λ
DA
Ti (E
BDA
Ti
, 0) (4.25)
= δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
CDA(hDA(E
BDA))
)
(4.26)
= δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
BDA
Ti
)
(4.27)
Then, the optimal day-ahead energy bid EBDA,∗Ti for the period Ti is given by the
optimization problem formulated in Equation 4.10. The decision problem is for only
one time unit (i.e. n = 1) and thus the norm in Equation 4.10 N is the identity
function: N (x) = x:
EBDA,∗Ti = argmin
E
BDA
Ti
λ
DA
Ti (E
BDA
Ti
, 0), subject to CDA (4.28)
with λ
DA
Ti (E
BDA
Ti
, 0) = δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
BDA
Ti
)
. The constraints CDA on the day-ahead
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market energy bid are given by the market rules. These constraints depend on
the considered day-ahead market. The main bidding constraints for day-ahead bids
refer to price-dependent bids. However, in this application, the price-taker IPP is
proposing a price-independent bid. Consequently, these constraints do not apply to
the decision EBDA . The optimization problem in this formulation is thus taken as
an unconstrained one: CDA = ∅.
Also, by considering Equation 4.11, the loss function given in the previous equa-
tion can be rewritten as:
λ
DA
Ti (E
BDA
Ti
, 0) =
∣∣∣ÊTi|td − EBDATi ∣∣∣× ∆̂ΠTi|td (4.29)
The energy forecast ÊTi|td and price forecast ∆̂
Π
Ti|td
taken in this decision-making
problem are the latest available forecasts at decision time td. The short-term gen-
eration forecasting methods for obtaining the energy forecast ÊTi|td are detailed in
section B.2. Similarly, the price forecast ∆̂ΠTi|td is obtained from approaches which
are described in section C.4.
4.4.3 Illustration of the loss function of the problem
The expression of the loss function λ
DA
given in Equation 4.29 can be developed by
taking into account the definition of the market price ∆̂Π given in Equation 3.8. In
the present example, the IPP is supposed to participate in the day-ahead market
only for selling energy and consequently, EBDA ≥ 0. Consequently, the loss function
λ
DA
is a piecewise linear function defined as follows:
λ
DA
(EBDA , 0) =
∆̂Π+ × Ê − ∆̂Π+ × EBDA ⇐ 0 ≤ EBDA ≤ Ê−∆̂Π− × Ê + ∆̂Π− × EBDA ⇐ Ê ≤ EBDA (4.30)
EE
~
δDA (E , E )
δDA(E, E ) 
E^
~
^
λDA (E ,0)
E^
BDA
BDA
^ BDA
BDAE
BDA^
0
0
0
0
E
BDA
0
λDA (E ,0)BDA
0
Figure 4.4: Relation between the functions λ
DA
and δ̂
DA
.
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Such λ
DA
function is represented in Figure 4.4. This figure also illustrates the
relation between the loss function λ
DA
and the corresponding estimated penalization
function δ̂
DA
, given in Equation 4.27. More precisely, the figure illustrates that, for
a given energy bid EBDA0 :
δ̂
DA
(Ê, EBDA0 ) = λ
DA
(EBDA0 , 0) (4.31)
Note that the previous plots of the function δ
DA
in the preceding chapter take EDA
as reference value, and not EBDA as shown in Figure 4.4. Actually, the quantity EDA
used in the previous chapter corresponds to the contracted volume EDA = ECDA ,
and in this example, ECDA = EBDA as a result of the price-taker hypothesis. This
explains why the volume EBDA is taken as the reference value for the estimated
penalization function δ̂
DA
in this figure. Also, in the example taken for the figure,
the estimated penalization of negative imbalance is lower than the one for positive
imbalance: 0 < ∆̂Π− < ∆̂
Π
+, which explains why the absolute value of the slope of the
δ̂
DA
function is lower for negative imbalances than the one for positive imbalances.
4.4.4 Resolution of the specific problem
This paragraph presents the resolution of the optimization problem given in Equa-
tion 4.28, by considering the formulation of the loss function in Equation 4.30.
The generation forecast Ê is assumed to be positive. Also, the price forecasts
∆̂Π− and ∆̂
Π
+ for negative and positive imbalance, respectively, are positive. Then,
the analysis of the loss function λ
DA
from Equation 4.30 shows that this function is
positive, and reaches its minimum for EBDA = Ê. The function λ
DA
is zero at this
minimum.
Consequently, the optimal day-ahead energy bid EBDA,∗ given by the decision-
making problem formulated in Equation 4.28 equals the estimation Ê of the delivered
energy: EBDA,∗ = Ê. This optimal energy bid is in this case independent from the
forecast of the price for imbalance.
4.4.5 Case study
Description of the case study
This section presents the simulation results obtained for the participation of a wind
farm as a balance responsible party in the day-ahead market. The methodology
followed is described in Figure 4.5. It is similar to Figure 3.7 presented in the case
study relative to the evaluation of the solutions for reducing the imbalance penalties,
in section 3.5.
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energy
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energy
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Market price
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E
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module:
DECISION
BDA
δDAImbalance penalty: 
E , ΠDA
Ewf^
Imbalance penalty 
price forecast : Δ^Π
Wind power 
forecasts: Ewf^
Δ^Π
CDA
CDA
Figure 4.5: Schematic representation of the overall simulation, including the decision-
making method relative to the trading in the day-ahead market.
In Figure 4.5, the day-ahead energy bid EBDA is presented as the result of a
decision-making method which takes into account the latest available wind power
forecast Êwf and imbalance penalty price forecast ∆̂
Π. The energy bid is derived
from the optimization problem formulated in Equation 4.28. In this particular case,
the analysis of the loss function for the specific problem in the previous paragraph
has demonstrated that the energy bid is actually independent from the penalty price
forecast ∆̂Π. However, this conclusion is specific to this particular simplification of
the day-ahead trading problem and is not true in the general case. Consequently,
the penalty price forecast ∆̂Π is maintained as an input for the general problem of
day-ahead trading.
The contracted energy ECDA and price ΠDA result from the market settlement.
Because the wind farm is participating as a “price-taker”, the contracted energy
equals the energy bid. The imbalance penalty δ
DA
results from the penalization of
the energy imbalance.
Results
The case study is based on the same wind farm as the reference wind farm taken in
section 3.5. This wind farm is a 18 MWwind farm located in Western Denmark. The
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Figure 4.6: Normalized Mean Absolute Error for five wind power forecasting models (i.e.
persistence, constant prediction, RPC, QRF and perfect prediction models) and resulting
imbalance penalties δ
DA
.
wind farm production is traded on the NordPool Elspot day-ahead market during
the period between the 01/10/2003 and the 30/06/2004. In NordPool, the contracts
for the coming day are traded on the day-ahead market, named Elspot [42]. The
market time step equals 1 h. The Elspot gate closure time is at 12:00 pm (local
time) of the preceding day.
Figure 4.6 presents the influence of the forecasting performance, described here
through the Normalized Mean Absolute Error (NMAE), on the total imbalance
penalty obtained using five different wind power forecasting approaches. These
approaches are the same as the ones presented in section B.2, where the NMAEs re-
sulting from each of these models are compared. The imbalance penalty and NMAE
are naturally zero in the case of perfect prediction. Regarding the advanced statis-
tical approaches “Regressive Power Curve (RPC)” and “Quantile Regression Forest
(QRF)”, the resulting forecasts are based on Hirlam Numerical Weather Predictions.
The training data set covers the first nine months of the year 2003. Figure 4.6(a)
shows that the relation between the NMAE and the imbalance penalty is nearly
linear. The numerical values of the NMAE and imbalance penalty relative to the
figure 4.6(a) are given in the table 4.6(b). In particular, the imbalance penalty when
using “RPC” is similar to the one obtained when using “QRF”, and is close to 55 %
of the one obtained when using the persistence approach for wind power forecasting.
Figure 4.7 also describes the influence of the NMAE on the imbalance penalty.
The results presented in this graph are taken from the aggregation case study al-
ready presented in 3.5. The wind farm selected for the previous results in Figure 4.6
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Figure 4.7: Normalized Mean Absolute Error and normalized imbalance penalty relative to
the aggregation of n wind farms, with n = 1 ... 20..
is taken as the reference wind farm. Each point corresponds to a given combina-
tion of the reference wind farm with n other wind farms which are also located in
Western Denmark. The number n of wind farms varies between 0 and 19, which
gives a total of 524288 cases. Generally, the wind farm aggregation reduces the
power forecasting errors since the errors relative to the aggregated wind farms may
compensate each other. This forecasting error reduction depends for example on
the number of aggregated wind farms, and also on the geographical dispersion of
the wind farms. Consequently, the NMAE relative to the reference wind farm in the
case of aggregation varies according to the aggregation combinations, and ranges
from 6.2 % to 12.1 % of the nominal power of the reference wind farm. From these
simulations, we conclude that the imbalance penalty is highly correlated with the
NMAE, with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.92. In other words, these results
confirm that using wind power forecasting methods with low NMAE for day-ahead
trading generally reduces the resulting imbalance penalty.
4.4.6 Conclusions
In this section, the generic decision method proposed in the previous section 4.3
has been applied to the reference case of trading renewable generation in the day-
ahead market. When considering the given market rules, the optimization approach
demonstrated that the day-ahead energy bid which minimizes the imbalance penalty
coincides with the value of the wind energy forecast.
Consequently, the participation in the day-ahead market can be considered as
a specific evaluation of the performance of the wind power forecasting tools. The
results obtained from the simulation of the participation of a given wind farm with
five different forecasting models clearly demonstrate the value of the wind power
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forecasting, in terms of imbalance penalty reduction.
Finally, these results have been obtained without considering any information
about the uncertainty related to the wind power forecasts. Such information, com-
bined with information about the imbalance penalty price, could be useful for further
improving the strategic participation of renewable generation in day-ahead electri-
city market. This approach is developed in the next chapter.
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4.5 Application of the decision-making method for the
combined participation in the day-ahead and intra-
day markets
This section focuses on the strategic participation of an IPP in an intraday market for
reducing the imbalance penalty related to the trading in the day-ahead market. The
generation portfolio of the IPP is supposed to include only RES units. The strategic
additional participation in the intraday market is one of the financial solutions
which has been described in section 2.3.1 and formulated in section 3.2.1. This
section presents the application of the generic decision-making method proposed in
section 4.3 to this specific financial solution.
4.5.1 Main hypotheses
Day-ahead market
The considered day-ahead market is based on a single market price clearing pro-
cess. Also, similarly to the previous example, the IPP participates in the day-ahead
market as a price taker entity, and the quantity bid is proposed based on the latest
available estimations of RES generation for the different market time periods.
Intraday market
The considered intraday market is based on a pay-as-bid market clearing process,
which is a continuous trading mechanism. Trading takes place in a central exchange
where standard products are traded on a “first-come-first-serve” basis: the first
matching offer to a bid (or vice versa) is rewarded and fixed into two bilateral
transactions between the seller and the buyer. Such a pricing mechanism is denoted
as pay-as-bid pricing. Contrary to single price market mechanism, where the IPP
can participate as a price taker entity, the intraday bid price is part of the decision
in the pay-as-bid mechanism since it will influence the amount of traded energy.
Figure 4.8 describes the proposed decision scheme relative to the combined par-
ticipation in day-ahead and intraday markets. The instants when decisions relative
to the intraday participation are made, are represented by the vertical red lines.
The possibility to trade electricity in the continuous market is offered after the day-
ahead gate closure time, and lasts till one hour before delivery. These periods are
represented by the horizontal light-red lines. The bids are proposed independently
for each market time period Ti.
The method is illustrated with the Elspot day-ahead market and the Elbas in-
traday market, in the Nordic countries. The Elspot market is based on a single price
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Figure 4.8: Example of a combined participation in the Elspot day-ahead and Elbas intraday
markets (NordPool). Bids in the Elbas market are proposed 6 hours before the delivery time.
clearing process while the Elbas is based on continuous trading with pay-as-bid pro-
cess. In the example, the bids in the Elbas are proposed 6 hours before delivery.
The instant when bids are proposed is also strategic: early bids offer more trading
possibilities while late bids offer the possibility to benefit from updated RES gen-
eration forecasts for proposing a bid which can reduce the exposition of the IPP to
imbalance penalties.
In the present study, the bids proposed by the IPP for the intraday markets are
only selling, and not buying bids. The proposition of selling bids is a solution to
reduce the positive energy imbalance resulting from the day-ahead market participa-
tion, but not the negative imbalances. The reduction of negative imbalances would
be possible if the trading of buying bids was considered.
4.5.2 Formulation and proposal of a solution for the specific pro-
blem
Formulation of the optimization problem
The formulation of the participation in the day-ahead market is similar to the one
given in the previous section: the quantity bid for a given time period equals the
estimate of the energy delivered for the same period, which is available at the day-
ahead closure time. The resulting day-ahead energy contract ECDATi and price Π
DA
Ti
are settled before trading in the intraday market, and are thus considered as known
in the following decision-making problem relative to the intraday trading.
The participation in the intraday market consists in determining, for a given
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market time period Ti, the quantity price bid u
ID
Ti
=
(
EBIDTi , Π
BID
Ti
)
. Also, the
decision uIDTi is made independently for each time period Ti, and similarly to the
day-ahead bid, the intraday bid decision is given by:
U IDTi = u
ID
Ti =
(
EBIDTi , Π
BID
Ti
)
(4.32)
The optimal participation in the intraday market is then determined from the
generic optimization problem given in Equation 4.10, for the case of the financial
solution. More precisely, the loss function in the case of intraday trading, for a
given market time unit Ti, is denoted as λ
DA
ID,Ti and is derived from the generic loss
function λ given in Equation 4.8.
In this case, the financial solution is the intraday trading (i.e. Sx : ID) and no
physical solution is considered (i.e. Sy : {}), which leads to YTi = 0 and yTi = 0.
Also, in this case, the energy volume x and the additional cost X are given by
Equation 3.13. The intraday energy volume EID and intraday price ΠID mentioned
in the latter equation are implicitly the intraday contract volume ECID and intra-
day contract price ΠCID , since Equation 3.13 is derived for the evaluation of the
penalty based on these contracts, and does not focus on the decision relative to
these contracts. Then, Equation 3.13 can be written as:XTi = E
CID
Ti
×
(
ΠDATi −Π
CID
Ti
)
xTi = E
CID
Ti
(4.33)
Moreover, the intraday contract energy ECID and price ΠCID are given from the
intraday bid (EBIDTi ,Π
BID
Ti
) by the functions hE
ID,Ti
and hΠ
ID,Ti
:E
CID
Ti
= hE
ID,Ti
(EBIDTi ,Π
BID
Ti
)
ΠCIDTi = h
Π
ID,Ti
(EBIDTi ,Π
BID
Ti
)
(4.34)
These functions model the intraday market settlement, and are presented in the
next paragraph.
Finally, the loss function λ
DA
ID,Ti is derived from the considerations given above
in Equation 4.8. In particular, the quantities x and X are obtained by combining
Equation 4.34 with Equation 4.33:
λ
DA
ID,Ti(uTi , vTi) = λ
DA
ID,Ti((E
BID
Ti
, ΠBIDTi ), 0) (4.35)
= hE
ID,Ti(E
BID
Ti
,ΠBIDTi )×
(
ΠDATi − h
Π
ID,Ti(E
BID
Ti
,ΠBIDTi )
)
(4.36)
+ δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
CDA + hE
ID,Ti(E
BID
Ti
,ΠBIDTi )
)
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Then, the optimal intraday bid
(
EBIDTi , Π
BID
Ti
)∗
for the period Ti is given by the
optimization problem formulated in Equation 4.10. Similarly to the decision for the
day-ahead trading, the decision problem is for only one time unit (i.e. n = 1) and
thus the norm in Equation 4.10 N is the identity function: N (x) = x:(
EBIDTi , Π
BID
Ti
)∗
= argmin(
E
BID
Ti
, Π
BID
Ti
) λDAID,Ti
(
EBIDTi , Π
BID
Ti
)
, subject to CID (4.37)
where λ
DA
ID,Ti is given in Equation 4.36. The constraints CID on the intraday bid are
given by the market rules. They are similar to the constraints CDA relative to the
day-ahead market, and the impact of these constraints on the proposed solutions is
explained in the next paragraph.
The generation forecast ÊTi|td and the price forecsat ∆̂
Π
Ti|td
which is used for the
derivation of the δ̂
DA
function are the latest available forecasts.
Model of the intraday market settlement
In the pay-as-bid market process, a trade occurs when the selling and buying bids
match. The contract price then equals the bid price:
ΠCID = ΠBID (4.38)
In other words, the function hΠ
ID
given in Equation 4.34 is the identity function.
The intraday energy contract ECID depends on the buying bids of the other
participants. This contract has been modeled as a function hE
ID
of the quantity-price
bid (ΠBID , EBID) in Equation 4.34. In this work, we propose to model the energy
contract ECID as a proportion of the bid energy quantity EBID . This proportion
models the bid acceptance and is expressed by a coefficient α which depends on the
bid price ΠBID :
ECID = hID(
(
EBID , ΠBID
)
= α(ΠBID)× EBID (4.39)
For a given delivery period, the price of the energy transactions in the intra-
day market is not fixed and depends on the proposed bids. The available public
information from the market operator for the intraday trading prices consists of
the minimum, the maximum and the mean of the intraday trading price ΠID of the
energy traded for each delivery time period. These values inform about the distribu-
tion of this trading price for each delivery period. Here, the intraday trading price
ΠID is modeled as a random variable which follows a triangular distribution. This
130
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
distribution is completely defined by the minimum, mean and maximum prices. An
example of such a distribution is shown in the upper plot of Figure 4.9.
The proposed market settlement model consists in modeling the proportion α of
accepted energy by the probability of having the bid accepted for a given bid price.
Since a trade occurs when the selling and buying bids match, this probability can
be estimated through the probability of having the bid price ΠBID inferior to the
trading price ΠID:
α = prob(ΠBID < ΠID)
= 1− prob(ΠID ≤ ΠBID)
= 1− FΠID(Π
BID) (4.40)
where FΠID is the cumulated distribution function (cdf) of the trading price Π
ID.
This model is illustrated in the lower part of Figure 4.9. In the example, the pro-
posed bid price (38.5 e/MWh) leads to a proportion α = 0.25 of accepted bid.
Consequently, in for example, the energy bid EBID equals 4 MWh, the resulting
energy contract ECID will be of 1 MWh.
Finally, this model only considers the bid price to determine whether the bid is
accepted or not, and does not consider either the market liquidity or the time when
the intraday bid is proposed.
37.5 38 38.5 39 39.5
0
1
2
mean : 38.2p
df
ΠID(eur/MWh)
37.5 38 38.5 39 39.5
0
0.5
1
bid price :      
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α: 0.251 
− 
cd
f
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Figure 4.9: Upper: Example of modeling the intraday trading price through a triangular
distribution. Lower: Resulting estimation of the α proportion. This example correspond to
the data from the Elbas intraday market (NordPool) the 27/10/2003 at 18h00.
By considering the proposed market settlement model from Equation 4.39 and
Equation 4.38, the formulation of the loss function λ
DA
ID
given in Equation 4.36 can
be simplified as:
λ
DA
ID
(
(EBID ,ΠBID), 0
)
= α·EBID×
(
ΠDA −ΠBID
)
+δ̂
DA (
Ê, ECDA + α · EBID
)
(4.41)
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where α is the proportion of accepted bid given in Equation 4.40. In this formulation,
the loss is given as the sum of a cost α ·EBID ×
(
ΠDA −ΠBID
)
, which represents the
cost related to the participation in the intraday market, and the estimation of the
imbalance penalties.
4.5.3 Illustration of the loss function of the problem
This section gives an illustration of the loss function λ
DA
ID
for a given market time unit
Ti for better understanding its structure. If we combine the definition of the function
δ̂
DA
given in Equation 4.11 with the previous loss formulation in Equation 4.41, the
loss function can further be expressed as follows:
λ
DA
ID
(
(EBID ,ΠBID), 0
)
= (4.42){
∆̂Π+ × (Ê − E
CDA)− (∆̂Π+ − (Π
DA −ΠBID))× α · EBID ⇐ 0 ≤ EBID ≤ Ê−E
CDA
α
−∆̂Π
−
× (Ê − ECDA) + (∆̂Π
−
+ (ΠDA −ΠBID))× α · EBID ⇐ Ê−E
CDA
α ≤ E
BID
The specific value Ê−E
CDA
α is obtained when α · E
BID = Ê − ECDA which cor-
responds to ECID = Ê − ECDA . For this specific value, the total contract energy
EC = ECDA+ECID equals the generation forecast Ê, and consequently the estimated
energy imbalance is null.
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Figure 4.10: Relation between λ
DA
ID
and δ̂
DA
ID
The formulation of the loss function λ
DA
ID
given in is Equation 4.42 is illustrated in
the right part of Figure 4.10. This plot is made with a fixed value of bid price ΠBID ,
and consequently, the loss function λ
DA
ID
is a piecewise linear function of the quantity
bid EBID . Figure 4.10 more generally illustrates the relation between the estimated
penalization function δ̂
DA
ID
and the loss function λ
DA
ID
, which is the application of the
general relation given in Equation 4.7 for the specific problem of intraday trading.
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For a given energy bid EBID0 , such relation is given by:
δ̂
DA
ID |(EBID=E
BID
0 )
(Ê, ECDA) = λ
DA
ID
(
(EBID0 ,Π
BID), 0
)
(4.43)
This figure 4.10 shows how the penalization function δ̂
DA
ID
which was proposed for
evaluating the imbalance penalty from the delivered energy E˜, is used for the defini-
tion of the loss function λ
DA
ID
, which is used for the decision of the bid (EBID ,ΠBID).
This figure is the follow-up of the example illustrated in Figure 4.4. The same values
of regulation prices are taken: the penalization of negative imbalance is lower than
the penalization of positive imbalance: 0 < ∆̂Π− < ∆̂
Π
+. Also for this example, the
intraday price is taken lower than the day-ahead price ΠBID < ΠDA.
Proposal of a simplified solution of the decision-making problem
In general, the resolution of the optimization problem given in Equation 4.37, where
the objective function is the cost function λ
DA
ID
given in Equation 4.42, is based
on the generation forecast Ê, the forecast of the price for positive and negative
imbalance ∆̂Π+ and ∆̂
Π
−, and also on estimations of the distribution of the intraday
price for the market settlement α-model. In this work, the generation forecasts
are given by short-term forecasting methods which are presented in section B.1.
However, forecasting the distribution of the intraday price is not a trivial task, and
is out of the scope of the present work. Also the results from the resolution of this
decision-making problem might be sensitive to the price forecast errors.
Consequently, the proposed approach is not based on a resolution of the gen-
eral problem described through the loss function is Equation 4.37, but is based on
particular values of the loss function, which are determined from the analysis of
the loss function. The proposed simplified approach consists in bidding in
the intraday market in order to adjust the contracted production using
updated wind power forecasts. Consequently, the intraday bid quantity for a
delivery period Ti equals the difference between the forecasted energy ÊTi|td for the
period Ti available at time td, and the energy contracted in the day-ahead market
ECDATi for the same period. Also, the quantity bid is positive since the wind power
producer is assumed to participate in the electricity market only with selling (offer)
bid.
EBIDTi =
ÊTi|td − E
CDA
Ti
, ÊTi|td > E
DA
Ti
0, ÊTi|td ≤ E
CDA
Ti
(4.44)
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td is the decision time relative to the participation in the intraday market for the
delivery period Ti. The proposed energy bid given by Equation 4.44 is supposed to
be in accordance with the constraints CID associated with the intraday trading.
If the α parameter which models the proportion of accepted bid equals 1, then
EBIDTi = E
CID
Ti
, and the proposed bid in Equation 4.44 corresponds to the specific
value Ê−E
CDA
α described in the analysis of the loss function in the previous para-
graph. Also, in the proposed model, α depends on the bid price ΠBID , and thus, we
consider different values of bid price ΠBID for analyzing the influence of this price
on the decision. Two specific values of ΠBID have to be noted:
• ΠBID = ΠDA: in this case, the additional cost α ·EBID ×
(
ΠDA −ΠBID
)
is zero.
Also, in the case of perfect prediction of the RES generation, the loss λ
DA
ID
is reduced to 0 after the intraday market participation if the intraday energy
contract equals the difference between the estimated energy and the day-ahead
energy contract: ECID = Ê − ECDA .
• ΠBID = Π̂+, where Π̂+ is the forecast regulation price for positive imbalance.
In the case of positive imbalance, the energy imbalance is penalized through
the function δ̂
DA
by the price difference ∆̂DA,+Π = Π
DA − Π̂+. If ΠBID = Π̂+,
Equation 4.42 shows that the loss λ
DA
ID
is independent from the intraday quan-
tity bid. In other words, the loss is unchanged by the participation in the
intraday market: λ
DA
ID
= λ
DA
.
Finally, the intraday bid price is formulated from the two prices ΠDA and Π̂+ as
follows:
ΠBID = Π̂+ + β ×
(
ΠDA − Π̂+
)
, β ∈ [−0.2, 2.2] (4.45)
In this bid decision, the parameter β enables to get different values of bid price. The
proposed bid prices given by Equation 4.45 are supposed to be in accordance with
the constraints CID associated with the intraday trading. More precisely, Π
DA ≥ Π̂+
and thus the bid price increases as β increases. Also, the two specific prices Π̂+ and
ΠDA are obtained for β = 0 and β = 1 respectively. The lower and upper bounds for
the β values are determined so that the variations of β are symmetric around ΠDA.
Finally, the different proposed values for β permit to perform a sensitivity analysis
on the bid price ΠBID in order to evaluate the influence of the bid price value on the
reduction of imbalance penalty.
134
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
Intraday trading
Day-ahead
trading
Wind power 
forecasts
Wind power 
measurements
Contracted
energy Ec:
Ec=E     +E
E
Ewf Delivered 
energy
Up/down regulation 
price
Down regulation 
price forecast
Market price
Market
settlement
Intraday bid: 
E      ,Π
Down regulation 
price forecast
Day-ahead 
Market price
Bidding 
module:
DECISION
Wind power 
forecast
BID
δ
E    , Π
DA
Imbalance 
penalty: 
Intraday
trading
ID
BID
E
Intraday market price
Day-ahead contract 
energy E
ΠDA
ΠID
Π^+
Ewf^
ΠDA
Π^+
Ewf^
CID CID
CID
CIDCDA
CDA
CDA
Figure 4.11: Schematic representation of the overall simulation, including the trading in
the day-ahead market and the decision-making method relative to the trading in the intraday
market.
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4.5.4 Case study
Description of the case study
This section presents the results obtained from simulation of the participation of
a wind farm in a day-ahead market, and in the corresponding intraday market.
The simulation methodology followed for obtaining these results is described in Fi-
gure 4.11. This figure is similar to the scheme presented in the reference participation
in the day-ahead market in section 4.4, or the evaluation of the solutions for reducing
the imbalance penalties, in section 3.5.
In Figure 4.11, the intraday quantity-price bid results from the decision given in
Equation 4.44 for the energy quantity EBID and in Equation 4.45 for the price ΠBID .
The intraday market settlement results from the model proposed in section 4.5.2.
The imbalance penalty δ
DA
ID
results from the penalization of the energy imbalance
between the delivered energy E˜wf and the total contracted energy E
C = ECDA + ECID .
The case study is based on the same wind farm as the one taken for the case study
corresponding to the reference participation in the day-ahead market in section 4.4.
This wind farm is a 18MW wind farm located in Western Denmark. The wind farm
generation is traded in the NordPool Elspot day-ahead market and in the Elbas
intraday market during the period between the 01/10/2003 and the 31/06/2004.
The Elbas market is a contract based market, with a pay-as-bid market settlement
mechanism. The intraday market closes one hour before the delivery period. In the
present case, the wind farm operator is supposed to propose the intraday bids 6
hours before the delivery period.
The wind power forecasting approach used for this case study is a power curve
modeling approach, denoted as “regressive power curve”(RPC) model. This model
is one of the models which have been used in the previous case study, referring to
the day-ahead trading. Details about this model are given in appendix B.2.
Regarding the forecast of the regulation price for positive imbalance (also called
down regulation price) Π̂+, two methods are considered. The first one is a realistic
and basic approach where Π̂+ equals a constant ratio of the day-ahead price. This
ratio is lower than one because regulation price for positive imbalance is lower than
the day-ahead price, and this ratio is calculated as the mean value of the ratio
between the regulation price for positive imbalance and the day-ahead price, for a
learning period during the first 9 months of 2003. Such constant equals 0.79. The
second approach assumes a perfect prediction for Π̂+.
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Figure 4.12: Example of the reduction of energy imbalance resulting from the combined
participation in the day-ahead and intraday market.
Results and discussion
This section gives the results from the simulation of the combined participation
in the day-ahead and intraday markets. First, Figure 4.12 illustrates the intraday
energy bid and contract for a given day of the simulation, the 27/10/2003. The
intraday energy bid aims at reducing the energy imbalance between the day-ahead
contract and the wind farm energy delivery. This bid is determined based on the
latest available wind power forecast. The wind power forecast used for the intraday
bid may have an error greater than the one used for the day-ahead trading. In this
case, the energy imbalance resulting from the combined day-ahead and intraday
trading is greater than the one relative to the trading only in the day-ahead market.
This phenomenon can be observed in the first graph of Figure 4.12 between hour 8
and hour 11. However, the wind power forecast used for trading in intraday market,
which is obtained 6 hours before delivery, is generally more accurate than the one
used for trading in day-ahead, which is obtained between 14 and 37 hours before
the delivery. This results from the fact that the forecasting error increases as the
forecasting horizon increases, as described in Figure B.2. The reduction of energy
imbalance is particularly clear in the first graph, between hour 12 and hour 19.
Also, still in Figure 4.12, the second graph illustrates the intraday market settle-
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Figure 4.13: Results from the simulation of the combined participation in the day-ahead
and intraday market during the period between the 01/10/2003 and the 30/06/2004.
ment model proposed in section 4.5.2. This graph plots the intraday energy bid and
the resulting contract. The difference between the bid and the contract is explained
by the relative position of the intraday bid price compared to the distribution of the
intraday price proposed by all the market participants for the same time step (third
plot). When the proposed intraday bid price is lower than the minimum intraday
price, the whole energy bid is accepted. In other words, the coefficient α equals one.
However, when the proposed price ranges between the minimum and maximum in-
traday price, only a proportion 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is accepted. This can be observed for
hours 14− 16.
The next results focuses on the influence of the decision-making parameter β
on the imbalance penalties. The results are presented for both the constant and
perfect prediction methods regarding the forecast of the regulation price for positive
imbalance Π̂+. The reference results are the one obtained when trading only in the
day-ahead market.
The graph at the top of figure 4.13(a) describes the influence of the intraday bid
price parameter β on the intraday contract energy. The horizontal line shows the
intraday bid energy which is independent of the parameter β. The ratio between the
contracted energy and the bid energy represents the α proportion. The simulation
shows that increasing the bid price (through the β parameter) decreases the α pro-
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Figure 4.14: Results from the simulation of the combined participation in the day-ahead
and intraday market during the period between the 01/10/2003 and the 30/06/2004.
portion of contracted energy, for both the realistic and the perfect prediction cases.
The second plot shows the influence of the β parameter on the surplus energy. First,
this graph illustrates the reduction of surplus energy imbalance (also called positive
imbalance) resulting from the energy selling in the intraday market. This reduction
is influenced by β. Low values of β lead to high values of intraday contracts and,
consequently, high reduction of surplus energy. Conversely, high values of β lead to a
lower reduction of surplus energy. Generally, the results using the perfect prediction
for Π̂+ are less sensitive to the β parameter, but the main analyses are valid for
both constant and perfect prediction approaches.
Figure 4.13(b) describes the influence of the β parameter on the constant cost
EID × (ΠDA − ΠID), and on the positive imbalance penalties. When the β parame-
ter increases, the intraday bid price increases and the intraday contracted energy
decreases, which decreases the intraday cost as shown with figure 4.13(a). The in-
traday cost markedly decreases for the β ≤ 0, and is zero for β = 0. The lower graph
of figure 4.13(b) corresponds to the equivalent in terms of imbalance penalty of the
second graph of figure 4.13(a) on the left, which plots the positive imbalance energy.
For low values of β, the surplus cost, which is the penalty for positive imbalance
energy, is reduced to nearly 50 % of the reference surplus cost. The surplus cost
rapidly increases for β values around 1, and reaches more than 90 % of the reference
surplus cost for β ≥ 2.
Finally, Figure 4.14 describes the consequences of the decision parameter β vari-
ation on the imbalance penalties. The imbalance penalty results from the intraday
139
Formulation of the decision-making problem
cost, in addition to the surplus and shortage costs. It is thus the combination of the
two graphs of figure 4.13(b). The left figure 4.14(a) describes the imbalance penalty
normalized by the reference one. For both constant and perfect prediction of Π̂+,
the imbalance penalty is reduced as β increases, for β ≤ 1 and β ≤ 0.9 respec-
tively. A minimum imbalance penalty is reached for β = 1 and β = 0.9, respectively
for the constant and perfect prediction. Then the imbalance penalty increases for
greater values of β. The minimum imbalance penalty represents 91 and 94 % of the
reference penalty for the perfect and constant prediction of Π̂+, respectively. The
reference imbalance penalty equals 45370 e in this case study, and the imbalance re-
duction thus represents approximately 2800 and 4000 e for the constant and perfect
prediction of Π̂+.
The figure 4.14(b) shows how reproducible the obtained results are. Instead
of considering the whole 9 month period as the simulation period, this period is
split into 9 one-month periods. For each of these one-month periods, the minimum
obtained imbalance penalty is plotted, as well as the β value corresponding to this
minimum. The graph demonstrates that most of the simulations show a reduction of
the imbalance penalty. Also, most of the minimum imbalance penalties are obtained
with a β parameter close to 1. The three cases with β = 2.2 correspond to a decreas-
ing function of the imbalance penalty, where no minimum is reached. The results
tend to confirm that the β values which gives the minimum imbalance penalty are
slightly lower in the case of perfect prediction of Π̂+ than for the constant prediction
case. This is explained by the fact that the average bias of the constant prediction
of Π̂+ is slightly positive, and consequently, the constant prediction approach is
overestimating Π̂+.
4.5.5 Conclusions
This case study presents the imbalance energy and penalty results related to the
strategic participation in the day-ahead and intraday market. They illustrate the
reduction of imbalance penalties relative the intraday market participation. They
confirm that the participation in an intraday market can be considered as a financial
solution for reducing the imbalance penalty, as proposed in section 2.3.1. More
precisely, the imbalance penalty reduction for the present case study reaches 9%
of the reference imbalance penalty obtained when participating only in the day-
ahead market. Also, the obtained results demonstrate a low sensibility of the results
regarding the regulation price forecasting approach.
In order to obtain these results, a model for the settlement of continuous trading
market is proposed. This model is based on the available data of market prices;
further work should consider the market liquidity. The influence of the time when
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the intraday bid is proposed should be considered as well.
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4.6 Application of the decision-making method for the
strategic operation of a Virtual Power Plant com-
posed of a renewables combined with storage
This section presents the application of the generic decision-making method pro-
posed in section 4.3 to the case of the strategic operation of a virtual power plant
composed of a RES unit combined with a storage unit. This combination is one
example of the proposed physical solutions for reducing the imbalance penalty, and
has been described in section 2.3.2 and formulated in section 3.3.4. This example
aims at demonstrating the benefits that might be obtained from the application of
an advanced intraday scheduling of the virtual power plant operation. This is done
by performing a rolling-window approach for dispatching the energy storage device
with the objective of minimizing the imbalance penalty risks associated with the
RES power forecast uncertainty.
4.6.1 Main hypotheses
2) Pumped-
Hydro Plant
1) Wind 
Farm
Electricity 
markets
Virtual power plant
~
Figure 4.15: Commercial VPP composed of a combination of a wind farm and a pumped-
hydro plant
As already stated, commercial Virtual Power Plants (CVPPs) consist in an ag-
gregation of different generation units in order to participate in the electricity market
as single entity. The Independent Power Producer (IPP) considered for this section
is the operator of a CVPP composed of a wind farm combined with a pumped-hydro
storage unit, as shown in Figure 4.15.
The priority in the management and operation of the storage is given to the
reduction of energy imbalances. As a consequence, the energy storage device is not
used either for buying energy in periods where the market price is considered to be
low enough, or for selling it back in periods where the market price is estimated
to be sufficiently high. Such a possibility is considered in [124] for example. More
generally, in the present study, the CVPP operator is considered to be only an
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energy producer, and not an energy consumer. In other words, the operator is not
able to buy energy from the market for charging the storage device. The storage is
solely charged by the RES power production when produced RES generation exceeds
contracted energy.
Finally, in this work the virtual power plant is supposed to participate only in
the day-ahead market and the CVPP operator is considered to be a price taker.
Description of the intraday scheduling and operation of the VPP
d d+1 d+2
Day-ahead 
market 
participation
Intraday 
scheduling
Operation
T1td
…       TnT2
V = [SOCTi   ] i =1
nSch.
T3
st
Figure 4.16: Coordination of the day-ahead market participation, intraday scheduling and
operation of the VPP. The vertical black lines indicate the instants when decisions are made.
The formulation of the participation in the day-ahead market is similar to the
one given for the day-ahead trading in section 4.4: the quantity bid for a given time
period equals the estimation of the energy delivered for the same period, which is
available at the day-ahead closure time. The resulting day-ahead energy contract
ECDATi and price Π
DA
Ti
are settled before the intraday scheduling, and are thus consi-
dered as known in the following decision-making problem. Note that in the present
study, the storage device is combined with the RES power unit only for reducing the
imbalance penalty, and, consequently, is not considered for the day-ahead market
participation. The first blue line in Figure 4.16 illustrates the day-ahead bid with a
gate closure time at 12h00.
Energy imbalance results from errors of the energy estimation used for the day-
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ahead market participation, and the storage unit is used for reducing such an imbal-
ance. During the operation stage, the limited capacity of the device implies that the
possibility to store or to deliver energy depends on the state-of-charge (SOC) level
of the device. The SOC level depends on the previous operation of the device. The
temporal dependence of the storage operation leads to the need of an anticipation
of the management of the storage device. For example, if the VPP operator wants
to avoid extreme energy imbalances, the intraday storage management will permit
to adapt the SOC level so that the storage device has the ability to store or inject
power at that critical point of time. For achieving this goal, updated wind power
forecasts are used to estimate the expected imbalance between the energy contracted
in the day-ahead market and the future delivery. The resulting storage schedule is
continuously updated for anticipating these imbalances.
The scheduling method is dynamic and based on a rolling-window approach as
shown in Figure 4.16. In other words, the method is carried out for a period of time
(i.e. window) which is then moved forward by an increment. The window width
is denoted as Tw. The increment time is denoted as Tinc. The example illustrates
the rolling-window approach with Tw = 12 h and Tinc = 3 h. The length of the
rolling-window is of particular importance for integrating the temporal dependence
of the storage operation into the decision.
Each schedule consists in deciding the future state-of-charge (SOC) of the storage
unit. In the present rolling-window approach, one schedule is calculated at every
increment and each schedule covers the n time periods of the window width Tw. The
instant when a scheduling decision is made is represented by a vertical red line in
Figure 4.16. The decision V st is formulated as the following vector:
V st =
[
vstTi
]n
i=1
, with vstTi = SOC
Sch
Ti (4.46)
where SOCSchTi is the scheduled SOC at the end of the market time unit Ti.
The operation of the VPP is then based on the storage SOC schedule. More
precisely, the latest available storage intraday schedule is considered as a series of
storage SOC setpoints for the operation of the VPP. These setpoints correspond to
the first 3 hours of each schedule and are represented in dark red in Figure 4.16.
The operation points are represented as the last grey line.
4.6.2 Formulation of the specific decision-making problem
Formulation of the optimization problem
This paragraph presents the formulation of the decision-making problem relative to
the scheduling of an energy storage device for minimizing the imbalance penalty.
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The aim of the decision-making approach is to determine the value of the storage
SOC setpoints for the period of the rolling-window Tw. The formulation of this
decision-making problem is a particular case of the generic optimization problem
derived in Equation 4.2, with U = 0 and V = V st =
[
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
:([
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
)∗
= argmin[
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
Φst
([
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
)
, subject to Cst (4.47)
where Cst is the set of constraints associated with the storage technical limits, and
the objective function Φst is derived from Equation 4.9 with uTi = 0 and vTi = v
st
Ti
=
SOCSchTi :
Φst
([
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
)
= N
(
λ
DA
st,Ti
(
0, SOCSchTi
))
(4.48)
N is the norm associated with the decision-making problem, discussed in section
4.3.5 and λ
DA
st,Ti is the loss function associated with the storage scheduling for the
time period Ti.
Formulation of the loss function λ
DA
st
The loss function associated with the present problem is derived from the generic
loss function derived in Equation 4.8 for the case of the physical solution Sy : st,
and no financial solution: Sx : {}.
The generic hSy ,Ti function considered in Equation 4.8 corresponds in this case
to the function hst,Ti which models the relation between the observed state-of-charge
S˜OCTi and the scheduled one SOC
Sch
Ti
. In this example, the storage SOC schedule
is directly considered as setpoints for the operation, and consequently, the observed
storage SOC equals the scheduled SOC, which gives:
SOCTi = hst,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti ) = SOC
Sch
Ti (4.49)
Regarding the energy volume y and the cost Y relative to the loss formulation
in Equation 4.8, these quantities are given for the case of the storage combination
by Equation 3.40. The energy volume y is the energy delivered by the storage unit
Est, which gives, by considering Equation 4.49:
y(hst,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti )) = Est,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti ) (4.50)
The cost Y is the additional cost associated with the storage solution. The
structure of this cost is discussed in section 3.3.4. In this discussion, it has been
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demonstrated that, if the day-ahead market prices during the charging and the
discharging phases are equal, the cost Y can be simplified to the following expression:
Y (hst,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti )) = |Est,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti )| × Γst ×Π
DA
Ti (4.51)
with Γst =
1− η
1 + η
where η is the round-trip efficiency of the storage unit, which is defined from the
charging and discharging efficiencies ηch and ηdis by η = ηch × ηdis. Also the hy-
pothesis of equal day-ahead prices when charging and discharging is coherent with
the objective of not using the storage for charging energy when the price is low and
discharging when the price is high.
Finally, by combining Equation 4.51 and Equation 4.50 in the loss definition
from Equation 4.8, the loss function λ
DA
st,Ti can be written as:
λ
DA
st,Ti(0, SOC
Sch
Ti ) = |Est,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti )| × Γst ×Π
DA
Ti (4.52)
+δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td + Est,Ti(SOC
Sch
Ti ), E
CDA
Ti
)
Similarly to the previous application relative to the intraday trading, the generation
forecast ÊTi|td and the price forecsat ∆̂
Π
Ti|td
which is used for the derivation of the
δ̂
DA
function are the latest available forecasts.
Norm relative to the optimization problem
The optimization problem given is Equation 4.47 is based on a norm N . In this
study, two norm are considered: the Manhattan norm N1 and the Maximum norm
N∞.
• The norm N1
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
= |cT1 | + |cT2 | + ... + |cTn | defined in Equation 4.17
focuses on the total cost for the period [T1, T2, ..., Tn] and refers to an ex-
pectancy choice.
• The norm N∞
(
[cTi ]
n
i=1
)
= max(|cT1 |, |cT2 |, ..., |cTn |) focuses on extreme
values of imbalance penalties and refers to a robust choice.
4.6.3 Illustration of the loss function
This section focuses on the loss function λ
DA
st , and more precisely gives an illustration
of this function for a given market time unit Ti to better understand its structure. In
order to simplify the mathematical expressions, the loss function λ
DA
st is represented
as a function of the energy delivered by the storage Est = Est(SOC
Sch). The
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combination of loss function formulation given in Equation 4.52, with the definition
of the function δ̂
DA
given in Equation 4.11 gives:
λ
DA
st (0, Est) = (4.53)
−∆̂Π− × (Ê − E
CDA)− (∆̂Π− + Γst ×Π
DA)× Est ⇐ Est ≤ Est ≤ −(Ê − E
CDA)
∆̂Π+ × (Ê − E
CDA) + (∆̂Π+ − Γst ×Π
DA)× Est ⇐ −(Ê − E
CDA) ≤ Est ≤ 0
∆̂Π+ × (Ê − E
CDA) + (∆̂Π+ + Γst ×Π
DA)× Est ⇐ 0 ≤ Est ≤ Est
where Est and Est are the lower and upper bounds for the energy delivered by
the storage unit. These limits are related to the constraints Cst, and a discussion
about these constraints is given in the next paragraph. The expanded formulation
EE
~
δ (E , E )
δ (E, E    )
E^
~
^
λ (0, Est)
^-(E-E )
^
Est
(E     - Est0)
^
Y(Est0)
0 EstEst
~
~
CDACDACDA
CDA
CDA
|Est=Est0
|Est=Est0
Est0
λ (0, Est0)
Figure 4.17: Definition of the function λ
DA
St from δ̂
DA
St
of the loss function in Equation 4.53 shows that this function λ
DA
st is a piecewise
linear function of the storage output energy Est. This function is represented in the
right part of Figure 4.17. In this example relative to the plot, the expected energy
imbalance relative to the trading in the day-ahead market (Ê − ECDA) is taken
positive. This figure more generally illustrates the relation between the estimated
penalization function δ̂
DA
st and the loss function λ
DA
st , which is the application of the
general relation given in Equation 4.7 for the specific problem of the scheduling of
the storage unit. For a given energy storage Est0, this relation is:
δ̂
DA
st |(Est=Est0)(Ê, E
CDA) = λ
DA
st (0, Est0) (4.54)
This figure is the follow-up of the example illustrated in Figure 4.4. The same values
of regulation prices are taken: the penalization of negative imbalance is lower than
the penalization of positive imbalance: 0 < ∆̂Π− < ∆̂
Π
+.
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4.6.4 Formulation of the technical constraints and temporal depen-
dence of the storage management
The constraints Cst on the vector
[
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
, in the optimization problem given
in Equation 4.47, are related to the storage unit characteristics presented in the
formulation of the imbalance penalty reduction in section 3.3.4.
The SOC at the end of the period Ti (i.e. SOC
Sch
Ti
) is bounded by the minimum
and maximum SOC levels, respectively SOCmin and SOCmax. Also, the storage
output energy Est,Ti is bounded by the storage nominal charging and discharging
rates, respectively rnomch and r
nom
dis . These two technical limits define the constraint
set Cst,Ti relative to the market time unit Ti:
Cst,Ti :
SOCmin ≤ SOCSchTi ≤ SOCmaxrnomch ×∆t ≤ Est,Ti ≤ rnomdis ×∆t (4.55)
where ∆t is the constant time length of the market time period Ti. The storage out-
put energy is assumed to be positive when discharging and negative when charging.
Consequently, rnomch ≤ 0 and r
nom
dis ≥ 0. Regarding the second constraint relative
to the delivered energy, this energy is derived from the difference between the SOC
level SOCSchTi at the end of the period Ti and SOC
Sch
Ti−1
which is the one at the end
of the period Ti−1. Charging and discharging modes are considered separately:
Est,Ti = (4.56){
−(SOCSchTi − SOC
Sch
Ti−1
)× Capst × ηdis, SOC
Sch
Ti
< SOCSchTi−1 (discharging)
−(SOCSchTi − SOC
Sch
Ti−1
)× Capst × 1/ηch, SOC
Sch
Ti
≥ SOCSchTi−1 (charging)
By considering this equation in the constraint set given in Equation 4.55, it appears
that the second constraint on the Est,Ti is actually a constraint on both SOC
Sch
Ti
and SOCSchTi−1 . Recursively, the constraint on Est,Ti is thus a constraint on the
vector
[
SOCSchTj
]i
j=1
. Such constraint demonstrates the temporal dependence of
the decisions.
Also, the two cases considered in the derivation of the delivered energy Est,Ti
in Equation 4.57 make its general expression from
[
SOCSchTj
]i
j=1
quite complex.
However, if the storage charging and discharging efficiencies are assumed to be 100 %,
the distinction between charging and discharging cases in the derivation of Est,Ti is
not needed anymore, and the delivered energy is given by:
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Est,Ti = −(SOC
Sch
Ti − SOC
Sch
Ti−1)× Capst, i ≥ 2 (4.57)
Est,T1 = −(SOC
Sch
T1 − SOCt0)× Capst (4.58)
where SOCt0 is the value of the state-of-charge at the time step t0, which is the
beginning of the first market period T1. SOCt0 is considered as a given value for
the present decision-making problem.
By combining the constraint definition in Equation 4.55 and the derivation of
the delivered energy in Equation 4.58, the constraints can be formulated as linear
constraints on the vector V st =
[
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
as follows:
C′st :
SOCmin · ✶ ≤ V st ≤ SOCmax · ✶❜ ≤ A · V st ≤ ❜ (4.59)
where ❜ and ❜ are n× 1 vectors defined by:
❜ =

rnomch ×∆t/Capst − SOCt0
rnomch ×∆t/Capst
rnomch ×∆t/Capst
...
rnomch ×∆t/Capst
 , ❜ =

rnomdis ×∆t/Capst − SOCt0
rnomdis ×∆t/Capst
rnomdis ×∆t/Capst
...
rnomdis ×∆t/Capst
 (4.60)
A is a n× n matrix and ✶ is the n× 1 unity vector defined by:
✶ =

1
1
...
1
 , A =

−1 0 0 . . . 0
1 −1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 −1
 (4.61)
Finally, the simplified decision-making problem can thus be formulated as the
following linear optimization problem:([
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
)∗
= argmin[
SOCSchTi
]n
i=1
N
([
λ
DA
st,Ti(0, SOC
Sch
Ti )
]n
i=1
)
, subject to C′st
(4.62)
where λ
DA
st,Ti(0, SOC
Sch
Ti
) is formulated in Equation 4.52.
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It is important to note that the hypothesis about the 100 % round-trip effi-
ciency is only used in the formulation of the constraints relative to the optimization
problem. The real efficiency is still taken into account in the loss function for the
definition of the Γst factor in λ
DA
st,Ti , as described in Equation 4.52, and also in the
operation model, which is presented in the next paragraph. The 100 % round-trip
efficiency hypothesis used in the constraints formulation may lead to SOC setpoints
which are slightly different to the operation SOC which takes into account the energy
losses due to the real efficiency lower than 100 %.
4.6.5 Modeling the real time operation
This section formulates a real-time operation model of the VPP, for a given time unit
Top. This operation is based on the schedule available for period Ti, with Ti = Top.
During this time period, the energy delivered by the VPP E˜V PP,Top is the sum of
the energy E˜wf,Top delivered by the wind farm and the energy E˜st,Top delivered by
the energy storage device :
E˜V PP,Top = E˜wf,Top + E˜st,Top (4.63)
In the scope of this study, the output energy from the wind farm is assumed to be
non-dispatchable. The output power delivered by the storage device is assumed to
be dispatchable with respect to the technical constraints Cst,Top , which are obtained
by transforming Equation 4.55 into Equation 4.64. The measured SOC at the end
of the period Top is denoted as S˜OCTop .
Cst,Top :
SOCmin ≤ S˜OCTop ≤ SOCmaxrnomdis ×∆t ≤ E˜st,Top ≤ rnomch ×∆t (4.64)
The delivered energy E˜st,Top is derived from the SOC, similarly to Equation 4.57.
However, for the real-time operation of the VPP, the SOC values for the time periods
prior to the current time period Top are known. More precisely, S˜OCTop−∆t is known,
and the delivered energy E˜st,Top only depends on S˜OCTop :
E˜st,Top(S˜OCTop) = (4.65)−(S˜OCTop − S˜OCTop−∆t)× Capst × ηdis, S˜OCTop < S˜OCTop−∆t (dis.)−(S˜OCTop − S˜OCTop−∆t)× Capst × 1/ηch, S˜OCTop ≥ S˜OCTop−∆t (ch.)
Furthermore, the operation model distinguishes two cases: the reference opera-
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tion and the strategic operation:
Reference Operation
The reference case is the case without strategic intraday storage schedule. In this
case, the operation mode for the storage unit consists in a “filter” mode, where the
storage energy output is so as to reduce the instantaneous absolute energy imbalance
between the delivered energy E˜wf + E˜st and the contracted energy E
CDA . This
approach is the one which has already been used in the evaluation of the reduction
of imbalance penalties in section 3.5. In this case, the storage energy is given by:
E˜st,Top = argmin
Est
∣∣∣(E˜wf,Top + Est)− ECDATop ∣∣∣ , subject to Cst,Top (4.66)
Strategic Operation
Conversely, the strategic coordination of the energy storage with the wind farm
considers the latest available storage SOC schedule SOCSch,∗Top resulting from the op-
timization in Equation 4.62. In this case, the storage unit is operated by considering
the SOC schedule as setpoints. In other words, the storage unit is operated in or-
der to have its SOC as close as possible to the SOC schedule, while respecting the
technical constraints:
E˜st,Top = argmin
Est
∣∣∣S˜OCTop(Est)− SOCSch,∗Top ∣∣∣ , subject to Cst,Top (4.67)
where
S˜OCTop(Est) = S˜OCTop−∆t +
1/ηdis × Est/CapESD (Est < 0)ηch × Est/CapESD (Est ≥ 0) (4.68)
4.6.6 Case study
Description of the case study
This section presents the followed methodology evaluating the strategic combina-
tion of a pumped-hydro storage unit with a wind farm, for the participation in a
day-ahead market. The methodology for obtaining these results is described in Fi-
gure 4.18. More precisely, this consists in an improvement of the storage case study
in section 3.5, where the only operation mode was the reference mode. In this case,
the benefits from the strategic combination are compared to this reference approach.
The data necessary for the scheduling approach are presented as inputs of the
storage scheduling and operation module. The day-ahead contract directly results
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Figure 4.18: Schematic representation of the overall simulation, including the scheduling
and the operation of the storage unit.
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from the available wind power forecasts, as already explained in the previous case
study in section 4.4. The storage SOC setpoints are determined using the decision-
making method formulated in Equation 4.62, and the delivered energy is derived
from the strategic or reference operation mode described in section 4.6.5. The im-
balance penalty δ
DA
st results from the penalization of the energy imbalance between
the delivered energy E˜wf + E˜st and the contracted energy E
C = ECDA .
The case study is based on the same wind farm as the one taken for the case study
corresponding to the reference participation in the day-ahead market in section 4.4.
This wind farm is a 18 MW wind farm located in Western Denmark. The wind farm
generation is traded in the NordPool Elspot day-ahead market during the period
between the 01/04/2004 and the 31/06/2004. The pumped-hydro storage unit is a
30 MWh capacity unit, with a 80 % round-trip efficiency. The nominal charge and
discharge rates are taken respectively equal to −6 and 6 MWh/h.
Wind power forecasts are used as input for both the trading in day-ahead mar-
ket and the storage scheduling. The wind power forecasting approach used for
this case study is a power curve modeling approach, denoted as “regressive power
curve”(RPC) model. This model is the same one as the one used in the previous
case study, referring to the intraday trading. Details about this model are given in
appendix B.2.
The derivation of the loss function λ
DA
st in Equation 4.53 demonstrates that this
function is based on forecasts of the imbalance penalty price ∆̂Π. In this study, two
approaches are considered for the forecasting of this price: the perfect and constant
prediction approaches.
• In the case of perfect prediction, the forecasts of the imbalance penalty price
∆̂Π correspond to the observed values, and are used as such for deriving the
loss function given in Equation 4.52.
• In the case of the constant prediction approach, the forecasts of the penalty
price for negative and positive imbalance (∆̂Π− and ∆̂
Π
+ respectively) are equal
and constant for all the different forecasting runs and horizons. In this case,
the definition of the reference penalization function δ̂
DA
in Equation 4.11 shows
that such function is proportional to the absolute value of the energy imbal-
ance. This function corresponds to the second term of the loss function λ
DA
st
given Equation 4.52. Also, for this price prediction approach, the first term
of the loss function is neglected in order to focus only on the minimization of
energy imbalance. This simplification is coherent with the hypothesis about
constant and equal predictions of the penalty price, which considers that no
information is available about the price for positive and negative imbalance.
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Consequently, the imbalance penalty minimization problem is simplified to an
imbalance energy minimization problem.
Finally, the results obtained from both approaches are compared and discussed in
the following paragraphs.
Results and discussion
The results are obtained using a simulation tool developed in Matlab®. In par-
ticular, the linear optimization problem is solved using a sequential quadratic pro-
gramming (SQP) method already implemented in Matlab®. The presented results
have been obtained considering a rolling-window width Tw equal to 12 h and the
increment time Tinc equal to 1 h. The results are computed for the two different
norms N1 and N∞. The reference case where the storage is operated with a “filter”
approach is denoted N0.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
En
er
gy
 (M
W
h)
 
 
Day−Ahead Contract VPP output without ESD
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
En
er
gy
 (M
W
h)
0 5 10 15 20 25
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
ES
D 
de
liv
er
ed
e
n
e
rg
y 
(M
W
h)
 
 
N0 N1 N∞
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
Hour (h)
ES
D 
SO
C
Figure 4.19: Influence of the strategy on the operation of the combined wind-hydro plant,
during the 04/04/04.
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Figure 4.19 shows the operation of the virtual power plant during the 24 hours of
the 4 April 2004. The results presented in this figure are obtained using the constant
approach for the forecast of the imbalance penalty price, and consequently, focus is
given to the energy imbalance. On the top graph, the blue line represents the energy
contract related to the day-ahead market participation and the dashed black line
represents the energy output of the wind farm. The area between the black line and
the blue line represents the energy imbalance without considering the storage. The
imbalance energy is relatively low for the first 11 hours. From hour 12 to hour 24,
the wind farm output is greater than the contracted energy, which leads to positive
energy imbalance for that period.
On the second graph, back line represents the energy output from the combined
plant energy output for the reference case N0. Similarly, the orange line marked
with circles and the red line marked with squares represent the energy output from
the combined plant for the strategies N1 and N∞, respectively. The two last graphs
plot the storage energy output and SOC level for the various cases.
The second graph first shows that the combination of the storage device with
the wind farm reduces the (positive) energy imbalance for the period from hour 12
to hour 24, for all the three cases. However, for this period, the storage operation
highly depends on the strategy:
• In the reference case N0, the surplus energy is stored till the energy stor-
age device is completely loaded, at hour 16. Note that, from hour 13 to
hour 17, the storage charge is limited by its nominal charging rate equal to
rnomch = −6 MWh/h. For hours 18 to 24, the storage device is completely
loaded (the SOC level is equal to 1). Consequently, no more energy can be
stored and the storage output power is null.
• In the N1 case, the storage charging power remains approximately constant
for the period between hour 12 and hour 22. The storage charging power is
then reduced for hour 23 and hour 24 since the energy imbalance is reduced
for the same hours.
• In the N∞ case, the second graph shows that the difference between the red
line and the blue line remains approximately constant from hour 13 to hour
20. In other words, the charging energy is set so that the imbalance is kept
constant and as small as possible. This analysis is in line with the objective
of this N∞ strategy which is to minimize the maximum imbalance energy.
Figure 4.20 describes the operation of the combined wind-hydro unit for the same
period as the one described in the previous figure. However, in this case, focus is
given to the influence of the approach regarding imbalance penalty price forecasting.
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Figure 4.20: Management of the storage unit with perfect knowledge of the imbalance
penalty price, during the 04/04/04.
Figure 4.20 compares the results obtained in the N1 case, using either the “constant
prediction” approach or the “perfect prediction” approach for imbalance price fore-
casting. Figure 4.20 shows that the operation resulting from the two approaches is
completely different. Contrary to the constant prediction case, where the absorbed
energy is rather constant between hour 13 and 22, the operation in case of perfect
prediction varies according to the imbalance penalty price. From the third graph,
we can observe only negative energy imbalance are penalized for hours 12 and 13,
because the up-regulation price is higher than the day-ahead price, which equals the
down-regulation price. Then, the storage is not charged during this period in the
perfect prediction case. The empty storage capacity is kept for the period between
hour 19 and 24 where positive imbalance are penalized.
Figure 4.21 presents results about the distribution of the hourly absolute energy
imbalances |d| and the hourly imbalance penalty δ obtained from the simulation
of the participation of the combined wind/pumped-hydro plant in the day-ahead
market for the period between the 01/04/2004 and the 31/06/2004. The results from
the strategiesN1 andN∞ are compared to the reference caseN0. Also both basic and
perfect prediction approaches for the imbalance penalty price are represented. The
mean gives the average of the value for each hour of operation. The q99 presents the
99%−quantile of the distributions of the hourly energy imbalance |d| or imbalance
penalties δ. This quantity gives an estimate of extreme values. It is defined as the
value q99(x) for which the number of occurrences of x greater than q99(x) is equal
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Figure 4.21: Analysis of the distribution of the imbalance energy and the imbalance penalty.
to 99% of the total number of occurrences:
n(x < q99(x)) = 99%× ntot (4.69)
The mean criterion is rather related to the evaluation of the N1 strategy, while
the 99%−quantile is related to extreme events and is thus more appropriate for
evaluating the N∞ strategy.
The plot 4.21(a) focuses on the absolute energy imbalance, while 4.21(b) focuses
on the imbalance penalty. The two figures show that the strategy N∞ decreases
extreme values of absolute energy imbalance by 31 % in the case of constant pre-
diction of imbalance penalty price, and extreme values of imbalance penalty in the
case of perfect prediction by 16 %. Regarding the N1 strategy, the mean absolute
energy imbalance is slightly increased by 11 % in the case of constant prediction of
imbalance penalty price, but the mean imbalance penalty is highly reduced by 38 %
in the case of perfect prediction.
Finally, the results illustrate the difference of objectives relative to the two pro-
posed norms N1 and N∞. For example, the results obtained with the N1 strategy
and perfect prediction approach highly reduces the mean imbalance penalty, but
increases the extreme values of absolute energy imbalance. Conversely, the results
obtained with the N∞ strategy and constant prediction approach highly reduces
the extreme values of absolute energy imbalance, but increases the mean imbalance
penalty.
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4.6.7 Conclusions
In this section, a novel method is proposed for the management of a combined
wind/pumped-hydro power plant under electricity market. The method focuses on
the intraday management of the energy storage device in order to reduce the penalty
risk associated with energy imbalances, for the combined power plant operator.
The method was presented in detail and applied to a realistic test case, where
real-world measured data and forecasts obtained by a state-of-the-art wind power
forecasting model are used.
The results clearly show that a strategic coordination of the energy storage device
is a way to manage the energy imbalances as well as the penalties associated with
these imbalances. The results also demonstrate the strong influence of the scheduling
strategies on the risk associated with the imbalance penalties.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, different decision-making problems relative to the management of
renewable energy sources in electricity markets have been described. Similarly to
the previous chapter 3, the decision-making problems have been classified into two
categories: the first one is related to decisions relative to financial decisions and the
second one is related to decisions relative to physical decisions.
A generic formulation of the decision-making problem, valid for the two kinds
of decisions, has been proposed. Such formulation is based on the minimization of
a norm of a loss function. This loss function is specific to the physical or financial
solution and is derived from the penalization function proposed in the previous
chapter 3. Also, this loss function is based on estimations of delivered energy by the
RES units, combined with estimations of market prices and regulation prices. The
decision-making approach has been evaluated for three specific problems:
• The participation in the day-ahead market has been considered as an approach
for evaluating the forecasting performance of renewable power forecasting me-
thods. More precisely, the presented case study demonstrated that the imbal-
ance penalties could be reduced by nearly a half when advanced forecasting
models were used, compared to the imbalance penalties obtained when using
basic forecasting approaches.
• The decision-making method has also been applied to the strategic sequential
trading in day-ahead and intraday markets. The influence of the intraday bid
decision on the resulting imbalance penalty has been analyzed. Results from
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a case study demonstrated than the strategic trading in intraday market can
reduce the imbalance penalty by up to 9 %.
• Finally, the decision-making method was applied to the management of the
combination of a wind farm with a hydro storage device. This management
based on a rolling-window approach. The study analyzed the influence of the
decision strategy on the distribution of the imbalance energy volumes and im-
balance penalties. The results obtained with a strategy which aims at reducing
the sum of the imbalance penalty during the period of the rolling-window, lead
to a reduction of 38 % of the total imbalance penalty as well as a reduction
by 14 % of the extreme values of imbalance penalties.
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CHAPTER 5
A Risk-Based Approach for the Management of
Uncertainty associated with Renewable Generation in
Electricity Markets
Chapter overview
This chapter extends the methodology proposed in the previous chapter to ac-
count for the uncertainty associated with the decision-making problem related to
the participation of renewable generation in electricity markets.
First, the uncertainties associated with the present decision-making problem
are described. General definitions and approaches for modeling the uncertainty
are given from the state of the art. Special attention is paid to the estimation of
the uncertainty related to renewable generation forecasts and to the market price
forecasts, given by probabilistic forecasting methods. An overview of the state of
the art of the methods for decision-making under uncertainty is presented in the
second section. Focus is given to risk-based approaches and different risk measures
are explained.
Then, the third section of this chapter gives the formulation of the risk-based
decision-making method. This method is an extension of the one which has been
formulated in the previous chapter in the case of deterministic forecasts (i.e. point
forecasts)) of future variables, to the case of probabilistic forecasts.
Finally, the two last sections present illustrations and application results of the
risk-based methodology. The fourth section illustrates the hedging resulting from
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the combination of a storage unit with a wind farm, and the fifth section gives the
benefits from the application of the method to the participation of wind generation
in electricity markets.
5.1 Estimation of uncertainties associated with the par-
ticipation of renewable generation in electricity mar-
ket
This section first presents the main sources of uncertainties in our decision-making
problem, which are renewable generation and market prices. Then, an overview of
the existing methods for representing the uncertainty, in a general way, is given.
These representations are used in the case of probabilistic forecasting models which
are able to provide information about the uncertainty associated with the forecasts.
Finally, the last part of this section gives examples of probabilistic forecasting models
for wind power and market prices which are available from the literature.
5.1.1 Sources of uncertainties
In general, the management of power systems has to take into account a wide range
of factors and parameters which may be uncertain. For example, the study in [125]
presents the main sources of uncertainty for a utility regarding operational-planning;
more precisely, the uncertainties about the load, the operating costs, the power
transmission are discussed.
In the present work, only the uncertainties relative to the participation of re-
newable generation in electricity markets are considered. From this point of view,
the two main sources of uncertainty are the electricity market prices and the re-
newable generation. Note that these two sources of uncertainties correspond to the
two forecasted quantities in the decision-making problem formulated in chapter 4.
• Renewable generation: the limited predictability of the generation from
some RES units has already been presented as one of the main properties
of renewable generation in section 1.2.2. This is mainly the result of the
dependence of this production on weather conditions, which in turn have a
limited predictability. This characteristic results to some uncertainty about
the future renewable generation.
• Electricity market prices: they are determined according to the fundamen-
tal economic rule of supply and demand, which makes them highly sensitive
to demand and supply variations. Such sensitivity results to a very high vari-
ability and volatility of the market prices. Also market prices may exhibit
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spikes, which are extreme variations during a very short time period. The
brief characterization of market price time series from the literature in section
C.1 gives further details about such volatility. Moreover, market prices depend
on a wide range of factors, which can be technical, meteorological or psycho-
logical. Such complex structure makes price forecasting a difficult problem.
The uncertainty associated with a given price forecast is consequently high.
5.1.2 State of the art of the approaches for modeling uncertainty
This section presents the different existing approaches to model and represent the
uncertainty related to a random variable. The classification into three main cate-
gories for representing uncertainty, which are scenarios, fuzzy sets and probabilistic
models, is taken from [121]. Special attention is paid to probabilistic models, which
will be used for the development of the decision-making approach proposed in this
chapter.
Scenarios
Scenarios are possible future instances of data. Representing the uncertainty with
scenarios is considered as a “natural” approach, where the main uncertain variables
are globally estimated and different possible futures are constructed. A possible way
to generate scenarios for the output of a process is to consider slight variations of
the value of one of the input parameters. The resulting scenarios are said to be
equi-probable when all the scenarios have the same probability to occur.
An important characteristic of the scenario approach is the “outside-in” aspect.
This means that the possible future course of a scenario is determined by outside
influences. Hence, the function of scenarios is not to predict the future but to explore
it. Since scenario approaches can become too exhaustive, work has been done about
the optimization of scenario building. Scenario reduction algorithms for determining
a subset of the initial scenario set, and assigning new probabilities to the preserved
scenarios, are proposed in [126]. In these methods, the scenario tree construction
algorithms successively reduce the number of nodes for a fan of individual scenarios,
by modifying the tree structure and by bundling similar scenarios.
Intervals and fuzzy sets
Using intervals is another “natural” way of dealing with uncertainty, where the data
are described by intervals instead of a single real number. In their basic formulation,
intervals are not linked to a probabilistic distribution but only try to capture every
possible future value of the relevant data [121].
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Fuzzy sets is another way to model the uncertainty with qualitative descriptions
corresponding to expert declarations about the data or the impact of the alterna-
tives. Fuzzy sets can thus be described as extension of intervals, where additional
information besides the range of possible values is given. The general fuzzy number
can be seen as a set of nested intervals, with increasing degrees of membership, also
called possibility values. The fuzzy set theory is fully described in [127].
Probabilistic models
Probabilistic models include information about the probability relative to each out-
come of the uncertain variable. The most complete information about uncertainty
is the probability distribution which is given by the probability density function. In
the case of a continuous random variable X, the probability density function of X is
denoted as fX . This function gives the probability for the variable X to be included
in the interval [x, x+ dx]:
fX(x) = prob(X ∈ [x, x+ dx]) (5.1)
The cumulative distribution function FX of a random variable X gives the prob-
ability for the variable X to be lower or equal than a given value x. Such function
is sometimes denoted as “cdf”. It can be derived as the integral of the probability
density function fX :
FX(x) = prob(X ≤ x) =
∫ x
−∞
fX(u)du (5.2)
The probability density function fX is positive, and consequently, FX is an increasing
function. If fX is strictly positive, FX is a strictly increasing function and is thus
invertible.
Several quantities can be derived from the probability distribution of the random
variable X. In particular, a α-quantile qαX , where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is defined as the
minimum value such that the probability for the variable X to be lower or equal to
this value equals α.
qαX = min(x|prob(X ≤ x) = α) (5.3)
If FX is invertible, the α-quantile q
α
X can also be written as q
α
X = F
−1
X (α).
The mean outcome µ of the random variable X with the probability density
function fX , is the defined as the expected value of X, and is calculated as follows:
µ = E(X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
xfX(x)dx (5.4)
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where E is the expectation operator. The expected value is sometimes referred to
as the first moment of X. More generally, the kth central moment µk of the variable
X is defined as:
µk(X) = E
(
(X − E(X))k
)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(x− µ)kfX(x)dx (5.5)
where k is a positive integer. For k = 0, the central moment is one µ0 = 1; the first
central moment is zero µ1 = 0. The second central moment µ2 is called the variance
and is usually denoted as µ2 = σ
2, where σ is the standard deviation. The variance
or standard deviation measures the dispersion of the variable X, and represents the
amount by which X tends to deviate from its expected value. Details about higher
moments can be found in [128].
5.1.3 Estimation of the uncertainty related to a forecasted variable
Deterministic versus probabilistic forecasting
A deterministic forecast of a stochastic variable for a given time in the future is
an estimation of the value of this variable for the given time. The deterministic
forecasts are also called point forecasts or spot forecasts, and provide a single value
for each forecast horizon. Most of the deterministic forecasting tools are based on
minimum least square estimation. For example, let consider xTi the estimation of
a random variable X for the period Ti, and x̂Ti the point forecast issued at time
td for the period Ti, based on the model M , the model parameters φtd , and the
information set Ωtd gathering the available information on the process up to time
td. The point forecast x̂Ti based on minimum least squares is formulated in [78] as:
x̂Ti = E [XTi |M, φtd , Ωtd ] (5.6)
Such deterministic forecasting models provide a single predicted value related
to a given random variable. Conversely, probabilistic forecasting methods consist in
providing the future probability related to the same random variable [129]. This
additional information about uncertainty may take the form of quantile, interval or
probability density function forecasts. These different representation models have
been presented in the previous section 5.1.2.
A distinction is made between parametric probabilistic forecasting methods which
are based on an underlying assumption about the shape of the forecasted distribu-
tion, and non-parametric probabilistic forecasting methods which do not rely on such
assumption [78]. Non-parametric methods are also called distribution-free methods.
They permit to obtain a more precise description of the uncertainty, compared to
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parametric methods.
Quantile forecasting is an example of non-parametric probabilistic forecasting
methods. For a given stochastic variable X, the α-quantile forecast for the period
Ti, issued at time td, is denoted as q̂
α
XTi|td
. Such quantile forecast can be obtained
using the quantile regression method, described in [130]. In particular, this method
is based on a minimization of a check function ρα, which is a piecewise linear and
asymmetric function given by:
ρα(x) =
(1− α) · |x| , x < 0α · |x| , x ≥ 0 (5.7)
A discussion about the similarities between this check function ρα and the reference
loss function λ
DA
given in Equation 4.27 is proposed in the last section 5.5.4 of this
chapter.
Then, the non-parametric forecast f̂XTi|td
of the density function of the variable
of interest during the period Ti can then be produced by gathering a set ofm quantile
forecasts:
f̂XTi|td
=
[
q̂
αj
XTi|td
]
with 0 ≤ α1 < ... < αj < ... < αm ≤ 1 (5.8)
where the nominal proportions αj are spread on the unit interval. This type of pro-
babilistic forecasts are denoted as predictive distribution. Other statistical methods
such as kernel density estimation directly provide the uncertainty in the form of a
predictive distribution. Further details on kernel density estimation can be found
in [131]. A prediction interval forecast, such as reported in [78], corresponds to
the specific case for which only two quantiles are quoted with nominal proportions
chosen to be symmetric around the median.
Finally, probabilistic forecasts may be very useful in decision-making applica-
tions. Consequently, probabilistic forecasting has been developed in several fields.
Meteorology and economics are the two domains that have been most active. Pro-
babilistic forecasting has spread from these fields into other fields such as power
system management (i.e. wind power or load forecasting).
Probabilistic forecasting of the renewable generation: the example of
wind power
In this thesis, the proposed decision-making methods have been applied to the case
of wind generation only, and consequently only probabilistic models relative to wind
generation are requested. However, as already mentioned in the introduction of
chapter 3, it is important to note that the general approach followed in this thesis
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could be directly applied to photovolta¨ıc or other renewable energy sources.
The general methods which can be found in the literature for the general problem
of probabilistic forecasting of wind generation are presented given in the appendix
B.3. An example of forecasts obtained with one of these methods is described in
Figure 5.1. This figure illustrates the typical probabilistic wind generation forecasts
which are requested for the decision-making methods. In this example, the method is
based on Kernel Density Estimators (KDE), and provides a predictive distribution
for each forecast horizon. The time step between two consecutive horizons is 3
hours, and the wind power production is forecasted for the next 60 hours. The
corresponding measurement is represented by the black line.
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Figure 5.1: Example of probabilistic wind power forecasts obtained with the KDE method,
from [132].
Finally, the methods which are used for the two case studies of this chapter, are
presented in the sections relative to the description of these case studies (i.e. in
section 5.4 and 5.5).
Probabilistic forecasting of electricity market price
In the decision problem relative to the participation of renewable generation in
electricity market, the price quantity which is considered by the IPP is the penalty
price for positive or negative energy imbalance ∆Π, as explained in section 4.3.3.
The definition of ∆Π in Equation 3.8 shows that this price quantity depends on the
sign of the energy imbalance, which makes it more difficult to forecast.
In the hypothesis of a dual price imbalance settlement mechanism, the forecas-
ting of ∆Π can be simplified to the forecasting of the price quantity Π∆, which is
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independent from the energy imbalance, and only depends on the regulation state
of the TSO. Π∆ is defined by
Π∆ = ΠDA −Πs (5.9)
where Πs = Π+ if only positive imbalances are penalized (i.e. TSO is down-
regulating), Πs = Π− if only negative imbalances are penalized (i.e. TSO is up-
regulating), and Πs = ΠDA if no regulation is needed by the TSO. The details of the
definition of Π∆, as well as the relation between ∆Π and Π∆, are given in section
subsection C.3.2.
Then, for the work presented in this thesis, we propose to represent of the uncer-
tainty related to Π∆ through a discrete probabilistic forecast based on three possible
outcomes. Each outcome is associated with a TSO regulation state : up-regulation,
no regulation, and down-regulation. These three regulation states correspond to
negative, null and positive values for Π̂∆, respectively. Each state is assigned a
probability α:
Π̂∆ =

(
Π̂∆− < 0, α−
)(
Π̂∆o = 0, αo
)(
Π̂∆+ > 0, α+
) (5.10)
This discrete probabilistic forecast can be obtained from advanced price fore-
casting methods, as described in section C.2. However, given the difficulty of price
forecasting, a method for simulating the price forecast Π̂∆ is proposed. This method
permits to obtain different levels of forecasting error, and to evaluate their impact
on the decision-making. The details of this simulation approach are detailed in the
appendix C.4.1. In particular, the level of forecasting error is based on two param-
eters which are a phase error τ and a parameter ǫ related to the uncertainty about
the regulation state of the TSO.
5.2 Overview of the state of the art of decision-making
methods under uncertainty with focus on risk-based
approaches
This section first gives examples of decision-making problems related to the man-
agement of power systems. Then, an overview of the existing approaches for the
general problem of decision-making under uncertainty is presented. These general
decision-making approaches are formulated for the case of our problem. Special
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attention is paid to the risk-based methods. In particular, different risk measures,
taken from the financial area, are defined.
5.2.1 Examples of decision-making methods under uncertainty in
power system management
The management of a power system involves several decision-making problems un-
der uncertainty. Generation planning and scheduling are two examples of such prob-
lems. Generation planning is a decision-making problem relative to the long-term
investment for new generation facilities, while generation scheduling refers to unit
commitment and economic dispatch problems, which are related to the power system
operation as introduced in section 4.1.3. The following paragraphs present exam-
ples, taken from the literature, of different approaches used for the management of
the uncertainty in these planning and scheduling problems.
A literature survey of the methodologies for accounting for uncertainty in power
system management is proposed in [133]. Although the survey is related to the
problem of planning electricity generation, the described methods are general and
could be used for more general power system management problems. A first method
is denoted as the deterministic equivalent method; in this method, the uncertainty
information is reduced to a deterministic value which is used in the decision-making
problem. The robustness analysis is a second method particularly adapted to the
problem relative to power system reliability. This method aims at finding a so
called robust decision with a trade-off analysis among conflicting objectives. Also,
the stochastic optimization is a method adapted from mathematical programming
which is frequently applied in multi-stage planning problems under uncertainty.
Using scenarios for representing the uncertainty related to future variables is
widely used in planning decision-making problems [133, 134]. These scenario-based
approaches have been extended to the operation problems. For example, in [135],
a multistage stochastic model is proposed for the optimal operation of a wind farm
combined with a pumped storage unit and thermal power plants. The wind farm
output generation and the electrical demand are considered as two independent
stochastic processes, which evolution is modeled with a scenario tree. Also, in [136],
an operation scheduling and contract management method is described, in which the
uncertainty related to market price is described using scenarios. The operating tool
described in the patent [137] is another example of stochastic generation scheduling
tool, where the uncertainty related to the load is described through scenarios.
Scenario-based models which consider all possible realizations of the stochastic
process lead to a huge set of scenarios. Consequently, scenario reduction methods are
often used. A scenario reduction algorithm based on a particle swarm optimization is
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used in [135]. More generally, in [138], the scenario reduction problem is formulated
as the determination a subset of preserved scenarios which is the “closest” to the
original set of scenarios using a given probability metric. The distance defined by
this metric takes into account the scenario probabilities and the distances between
scenario values.
Another alternative to scenarios for representing uncertainty is the considera-
tion of probabilistic forecasts. Historically, probabilistic methods relative to power
systems have been first developed to analyze the reliability of the systems and the
problem of reserve setting. In this context, the uncertainty is associated with the
possibility of a default in the generation portfolio. The distribution of the value of
the system margin, which is the difference between the available generation power
and the load, is derived from the default distribution. Then, the loss of load proba-
bility (LOLP) is one reliability measure, which is defined by the probability to have
a negative margin of the system. The amount of reserve is then settled in order to
have the LOLP lower than a given threshold. In [139], a method for quantifying
the reserve needed for a power system including wind generation, is proposed. In
this advanced method, the uncertainty related to the wind generation is estimated
through probabilistic forecasts.
5.2.2 Formulation of the state-of-the-art probabilistic methods for
decision-making under uncertainty
The decision-making methods, which are based on probabilistic forecasts are denoted
as probabilistic methods. These methods are distinguished from scenario-based me-
thods, which are not considered in this work. The general principle about decision-
making under uncertainty refers to the class of decision-making problems in which
the imperfect knowledge of the future is incorporated in the decision process [116].
In addition to this reference, the probabilistic methods for decision-making under
uncertainty presented hereafter are based on the state of the art of these methods
in [121], which proposes a unified view over the issue, as well as on [112]. The pro-
posed classification of the methods for decision-making under uncertainty is inspired
from the one proposed in [120].
In this section, we propose to formulate the general decision-making methods
which are presented from the literature, for our specific problem. The formulation
of the decision-making methods is valid for both financial and physical decisions
presented in section 4.1.1. In this section, the formulation is proposed for a decision
v related to a physical solution, but would be similar for a decision u related to a
financial solution. The alternative v is supposed to be continuous. The attribute of
the decision (the concept of attribute is explained in section 4.1.1) is the associated
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loss is λ(0, v), where λ is the loss function defined in Equation 4.8. In order to sim-
plify the mathematical expressions, the notation of the loss is simplified as follows:
λ(0, v) = λ(v).
In this case, this loss is a random variable, and its distribution is estimated by its
probability density function fλ(v). In this section, this probability density function
is supposed to be known. The derivation of this function is detailed in the next
section 5.3. For a given decision-making method, the chosen alternative is denoted
as v∗. The constraints on the decision v are denoted as Cv. Finally, note that this
decision v is relative to a given market time unit Ti, but the index Ti is omitted for
simplifying the mathematical expressions.
Note that similarly to section 5.2.2, the considered decision vTi is relative to
a physical hedging solution, but the formulation would be similar in the case of a
financial decision uTi .
Expected value method
The expected value method consists in choosing the alternative which maximizes (or
minimizes, according to the type of problem) the expected value of the attribute.
The chosen alternative v∗ is derived as follows:
v∗ = argmin
v
∫ ∞
−∞
x · fλ(v)(x)dx, subject to Cv (5.11)
This method assumes implicitly that a number of similar decision situations will be
repeated over time. Also, the expected value method does not integrate the decision
maker needs and desires in the decision-making process [112]. The method is rather
prescriptive disregarding any subjectivity or judgment that the decision maker might
have [140]. In particular, it does not take into account the risk related to extreme
events.
Expected utility theory
The concept of utility has already been presented in section 4.3.1. In this section,
the concept is reminded, and is presented more precisely in the context of decision
under uncertainty.
Utility theory was first proposed in 1738 by Bernoulli [140] as a response to
the critic of the expected value decision method which does not incorporate the
preferences of the decision maker in the decision process. Later, a set of axioms
have been proposed in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern in [141] for defining
the expected utility theory. In particular, these axioms can be used as a base for
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constructing a cardinal utility function [116]. A utility function is a function of the
attribute of the decision-making problem, such as the benefits or the loss.
The utility function of the loss λ(v) is denoted as U(λ(v)). In the expected utility
theory, the chosen alternative v∗ is the one which maximizes the expected utility
U(λ(v)). The distribution of the utility is assumed to be known for each possible
alternative value v. This distribution is modeled by the probability density function
fU(λ(v)), and the chosen alternative v
∗ is derived as follows:
v∗ = argmax
v
E (U(λ(v))) = argmin
v
∫ ∞
−∞
x · fU(λ(v))(x)dx (5.12)
subject to Cv (5.13)
The risk related to the attribute λ(v) is implicitly integrated in the utility func-
tion, and consequently, in the decision process. Three main risk attitudes exist and
correspond to three types of utility functions [120,121].
• A decision maker is said to be risk prone if the corresponding utility function
translates a willingness to give a premium to higher risk situations. The risk
proneness attitude of a decision maker corresponds to convex utility functions.
• A decision maker is said to be risk neutral if the corresponding utility function
does not present any risk premium or penalty associated with any possible
outcome. This corresponds to a linear utility function. In this case, the deci-
sion alternative selected by the expected utility theory is the same as the one
determined via the expected value decision method.
• A decision maker is said to be risk averse if the corresponding utility function
translates a willingness to penalize higher risk situations whilst favoring lower
risk ones. The risk aversion attitude of a decision maker corresponds to concave
utility functions.
Decision-making methods based on the utility theory result in a somewhat nor-
mative procedure for making decision. Once the decision maker risk attitude is
modeled in the utility function, decision can be made without further interference
of the decision maker. However, the determination of the utility function for a given
decision maker might be a time-consuming and hard task [112].
Spot-risk model
Alternative decision-making methods based on explicit risk measures have been pro-
posed in the literature for overcoming the difficulty of deriving a specific utility
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function. One of the most generic approaches is the spot-risk approach. The de-
nomination of the approach is taken from [120]. The spot-risk methods formulate
the expected utility as a function of the spot value (SV), which is an estimation
of the outcome of the alternative, and a risk measure R, which quantifies the risk
related to the distribution of outcomes associated with every alternative. The risk
attitude of the decision maker is modeled through a risk parameter β. Also, the
expected utility theory is based on the maximization of the expected utility and
consequently, the opposite spot value is considered when low values of the attribute
are preferred. This is the case when the attribute is the loss. In that case, we pro-
pose to formulate the expected utility E(U(λ(v))) associated with the alternative v
as:
E(U(λ(v))) = −SV (λ(v))− β · R(λ(v)) (5.14)
where SV (λ(v)) and R(λ(v)) are respectively the spot value and the risk measure
associated with the alternative v. The spot value can be the mean or the median of a
beneficial outcome of a given alternative. The risk measure R used in this spot-risk
model is generic and can be adapted to the needs and desires of the decision maker.
On overview of the main risk measures found in the literature is given in the next
section.
For simplifying the mathematical expressions in the rest of the work, the spot-
risk measure ρ is defined as follows:
ρ(λ(v)) = SV (λ(v)) + β · R (λ(v)) (5.15)
The alternative v∗, which is determined in the expected utility theory, is the one
which minimizes the spot-risk measure ρ:
v∗ = argmin
v
ρ(λ(v)), subject to Cv (5.16)
Stochastic dominance approach
Stochastic dominance is a term referring to a comparison technique between the dis-
tributions of the decision attributes which are relative to different alternatives [116].
This method is an alternative way for ranking the decision maker’s preferences, but is
not itself a decision principle such as, for instance, utility theory. More precisely, the
stochastic dominance method relies on an axiomatic model of risk-averse preferences.
The decision attributes are compared using performance functions constructed from
their distribution functions [142]. Technically, the stochastic dominance between
decision alternatives is determined in increasing orders. In particular, the Second-
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order Stochastic Dominance (SSD) is based on the comparison between the double
integral of the probability density functions of the attributes.
The relation between SSD and risk measures is explained in [143]. In particular,
the concept of consistency between a risk measure and the SSD approach is defined
as follows: a risk measure is said to be consistent with SSD if, in the case of two
alternatives, the alternative which is chosen by minimizing the risk measure is the
same as the one which is dominated under SSD. Further details about consistency
between stochastic dominance and risk measures can be found in [143].
However, the main limit regarding stochastic dominance is the absence of con-
sideration of the decision maker risk preferences in the method. More precisely, this
method assumes that the decision maker is risk averse [116], and this method does
not permit to analyze the influence of the risk attitude of the decision maker on the
resulting decisions. Consequently, this decision method is not further considered in
the rest of the present work.
5.2.3 Focus on risk-based methods
This section focuses on the definition of the risk which is considered in the spot-
risk approach formulated in Equation 5.15 and Equation 5.16. Initially, a general
definition of the concept of risk is given. Then this definition is used to derive
the definition of the risk considered in this work related to the participation of
renewable generation in electricity markets. The second part of this section presents
an overview of the state of the art of risk measures.
Concept of risk
The concept of risk is widely used in many fields such as finance, mathematics,
psychology or decision sciences. This concept highly depends on the discipline. In
a general way, the notion of risk is associated with the possibility of an unfavorable
outcome [118,144]. This definition shows the close relation between uncertainty and
risk. In order to define more precisely the risk, a distinction between uncertainty
and risk is proposed in [145]:
• The notion of uncertainty refers to the decision-making science, and is de-
fined as “a state of having limited knowledge where it is impossible to exactly
describe future outcome” [12]. Uncertainty is also described as the existence
of more than one possibilities. A probabilistic measure of uncertainty is a set
of possibilities, to which is assigned a set of probabilities.
• The Risk is then defined as a state of uncertainty where some of the pos-
sibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or other undesirable outcome. A risk
174
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
measurement is a set of possibilities each with quantified probabilities and
quantified losses.
From these definitions, we conclude that uncertainty without risk is possible if
none of the possibilities involves a loss, but risk without uncertainty is impossible.
The uncertainty measure only refers to the probabilities assigned to outcomes, while
the risk measure requires both probabilities for outcomes and quantified losses for
each outcome.
Risk measures
Variance The first historic risk measure was the variance or standard deviation,
which was introduced by Markowitz in portfolio selection [146]. Portfolio selection
discusses the general problem of the capital allocation to a large number of securi-
ties so that the investment can bring a most profitable return. Before introducing
any risk measure, investors used to talk about risk, but there was no measurable
term to define it. In 1952, Markowitz stated that variance could be regarded as
risk. Since Markowitz, mathematical analysis on portfolio management has greatly
developed, and variance has become the most popular mathematical definition of
risk for portfolio selection [121, 147]. In order to obtain a risk measure which is
homogeneous in terms of unity to the spot value in the spot-risk decision method,
the standard deviation σ is often preferred to the variance. For a given random loss
λ(v) associated with a decision v, the risk measure R based on standard deviation
σ is formulated as:
R(λ(v)) = σ (λ(v)) (5.17)
The use of variance or standard deviation for estimating the risk is quite sim-
ple. However, this risk approximation has several limitations [148]. The standard
deviation risk measure is based on a normal distribution hypothesis for the loss. In
this case, the loss is assumed to be symmetric and the risk measure penalizes the
possibility of obtaining extremely high losses as much as the possibility of obtaining
extremely low losses. However, in many practical cases, the loss distributions are
asymmetrical and the variance of the loss distribution becomes rather insufficient
for measuring the risk associated with the loss for a given alternative.
Value at Risk
Definition Since the definition of Markowitz in 1952, advanced risk measures
based on the knowledge of the possible losses have been proposed. In particular, the
Value at Risk (VaR) is a measure of the risk of loss for a given portfolio of financial
175
Risk-based approach for renewable generation in electricity markets
assets, widely used in financial mathematics and financial risk management [149].
The Value at Risk (VaR) is defined as the minimum value of loss that will not be
exceeded with an α confidence level. In other words, with respect to a specified
confidence level α, the α-VaR of a portfolio is the lowest loss value l such that the
probability that the loss λ(v) exceeds l is lower than (1− α):
Rα(λ(v)) = α-VaR(λ(v)) (5.18)
= inf {l ∈ R : prob(λ(v) > l) ≤ 1− α} (5.19)
= inf {l ∈ R : prob(λ(v) ≤ l) ≥ α} (5.20)
= inf
{
l ∈ R : Fλ(v)(l) ≥ α
}
(5.21)
The cumulated density function Fλ(v) is an increasing function and consequently,
Equation 5.21 is equivalent to
inf {l ∈ R : prob(λ(v) ≤ l) = α} (5.22)
which is the definition of the α-quantile of the loss distribution.
For a given loss distribution, the α-VaR depends on the confidence level α which
is a parameter of the risk measure. The α-VaR is a level of loss. In a symmetric way,
Roy in [150] defined a risk measure called Probability of an Adverse Outcome (PAO),
which is based on a level of loss l0 as a parameter, and measures the probability to
have a loss equal or greater than the accepted level:
PAOl0 = prob(λ(v) ≥ l0) = 1− prob(λ(v) ≤ l0) (5.23)
PAOl0 = 1− Fλ(v)(l0) (5.24)
where Fλ(v) is the cumulated density function of the loss λ(v) associated with the
decision v.
The VaR is a popular risk measure which is widely used in finance. However,
the large use of this measure demonstrated that it has undesirable mathematical
characteristics [151]. In particular, the VaR measure does not inform about the
extent of the losses that might be suffered beyond the amount indicated by this
measure. Indeed, the VaR measure provides a lowest bound for losses in the tail of
the loss distribution and has a bias towards optimism instead of the conservatism
that ought to prevail in risk management.
From a theoretical point of view, a risk measure can be considered as a function
which gives a real number from a probability space. Such a function has to satisfy
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two conditions which are monotonicity and translation invariance. The interested
reader may refer to [152] for obtaining furher information about these conditions.
In addition to these two properties, when considering two portfolios A and B, the
subadditivity property states that the risk of the sum of the portfolios A+B is smaller
than or equal to the sum of their individual risks. This property is important when
different business units calculate their risks independently and when an estimation
of the total risk is required. More generally, a risk measure which satisfies the four
conditions of monotonicity, translation invariance, convexity and subadditivity is
defined as a coherent risk measure [153].
The VaR measure has a lack of subadditivity. More precisely, it is subadditive
only in the case of normal distributions, when the VaR is a multiple of the standard
deviation [154]. The VaR has also a lack of convexity, which can be a major handicap
when trying to determine the VaR of a mix of portfolios. These limits relative to
the VaR measure justify the proposition of alternative risk measures.
Conditional Value at Risk
Considering the limits of the VaR as a risk measure, Rockafellar in [151, 154] pro-
poses the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). The CVaR is also denoted as expected
shortfall or average VaR. For a given probability level α, the α-CVaR is defined as
the conditional expectation of losses above the α-VaR:
Rα(λ(v)) = α-CVaR(λ(v)) (5.25)
= E(λ(v) : λ(v) ≥ α-VaR) (5.26)
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the α-VaR and α-CVaR for a given loss distribution.
The definition of the α-VaR and α-CVaR is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The prob-
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ability density function fλ of a given random loss λ is plotted in plain line and the
corresponding cumulative density function Fλ is plotted in dash line. The α-VaR
value is determined from the Fλ function and the α-CVaR is derived as the measure
of the grey area under the fλ function.
Other formulas for CVaR may be operationally more convenient in some situa-
tions [151]. For example, the CVaR can be formulated as follows:
α-CVaR(λ(v)) =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
β-VaR(λ(v)) dβ (5.27)
The CVaR may also be formulated a the result from a minimization:
α-CVaR(λ(v)) = argmin
l∈R
{
l + (1− α)−1E [max {0, λ(v)− l}]
}
, (5.28)
More precisely, Equation 5.28 show that the CVaR calculation can be formulated as
an expectation-based problem with additional variables. As a consequence, several
properties of expectation-based stochastic programs remain valid when the CVaR
risk measure is used. Most of these results are essentially based on the linearity of
the expected value operator E. From a more theoretical point of view, the CVaR is
an example of a polyhedral risk measure, where polyhedral risk measures are defined
as optimal values of linear stochastic programs [155].
Also, for a given loss λ(v), α-CVaR is a continuous function of α ∈ [0, 1], with:
lim
α→1
α-CVaR(λ(v)) = sup(λ(v)) (5.29)
lim
α→0
α-CVaR(λ(v)) = E(λ(v)) (5.30)
Multistage Risk measures
The different risk measures described in the previous paragraphs consider the risk
associated with a loss λ(v) relative to a single decision v. The loss λ(v) is a random
variable itself. However, for multistage stochastic problems, the above definitions
might not be sufficient. For such problems, it is necessary to define multistage or
multiperiod risk measures, which evaluate the risk relative to consecutive decisions.
The n consecutive decisions are denoted as [vT1 , vT2 , ...vTn ] = [vTi ]
n
i=1 and the
multistage risk measure Rα gives the risk relative to the loss associated with the n
decisions [λT1(vT1), λT2(vT2), ...λTn(vTn)] = [λTi(vTi)]
n
i=1
The polyhedral risk measure class is extended to the multistage case in [155]. An
example of a multistage polyhedral risk measure is the weighted sum of the CVaR
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values relative to each period:
Rα([λTi(vTi)]
n
i=1) =
n∑
i=1
γ(i) α-CVaR(λTi(vTi)) (5.31)
where γ(i) is a positive weight relative to the period Ti, and α is the confidence level
associated with the risk measure Rα. A first basic approach is to consider a constant
weight for all periods: γ(i) = 1n . More advanced approaches for the determination
of the weight γ(i) are proposed in [156].
5.3 Formulation of a risk-based approach for the man-
agement of renewable generation in electricity mar-
kets
The aim here is to apply the general risk-based approach presented in the previous
section, to the management of the uncertainties related to the renewable power
generation and to the market prices, which have been described in the first section
of the chapter. The methodology proposed in this section is presented through the
concept of risk management, which is explained into detail for our specific problem.
5.3.1 Concept of risk management
The concept of risk management, relative to a given entity, comes from the finance
area and defines a process which can be divided into four different general steps,
as proposed in [157]. Each of these steps is presented below while reference to our
specific problem is made.
• The first step is the definition of the risks incurred by a given actor. This def-
inition also determines which loss is considered for the given risk, and also the
time frame relative to the risk management process. In our specific problem,
the risk is related to the imbalance penalty for an Independent Power Producer
(IPP) including RES power units, who participates as a balance responsible
party in short-term electricity markets. Further details about the definition
of the risk associated with imbalance penalty, the considered time frame, and
the associated loss, are given in the next section.
• The second step of the general risk management process focuses on the quan-
tification of the risk. Also, at this stage, the different solutions for reducing
this risk are reviewed. The reduction of risk relative to each solution is quan-
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tified, based on a specific risk measure. The existing solutions for reducing the
risk are called hedging solutions.
In our problem, the risk is modeled using the generic loss function λ derived in
the previous chapter 4. Based on this loss function, a probabilistic prediction of
the loss is derived using probabilistic forecasts of both the delivered energy and
the market prices. Such loss also depends on the financial or physical solutions
which are used. These solutions are considered as the hedging solutions of the
problem. Then, the risk is measured from the loss distribution using explicit
risk measures, defined in section 5.2.3.
• The next step in risk management is the decision step about the hedging
solutions. The decisions (U, V ) relative to the use of a physical or financial so-
lutions are made using a spot-risk approach, where the attitude of the decision
maker towards risk is considered through a risk parameter β.
• Finally, the last step is the evaluation of the risk management approach. This
corresponds to the two last sections of the chapter. The risk management is
illustrated in the case of the physical solution which consists in the storage
combination. The benefits from the application of the risk-based approach for
the participation of wind generation in a day-ahead market are also presented.
The term of “hedging solution” is taken from the financial domain, where it
designates generic contracts which are designed for transferring the financial risks
between participants [158–160]. They can be sophisticated financial products, and
are mainly based on forward contracts, swap contracts or options. In this work, the
concept of hedging is extended to both the physical and financial solutions, which
have been formulated in chapter 3. Such generalization is justified by the conclusion
given in chapter 3 that the impact of both physical and financial solutions can be
modeled in a similar way when considering the imbalance penalty model given by
the function δ. Similar considerations can also be found in the literature, such as
in [160] or [108].
5.3.2 Details about the considered risk
Focus on the quantity-price risk
The concept of risk considered is the one defined in section 5.2.3 where the risk is
defined as a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss. In
section 5.1.1, two main sources of uncertainty have been described: the renewable
generation and the electricity market prices. Consequently, these two sources of
uncertainty result in two types of risk:
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• The quantity risk results from the penalization of the uncertainty associated
with the renewable generation output. The quantity risk is also called volu-
metric risk [161]. The same concept of volumetric risk for a conventional power
producer is presented in [162], and is related to plant outage or fuel shortages.
In [163], the quantity risk is related the uncertain wind power generation, and
is estimated through a measure called “WindGen at Risk”, which is based on
the concept of the Value at Risk measure. In the example, this risk is used for
the integration of the wind resource capacity into unit commitment scheduling.
• The price risk results from the uncertainty related to the market prices. In
general, fluctuating market prices in electricity pools lead to financial risks
for power producers [158, 164]. In the particular case of the risk related to
imbalance penalties, the IPP is sensitive to the uncertainty related to the
penalty price Π∆, which is defined in Equation 5.9. Such price is the difference
between two volatile prices, and can reach extreme values, the occurrence of
which is hard to forecast. Also, the sign of Π∆ depends on the regulation state
of the TSO, which is also hard to forecast. These characteristics lead to a high
uncertainty about Π∆, which in turn leads to a high price risk.
Finally, the risk considered in the present work can be denoted as a “quantity-
price” risk, which is a combination between the quantity risk and price risk concepts.
However, it is important to note that many other kinds of risk are related to the
participation in an electricity market. These risks include counter-party credit risks,
transaction risks, regulatory risks, operational risks and liquidity risks [157, 165].
Also, for renewable power producers, the income from energy trading in electricity
markets may vary as a result of the varying resource. Such variation, which is mainly
seasonal, could represent a risk for the renewable power unit operator in terms of
cash flow. However, this risk is not considered in this work. The only risk we
consider here is the one associated with the imbalance penalties in the case of direct
participation of renewable generation in liberalized electricity markets.
Discussion about the relation between the risk and the time frame
The risk considered in the proposed decision-making approach is related to the
extreme imbalance penalties for a given market time unit. If the market time unit is
one hour, the risk thus focuses on extreme values of hourly imbalance penalties. Also,
such extreme penalties are partly due to “spike” occurrences in market price time
series, which are steep increases shortly followed by steep decreases. The resulting
extreme imbalance penalties may thus occur for very short periods, in the order of
a few hours.
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period mean(δ) (e) q95(δ) (e) q95(δ)/mean(δ)
1 hour 7 34 5.0
1 day 166 637 3.8
1 week 1162 2960 2.5
Table 5.1: Analysis of the extreme imbalance penalty time series, for various temporal
resolutions. In this example, the imbalance penalties result from the participation of a wind
farm in a day-ahead market for the period between 01/10/2003 and 30/06/2004.
As a consequence, the extreme imbalance penalties will be smoothed out when
a longer time period is taken for the quantification of extreme penalties. Table 5.1
presents the analysis of extreme imbalance penalty values obtained during the sim-
ulation period between 01/10/2003 and 30/06/2004. These imbalance penalties are
the ones obtained for the reference case of all the examples of this thesis, which
is the participation of a 18 MW wind farm in the Elspot day-ahead market. The
q95 presents the 95%−quantile of the distributions of the hourly, daily and weekly
imbalance penalty δ. This quantity gives an estimate of extreme values. Table 5.1
shows that the extreme penalty values, relatively to the mean values, decrease as
the temporal resolution decreases.
The relation between risk and time frame is important for the definition of the
risk sensitivity factor β relative to the spot-risk approach in Equation 5.15. In the
present thesis, the IPP is supposed to be sensitive to the risk relative to hourly
imbalance. However, the market bidding decisions are hourly decisions, which are
repeated a large number of times, and this high number of decisions may reduce to
risk sensitivity of the IPP.
5.3.3 Modeling of the quantity-price risk
The risk definition in section 5.2.3 highlights the fact that the concept of risk is based
on a given loss. In this section, we formulate the risk related to a given decision vTi
for the market time unit Ti. The associated loss is modeled through the generic loss
function λTi derived in the previous chapter. Note that similarly to section 5.2.2, the
decision vTi considered is relative to a physical hedging solution, but the formulation
would be similar in the case of a financial decision uTi . Also, similarly to section
5.2.2, the formulation of the loss is simplified by setting λTi(0, vTi) = λTi(vTi). This
loss is given by considering only the case of physical solution in the generic loss
formulation given in Equation 4.8:
λTi(vTi) = δ̂
DA
Sy,Ti(ÊTi|td , E
DA
Ti ) = Y (v˜Ti) + δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td + y(v˜Ti), E
DA
Ti
)
(5.32)
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where v˜Ti is the realization associated with the decision vTi . ÊTi|td is the forecast of
the energy delivered for the period Ti, available at the decision time td. E
DA
Ti
is the
day-ahead energy contract relative to the period Ti. Y (v˜Ti) is the additional cost
associated with the physical solution and y(v˜Ti) is the energy balance provided by
the physical solution.
By considering the definition of the price Π∆ given in Equation 5.9, the estimated
reference imbalance penalty function δ̂DA can be reformulated as:
δ̂
DA
Ti
(
ÊTi|td , E
DA
Ti
)
= max
(
0, (ÊTi|td − E
DA
Ti )× Π̂
∆
Ti|td
)
(5.33)
The details about such reformulation are given in section C.3.1. Also, based on this
reformulation, Equation 5.32 can be rewritten as:
λTi(vTi) = Y (v˜Ti) + max
(
0,
(
ÊTi|td + y(v˜Ti)− E
DA
Ti
)
× Π̂∆Ti|td
)
(5.34)
This formulation shows that the loss λTi(vTi) associated with the decision vTi de-
pends on both the energy forecast ÊTi|td and the price forecast Π̂
∆
Ti|td
. In a similar
way, in the case of a financial decision uTi , the loss would be:
λTi(uTi) = Y (u˜Ti) + max
(
0,
(
ÊTi|td − (E
DA
Ti + y(u˜Ti)
)
× Π̂∆Ti|td
)
(5.35)
In the case of deterministic power and price forecasts, the quantities ÊTi|td and
Π̂∆Ti|td are real numbers estimating the value of the delivered energy and market
price for the given period Ti. Consequently, the estimated loss λTi(vTi) is also a
real value. However, in the case of probabilistic power and price forecasts, the
quantities ÊTi|td and Π̂
∆
Ti|td
include additional information about uncertainty. In the
present formulation, these two quantities are random values, and their distribution
is supposed to be given by probability density function (pdf), namely f̂E and f̂Π∆ .
These pdfs are in this work predictive pdfs which are obtained using probabilistic
forecasting method.
Then, in the probabilistic case, the loss λTi(vTi) is a function of two random vari-
ables ÊTi|td and Π̂
∆
Ti|td
, and is consequently also a random variable. The technique
developed in the frame of this thesis for deriving the loss pdf fλ(v) from the two pdf
f̂E and f̂Π∆ is presented in appendix D.
Then, the risk associated with the decision vTi can be estimated by considering
one of the risk measures presented in section 5.2.3. For example, if we consider the
conditional value at risk (CVaR), the risk is given by:
Rα(λTi(vTi)) = α-CVaR(λTi(vTi)) (5.36)
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5.3.4 Formulation of the spot-risk decision-making method
In the previous chapter, the general decision-making problem has been formulated
as an optimization problem in Equation 4.10. In particular, the decision-making
problem relative to n consecutive physical decisions V = [vT1 , vT2 , ...vTn ] is for-
mulated on the basis of Equation 4.10 as following:
V ∗ = argmin
V
N
([
λTi (0, vTi)
]n
i=1
)
, subject to CV (5.37)
where N is the norm associated with the decision-making problem, as detailed in
section 4.3.5, and λTi(0, vTi) is the estimated loss for the decision vTi . Hereafter, for
sake of simplicity, it will be set λTi(0, vTi) = λTi(vTi). This formulation is valid
if the loss λTi(vTi) is a real value. However, in the probabilistic case, this loss is
a random variable which is estimated through its pdf, as explained in the previous
section.
From the overview of the state of the art of decision-making methods under
uncertainty proposed in section 5.2.2, it appears that the spot-risk approach which is
the most appropriated one to our problem. In fact, this method is a generalization of
the expected value method, which corresponds to a neutral risk attitude (i.e. β = 0)
in the spot risk approach. Also, the spot-risk method does not rely on a complex
utility function which is hard to derive. Moreover, this approach considers as input
a probabilistic representation of the loss associated with a given decision, which is
consistent with the available renewable generation probabilistic forecast. Finally, the
justification of the choice of this approach will become even more evident later in
the discussion. Based on this analysis, we propose to use a spot-risk approach for
considering the uncertainty relative to the loss in the decision-making problem. This
approach has been presented in section 5.2.2, and is based on a spot-risk function ρ
given from Equation 5.15:
ρ(λTi(vTi)) = SV
(
λTi(vTi)
)
+ β · R
(
λTi(vTi)
)
(5.38)
In the present formulation, the “spot” estimation (SV ) of the loss is taken to be the
expected value E. Also, the considered risk measure (R) is the Conditional Value
at Risk relative to the confidence level α (α-CVaR). The parameter β models the
decision maker attitude towards risk. It is assumed that the risk attitude is the same
for consecutive decisions, thus, β is taken to be constant. Consequently, the generic
decision-making problem formulated in Equation 5.37 can be rewritten as following,
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for a physical solution:
V ∗ = argmin
V
N
([
E
(
λTi(vTi)
)
+ β · α-CVaR
(
λTi(vTi)
)]n
i=1
)
(5.39)
subject to CV
and straightforwardly, it can be written as following for a financial solution:
U∗ = argmin
U
N
([
E
(
λTi(uTi)
)
+ β · α-CVaR
(
λTi(uTi)
)]n
i=1
)
(5.40)
subject to CU
This formulation relies on the risk management concept, which is illustrated in
the next section, for the physical solution based on storage combination. Finally,
the last section of this chapter illustrates the benefits from this risk-based method
for the participation of wind generation in a day-ahead market.
5.4 Hedging imbalance penalty risk through combina-
tion of renewables with storage
This section analyzes the risk hedging in the case of the combination of a wind farm
with a storage device. Such combination is considered as a physical solution for
the management of the imbalance penalties related to the participation of the wind
farm itself in the day-ahead electricity market. This specific physical solution has
already been modeled in section 4.6, where the decision-making problem relative to
the strategic scheduling of the storage unit was presented. The loss relative to the
scheduling decision was estimated from deterministic forecasts; no information on
uncertainty was considered and consequently, the risk was not taken into account.
Here, the distribution of the loss relative to the scheduling decision is estimated
from probabilistic forecasts of the wind generation and market prices. Initially,
the general method for the derivation of the loss function given in section 5.3.3 is
applied to the specific physical solution. Then the influence of the risk attitude of
the decision-maker on the resulting decisions is analyzed.
5.4.1 Derivation of the specific loss function relative to the storage
combination
In the study presented in section 4.6, the scheduling decision consisted in n consec-
utive setpoints for the storage state-of-charge (SOC) level. However, here we focus
on the scheduling decision for a given single market time unit, and consequently, the
decision v is relative to the energy output Est from the storage device during this
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market time unit: v = Est. The index Ti for the time unit is omitted hereafter for
sake of simplicity. Also, the actual energy delivered by the storage device, which is
the realization v˜ associated with the decision v, is supposed to be equal to the deci-
sion. This consists in considering the scheduling decision about the storage energy
output Est directly as a setpoint for the operation of the storage device, which gives:
v˜ = E˜st = Est = v (5.41)
where E˜st is the energy which is really delivered by the storage unit. Then, the loss
λ(Est) is derived from Equation 5.34:
λ(v) = λ(Est) = Y (Est) + max
(
0,
(
Êwf + y(Est)− E
DA)
)
× Π̂∆
)
(5.42)
The quantities Y (Est) and y(Est) have been defined in section 4.6.2, and more
precisely from Equation 4.50 and Equation 4.51, as:
Y (Est) = |Est| ×
1− η
1 + η
×ΠDA (5.43)
y(Est) = Est (5.44)
where η is the round trip efficiency of the storage unit. In this application, the deci-
sion about the storage schedule is determined after the day-ahead trading decision,
similarly to section 4.6, and consequently, the day-ahead market price ΠDA and the
energy volume EDA are known values in this problem since .
The probabilistic forecast of the wind generation Êwf is given in the form of a
predictive probability density function (pdf), which is denoted as f̂Ewf . Also, the
price forecast Π̂∆ is taken as a discrete distribution as explained in Equation 5.10.
The price forecast is supposed to be independent from wind generation forecast.
Then, the pdf of the loss λ(Est) is denoted as fλ(Est), and is obtained from the
technique proposed in the appendix section D.3. The formulation of fλ(Est) is more
precisely obtained from the application of the general solution given in Equation D.17
with a = Y (Est) and b = E
DA − Est, which gives:
fλ(Est)(z) = A · d(z − Y (Est)) +B · f̂E(γ
−,−1
Π̂∆−
(z)) + C · f̂E(γ
+,−1
Π̂∆+
(z)) (5.45)
The quantities A, B and C are detailed in section D.3. The functions γ−
Π̂∆−
and γ+
Π̂∆+
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are defined on the intervals I−wf and I
+
wf respectively, with:
I−wf = [0, E
DA − Est] and I
+
wf =
[
EDA − Est, E
max
wf
]
(5.46)
This formulation of the loss pdf given in Equation 5.45 is valid for every storage
output energy Est lower than the maximum storage output energy E
max
st and greater
than the minimum one Eminst . These boundaries are determined by the technical
constraints of the storage device. Finally, the results of the application of this
formulation for the case study considered in this thesis are illustrated in the next
section.
5.4.2 Results: Analysis of the influence of the risk attitude on the
decisions
The wind farm considered in this case study is the reference wind farm taken for all
the previous case studies. It is a 18 MW wind farm located in Western Denmark.
It is assumed to be combined with a 30 MWh capacity pumped-hydro storage unit.
The storage charging and discharging nominal rate rnomch and r
nom
dis are taken equal to
−6 MWh/h and 6 MWh/h respectively. The storage round-trip efficiency is taken
equal to 75 %.
The results are obtained using real world data. The considered time period is
between 11h00 and 12h00 the 22/12/2003. The wind farm operator is supposed
to have participated the day before, the 21/12/2003, in the Elspot day-ahead mar-
ket, and the resulting contract for this period is a 10.7 MWh energy contract at
29.84 e/MWh. Such contract results from the day-ahead bid established the day
before using wind power forecasts available at that time.
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Figure 5.3: Probabilistic wind power forecast obtained from a KDE method, for the period
between 11h00 and 12h00 the 22/12/2003.
In the example, the storage operation is scheduled from updated wind power
probabilistic forecasts, which are obtained from a method based on kernel density
estimator (KDE). This method aims at directly estimating the future conditional
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Figure 5.4: Estimation of the loss distribution from the delivered energy distribution.
probability density functions of the variable to be predicted based on a kernel den-
sity estimator. Such estimator computes a smooth density estimation from data
samples by placing on a each sample point a function representing its contribution
to the density. The distribution is then obtained by summing all these contributions.
The model is presented in detail in [129, 166]. Figure 5.3 illustrates the forecasted
probability density function and the cumulated density function for the time period
is between 11h00 and 12h00 the 22/12/2003. This forecast was issued at 06h00 the
22/12/2003. From the pdf curve, it can be observed that the obtained probabilistic
forecast is non-symmetric. The mean wind power generation forecast is 5.77 MWh.
The price forecasts Π̂∆ are obtained by considering the reference constant fore-
casting approach proposed in section C.4.1. In this application, we assume equal
positive and negative imbalance penalization:
Π̂∆ =

(
Π̂∆− = −10 e/MWh, α− = 0.40
)(
Π̂∆o = 0 e/MWh, αo = 0.20
)(
Π̂∆+ = 10 e/MWh, α+ = 0.40
) (5.47)
Figure 5.4 illustrates the application of Equation 5.45 to estimate the loss distri-
bution. This figure more precisely shows the “transfer” from the energy distribution
represented by its pdf f̂E , to the loss distribution represented by its pdf fλ(Est).
The energy delivered by the storage is in this example 4 MWh. The left graph
describes the predictive pdf of the wind generation, which is identical to the one
presented in Figure 5.3. A distinction is made between the part of the distribution
that corresponds to wind energy values lower than b = (EDA-Est) = 6.7 MWh, in
green, and higher, in red. The green values coincides with the interval I−wf , defined
in Equation 5.46, and correspond cases of negative energy imbalance. By contrast,
188
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
pdf
lo
ss
 (e
ur)
 
 
E
st = −6
E
st = −4
E
st = −2
E
st = 0
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
pdf
lo
ss
 (e
ur)
 
 
E
st = 0
E
st = 2
E
st = 4
E
st = 6
Figure 5.5: Influence of the delivered energy from storage Est on the loss distribution.
(left) situations when storage is charging. (right) situations when storage is discharging.
the red values coincides with the interval I+wf , also defined in Equation 5.46, and
correspond cases of positive energy imbalance.
The center graph represents the loss function based on its formulation given in
Equation 5.42. As shown in the figure, it has the role of a transfer function. The
wind generation forecast is the input. The energy imbalance between the forecasted
energy and the energy quantity b is penalized by the price α− · Π̂
∆
− or α− · Π̂
∆
+
depending on the sign of the imbalance. The constant cost a = Y (Est) corresponding
to the storage energy losses is also represented.
Finally, the right graph represents the loss distribution, derived from Equa-
tion 5.45. The three terms of Equation 5.45 are represented: the Dirac correspond-
ing to the loss value a = Y (Est) is illustrated by the “jump” of the distribution.
This term is the first one of Equation 5.45. The penalty for negative energy imbal-
ance, corresponding to the interval I−wf for the wind generation forecast, is plotted
in green. This term is the second one of Equation 5.45. The penalty for positive
energy imbalance, corresponding to the interval I+wf for the wind generation forecast,
corresponds to the third term of Equation 5.45 and is plotted in red. Finally, the
loss distribution is the sum of these three terms, and is plotted in black.
It is of interest to assess the influence of the energy delivered by the storage
device Est on the loss distribution. In Figure 5.5, the left graph describes cases
when the storage device is charged and the right one describes discharge cases, for
the same time unit of simulation. The grey plot on both graphs corresponds to the
reference case where no energy is delivered or absorbed by the storage unit. From
cases when storage is charging, it is observed that the loss distribution is shifted
to higher values, without any modification of its shape. In the discharging case,
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Figure 5.6: Mean and 0.90-CVaR of the loss distribution resulting from the delivered energy
by the storage Est.
the loss distribution is shifted to higher values of loss, but the resulting distribution
width is reduced. For both cases, such shift is the illustration of the constant cost
added by the storage operation. This cost is derived in Equation 5.43; it is a linear
function of the absolute value of the storage energy Est, which explains the shift to
higher values of loss for high charging or discharging values. The width reduction of
the loss distribution illustrates the reduction of imbalance penalties, which results
from the energy imbalance decrease. In the example, the day-ahead contract energy
is 10.7 MWh, and the mean of the forecast of the energy delivered by the wind farm
is 5.77 MWh. The storage energy which minimizes the mean energy imbalance is
denoted by the reference storage energy Est,ref , and is given by:
Est,ref = E
DA − E(Êwf ) = 4.93 MWh (5.48)
If for that time unit, the storage device is charging, then the absolute energy im-
balance, and consequently the loss, will increase. Conversely, if the storage device is
discharging, then the absolute energy imbalance will be reduced, and the loss width
distribution will be reduced as well. The mean and the risk measure relative the
loss distributions shown in Figure 5.5 are detailed in the next figure.
Figure 5.6(a) describes the variation of the mean of the loss distribution for
different values of energy Est delivered by the storage device. In order to better
understand the impact of the storage round-trip efficiency η, three different values
of round-trip efficiency are considered η = 0.75, 0.85 and 0.95. For negative values
of Est, the shift to higher values of loss observed in Figure 5.5 corresponds to an
increase of the mean loss, for the three cases of efficiency. However, for positive
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Figure 5.7: Influence of the consideration of the risk in the decision relative to the energy
delivered by the storage device.
storage energy, the variation of the mean loss depends on the efficiency value. In
the case of low efficiency (η = 0.75), the cost resulting from the storage energy
losses, modeled in the quantity Y (Est), is higher than the reduction of imbalance
penalty. Consequently, the mean loss increases as the storage energy increases and
the minimum mean loss is reached when no energy is delivered from the storage
unit. As the storage efficiency increases, the mean loss is reduced. Also, the value
of storage energy which leads to the minimum mean loss gets higher as the storage
efficiency gets higher, and is bounded by Est,ref defined in Equation 5.48. Most of
the analyses regarding the mean loss remain valid for the risk measure, in figure
5.6(b). The α-CVaR is the risk measure; it is evaluated from each distribution by
applying Equation 5.26, with α = 0.90. The main point to notice is that the value
of Est which minimizes the CVaR gets higher as the storage efficiency increases. For
example, the storage value Est which minimizes the CVaR is close to 0 MWh when
η = 0.75, this value is close to Est,ref when η = 0.95.
Figure 5.7 describes the impact of the consideration of the risk on the decision
relative to the energy delivered by the storage device. The decision is made using
a spot-risk approach already described in section 5.2.2. More precisely, the storage
energy is determined as follows:
E∗st = argmin
Est
ρ(λ(Est)), subject to Cst (5.49)
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with
ρ(λ(Est)) = E
(
λ(Est)
)
+ β · α-CVaR
(
λ(Est)
)
(5.50)
and Cst is the set of constraints modeling the technical limits of the storage device.
In this example, we assume that there are no limits imposed by the minimum or
maximum SOC for this given market time unit. The only constraints thus come
from the charging and discharging nominal rates, which gives:
Cst : r
nom
ch ≤ Est ≤ r
nom
dis (5.51)
−6 MWh/h ≤ Est ≤ 6 MWh/h (5.52)
In this example, the parameter α for the risk measure is taken equal to 0.90. β
is the parameter which models the importance which is given to the risk in the
decision-making. The range of value for β is determined so that the two terms of
Equation 5.50 are of the same order. The risk is not considered when β = 0.
Figure 5.7(a) gives one example of the function ρ(Est) with β = 20. This figure
results from the combination of the two plots from Figure 5.6. In this example,
for η = 0.85, the minimum spot-risk value is reached for E∗st = 3.84 MWh. Figure
5.7(b) gives the influence of β on the quantity E∗st. The three cases of efficiency lead
to three different decisions. For low value of efficiency η = 0.75, the energy storage
value which minimizes the spot-risk is nearly independent from the risk parameter
β and is close to 0 MWh. It can be explained from Figure 5.6 where the storage
energy which minimizes both mean value and CVaR is close to 0 MWh. Also,
for high efficiency (η = 0.95), the value which minimizes the spot-risk measure is
nearly independent from the risk parameter β and is close to Est,ref . However, for
η = 0.85, the optimal storage value E∗st highly depends on β. E
∗
st is close to 2.7 MWh
for β = 0, and rapidly increases as β increases. In other words, the consideration
of the risk in the decision-making method leads to a higher storage energy schedule
Est. In this example, the energy delivered by the storage is considered as a method
for preventing from extreme values of loss.
Finally, three main concluding remarks can be formulated from this example
based on the combination of a wind farm with a storage unit: first, this example
permits to understand the formulation of the loss, which has been proposed in a
generic way in the previous section, especially with the graphical illustration given
in Figure 5.4. Also, this example clearly demonstrates the risk hedging provided
by the storage device: the energy delivered by the storage unit reduces the risk
related to imbalance penalties. Finally, the influence of the risk parameter β on the
resulting decision has been analyzed. In this case, a risk averse attitude (i.e. high
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values of β) leads to higher values of energy delivered by the storage for reducing
the risk of imbalance penalty.
5.5 Application: risk-based trading of wind generation
in day-ahead electricity markets
This section presents the benefits from the application of the generic risk-based
method formulated in Equation 5.40 to the particular case of trading wind genera-
tion in a day-ahead electricity market. More precisely, the spot-risk approach is used
to determine the optimal energy bid from probabilistic wind power forecasts. The
imbalance penalties resulting from such advanced method are compared to the im-
balance penalties obtained when no information about uncertainty associated with
the wind generation is available.
5.5.1 Main hypotheses
This case study is the follow-up of the case study presented in section 4.4.5. We
recall that the independent power producer (IPP) is assumed to be operating a wind
farm and to trade the whole electricity production to the day-ahead market. The
IPP is also assumed to participate as a price taker party, which means that the bids
proposed by the IPP are price independent bids, with a zero price. Consequently,
the bidding decision only consists in the quantity bid. Further details about the
price taker hypothesis are given in section 2.2.4.
The quantity bid the IPP proposes to the market for a given market period Ti
is denoted as EBDATi . Also, similarly to the case study in section 4.4.5, the general
bidding decision for the n consecutive market periods covering the following day is
simplified to n independent decision-making problems relative to a single market
period. The following formulation is valid for any market time unit Ti of the trad-
ing period. However, for simplifying the mathematical expressions, the index Ti is
omitted.
5.5.2 Formulation of the risk-based decision-making method in the
case of day-ahead trading
Similarly to the approach followed in section 4.4, the derivation of the specific spot-
risk approach from the generic formulation is based on the specificities of the present
decision-making problem. The decision in the case of day-ahead trading is a finan-
cial decision u = EBDA . Then, the spot-risk approach for the day-ahead trading
is a particular case of the generic formulation relative to financial decisions V in
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Equation 5.40. Also, the decision is relative to only one market time unit, which
corresponds to n = 1 in Equation 5.40. The norm N is the identity function. Based
on these hypotheses, the optimal bid quantity EBDA,∗ is derived from Equation 5.40:
EBDA,∗ = argmin
EBDA
(
E
(
λ(EBDA)
)
+ β · α-CVaR
(
λ(EBDA)
))
(5.53)
subject to CEBDA
where β is the risk parameter which models the importance which is given to risk
in the decision-making. CEBDA is the constraint associated with the energy bid. In
this example, the energy bid is supposed to be positive and lower or equal to the
maximum energy delivered by the wind farm during the period of a market time
unit. This maximum is denoted as Emaxwf , and corresponds to the energy delivered
by the wind farm generating at nominal power P nomwf during the duration ∆t of the
market time unit: Emaxwf = P
nom
wf × ∆t. Then, the constraints are written as:
CEBDA : 0 ≤ E
BDA ≤ Emaxwf (5.54)
5.5.3 Estimation of the loss distribution from probabilistic forecasts
of wind energy and market prices
The loss distribution λ(EBDA) relative to the imbalance penalty for a given day-
ahead energy bid EBDA is derived from the generic loss formulation in Equation 5.35.
The realization associated with the energy bid decision is the energy contract. This
energy contract equals the energy bid as a result of the price-taker hypothesis.
Consequently, u = u˜ = EBDA . Also, in the particular case of day-ahead trading,
the quantity EDA is taken null, as already explained in section 4.4.2. Consequently,
Equation 5.35 becomes:
λ(EBDA) = Y (EBDA) + max
(
0,
(
Êwf − y(E
BDA)
)
× Π̂∆
)
(5.55)
As already explained in section 4.4.2, the cost Y (EBDA) is null and the energy volume
y(EBDA) equals the energy bid EBDA , which gives:
λ(EBDA) = max
(
0,
(
Êwf − E
BDA
)
× Π̂∆
)
(5.56)
In this case, the forecast of the wind generation Êwf is supposed to be a pro-
babilistic forecast, represented by a predictive pdf f̂Ewf . The price forecast Π̂
∆ is
assumed to be a discrete probabilistic forecast, similarly to the previous example
in section 5.4. Then, the pdf of the loss for a given energy bid EBDA is denoted as
fλ(EBDA ). The derivation of this loss pdf is a particular case of the generic formula-
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tion given in Equation D.17. The derivation of fλ(EBDA ) is similar to the one which
has been detailed in the previous section, with Y (EBDA) = 0. More precisely, this
gives:
fλ(EBDA )(z) = A · d(z) +B · f̂E(γ
−,−1
Π̂∆−
(z)) + C · f̂E(γ
+,−1
Π̂∆+
(z)) (5.57)
The quantities A, B and C are detailed in section D.3. The functions γ−
Π̂∆−
and γ+
Π̂∆+
are defined on the intervals I−wf and I
+
wf respectively, with:
I−wf = [0, E
DA] and I+wf =
[
EDA, Emaxwf
]
(5.58)
5.5.4 Discussion about the expected value of the loss distribution
The optimal energy bid EBDA,∗ obtained from the spot-risk method is formulated
as the result of the optimization problem given in Equation 5.53. However, in the
particular case of β = 0, the spot-risk approach is similar to the expected value
approach:
EBDA,∗ = argmin
EBDA
E
(
λ(EBDA)
)
(5.59)
subject to CEBDA
The formulation of the loss λ(EBDA in Equation 5.56 shows that this loss is a
function of the two random variables Êwf and Π̂
∆. The discrete distribution of Π̂∆
is given by Equation 5.10. Using Bayes’ theorem, the expected value E
(
λ(EBDA)
)
can be written as:
E
(
λ(EBDA)
)
=
∑
s={−,o,+}
αs · E
(
λ(EBDA)
Π̂∆=Π̂∆s
)
(5.60)
By considering the formulation of the loss given in Equation 5.56, Equation 5.60
can be simplified to:
E
(
λ(EBDA)
)
=
α− · Π̂∆− × |Êwf − EBDA | , (Êwf − EBDA) < 0α+ · Π̂∆+ × |Êwf − EBDA | , (Êwf − EBDA) ≥ 0 (5.61)
which leads to:
E
(
λ(EBDA)
)
∝
(1− µ)× |Êwf − EBDA | , (Êwf − EBDA) < 0µ× |Êwf − EBDA | , (Êwf − EBDA) ≥ 0 (5.62)
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with µ =
α+·Π̂∆+
α+·Π̂∆++α−·Π̂
∆
−
.
It is then interesting to note that Equation 5.62 corresponds to the check function
ρµ(Êwf − E
BDA) defined in Equation 5.7. Such function is used to derive the µ-
quantile of a random value in the quantile regression method, as explained in section
5.1.3. More precisely, the minimum of this function is reached for the µ-quantile of
(Êwf−E
BDA). Consequently, the optimal energy bid EBDA,∗ given by Equation 5.59
is in this particular case of β = 0, the µ-quantile of the distribution of the wind
generation forecast Êwf :
EBDA,∗|β=0 = q̂
µ
Ewf
(5.63)
This result is coherent with the one obtained in [60]. In other words, the trading
strategy based on quantile regression, as it is proposed in [60], is a particular case
of the more general decision-making method proposed in this work.
5.5.5 Case study
This section gives the results from the application of the risk-based decision-making
approach given in Equation 5.53 for the participation of a wind farm in a day-ahead
market. The considered wind farm is the reference wind farm taken for all the
previous case studies. It is a 18 MW wind farm located in Western Denmark. The
results are related to the trading of the wind farm generation in the Elspot day-
ahead market during the period between the 01/10/2003 to the 30/06/2004. These
results are obtained using real world data. The forecasting approaches for both the
wind energy and the market price are detailed in the following paragraphs.
Forecasting of the wind generation
In this example, the wind power probabilistic forecasts are obtained from a statistical
model based on quantile regression forest (QRF). This method is a particular case
of quantile regression models, which includes a random input selection phase. It is
specially designed to manage large input dimensionality [167]. More precisely, this is
an extension of Random Forests methods, which rely on classification and regression
trees (CARTs). The application of the QRF method for probabilistic wind power
forecasting is detailed in [132]. For each forecast horizon, a forecast in the form of
a set of quantiles is provided. In this case study, the set includes 21 α-quantiles,
where α is:
α = [0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.30, ..., 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.96, ..., 0.99]
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Such set of quantiles permits to focus on the tails of the distribution (i.e. quantiles
close to 0 and close to 1)for evaluating more precisely the risk related to these tails.
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Figure 5.8: Step probability density function obtained from the quantiles.
The predictive cumulated density function (cdf) is derived as a piecewise linear
function from the quantiles, which corresponds to given points of this cdf. The exam-
ple of the forecast for a one-hour period of the case study is described in Figure 5.8.
The forecast is relative to the delivered energy the 04/11/2003 between 03h00 and
04h00. The forecast was obtained 28 hours before, that is on the 03/11/2003 at
00h00. In this figure, the quantiles are represented by the circles and the cfd is the
dashed line. Then, the predictive pdf of the wind power production f̂EWF is com-
puted as a step function from the cdf. For each interval between two consecutive
quantiles, the step value equals the constant value of the derivative of the cdf, as
shown in Figure 5.8.
Forecasting of the imbalance penalty price
Given the difficulty of price forecasting, a method for simulating the price forecast
Π̂∆ is proposed. This method permits to obtain different levels of forecasting error,
and to evaluate their impact on the decision-making. The details of this simulation
approach are developed in section C.4.1.
First, two reference model are considered: the “constant prediction” model,
which gives a constant forecast for all the horizons, and the “perfect prediction”
model which gives the observed price for each horizon. These two models define
the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the price forecasting errors. Then the
simulated price forecast are based on two parameters which model the forecasting
error, and which are applied to the “perfect prediction” model. The first parameter
is a phase error τ , and the second one is a parameter ǫ which is related to the
uncertainty about the regulation state of the TSO. The “perfect prediction” model
is a particular case of such (ǫ, τ)-model, with (ǫ, τ) = (0, 0). An increase of τ or ǫ
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leads to an increase of the forecasting error, and the “constant prediction” model
corresponds to (ǫ, τ) = (0.5, 0). Further details about this simulation approach,
as well as the performance associated with these models, are given in section C.4.
Here, three different simulated price forecasts are used from the (ǫ, τ)-model with
(ǫ, τ) = (0.75, 0), (0.75, 3), (0.6, 3).
In total, five approaches are considered, including the constant and prefect pre-
diction together with the above three (ǫ, τ)-models, while the imbalance penalty
price Π̂∆ is given as a discrete probabilistic forecast, given by Equation 5.10.
5.5.6 Results
The results are obtained using a simulation tool developed in Matlab®. In partic-
ular, the optimization problem given in Equation 5.53 is solved using a sequential
quadratic programming (SQP) method already implemented in Matlab®.
The first results of this case study focus on the relation between the risk and
the observed imbalance penalties. The aim is to demonstrate that the risk mea-
sured from the loss distribution gives some information about the extreme imbalance
penalties. For this analysis (and only for this one), the day-ahead energy bid does
not take into account the risk related to imbalance penalties, and is taken equal to
the mean of the probabilistic forecast. Then, the risk associated with this specific
decision is calculated from the distribution of the loss, which in turn is derived from
the probabilistic forecast of the wind power production.
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Figure 5.9: Relation between the risk, measured through the VaR or the CVaR, and the
obtained imbalance penalty δ. The results are obtained from the trading simulation period
from the 01/10/2003 to the 30/06/2004.
Figure 5.9 describes the relation between the risk level and the obtained imbal-
ance penalty. The α-VaR and α-CVaR were calculated with the confidence level α
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equal to 0.90. The price model for calculating the loss distribution was the (ǫ, τ)-
model with (ǫ, τ) = (0.75, 0). For better analyzing the influence of the risk level on
the imbalance penalty, the distribution of the imbalance penalty is represented for
different risk levels. A risk level is in this case an interval of risk so that all the lev-
els have the same number of observations. For each risk level, a distribution of the
penalty values is produced. Such distribution is represented through five α-quantiles
with α = [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9]. The first two quantiles α = [0.1, 0.3] equal 0 for all
the different risk level values. This is explained by the dual imbalance pricing mech-
anism, which penalizes only positive or negative imbalances. Consequently, a high
proportion (i.e. 30 %) of the hourly imbalance penalties are null.
For both the VaR and the CVaR measures, Figure 5.9 shows an increase of the
dispersion of the imbalance penalty as the risk measure increases. More precisely, the
extreme imbalance penalties, which are represented by the 0.90-quantile, increase as
the risk measure increases. This analysis confirms that both the VaR and the CVaR
measures inform about extreme penalties, and are thus acceptable risk measures.
Regarding the VaR, this risk measure has been defined in section 5.2.3 as the α-
quantile of the loss distribution, where α is the confidence level. In case of perfect
estimation of the loss distribution, the 0.90-quantile of the imbalance penalty should
be equal to the 0.90-VaR measure. Graphically, this means that the dark red line
would be superposed on the black dashed line, which gives the identity function.
However, figure 5.9(a) shows that the 0.90-quantile of the imbalance penalty is higher
than the 0.90-VaR measure. In other words, the VaR is slightly underestimated.
This is the result from a combined underestimation of the extreme wind power
production and of the imbalance price penalty. This underestimation more generally
refers to the problem of reliability of probabilistic forecasts, which aims at evaluating
how close to the reality the probabilistic forecasts are. The interested reader can
refer to [78] for further details about reliability.
Based on the analysis that the proposed risk is an acceptable measure of extreme
imbalance penalty, the following results focus on the influence of such risk on the
decision-making results for day-ahead trading. The results below are obtained by
applying the spot-risk decision-making method given in Equation 5.53 for determin-
ing the optimal energy bid. Figure 5.10 presents the influence of the risk parameter
β on the distribution of the imbalance penalties. The graph on the left gives the
histograms of the penalty distributions in the reference case and for three different β
values: β = 0, 15, 75. The reference case does not consider any risk. This case con-
sists in setting the energy bid as the mean of the probabilistic forecast of the wind
generation. The results from the risk-based method have been obtained taking the
(ǫ, τ)-model with (ǫ, τ) = (0.60, 3) as price prediction approach. The influence of the
(ǫ, τ) parameters is discussed in further results. From the histograms of Figure 5.10,
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Figure 5.10: Analysis of the distribution of the imbalance penalties resulting from the
risk-based trading method.
it can be observed that the number of occurrences of extreme imbalance penalties is
reduced by using the risk-based approach, compared to the reference case. Also, this
reduction gets higher when high β values are taken. The right graph of Figure 5.10
also describes the impact of the risk-based approach on the imbalance penalty distri-
bution. This graph plots the hourly imbalance penalty resulting from the risk-based
approach, with blue points, against the one obtained in the reference case. The grey
line represents the reference imbalance penalties against themselves, and is thus the
identity function. The reduction of extreme imbalance penalties is illustrated by the
fact that most of the blue points for high values of imbalance penalties are under
the grey line. Consequently, the results presented in Figure 5.10 show the benefits
of the risk-based method in terms of reduction of extreme penalty values.
Figure 5.10 completes the analysis of the influence of the risk parameter on the
imbalance penalty distribution. This figure gives the mean and 0.95-quantile of the
penalty distribution obtained with various β values. First the two graphs show
that both the mean and the 0.95-quantile are reduced by the risk-based approach
compared to the reference approach, and this for all the considered β values. For
values of β lower than 40, the mean and the 0.95-quantile have similar trends. This
signifies that both the average and the extreme values of the imbalance penalty are
reduced with the risk-based approach. They reach of minimum value when β is
close to 10. For β values greater than 40, the 0.95-quantile of the penalty slightly
decreases as the risk parameter increases, whereas the mean penalty increases. This
is coherent with the definition of the risk parameter β, which models the risk aversion
of the decision maker. High values of β mean that the decision maker is highly
sensitive to the extreme penalties, and the consideration of this risk aversion in the
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Figure 5.11: Mean and 0.95-quantile of the imbalance penalty distribution obtained from
the risk-based trading method.
decision-making leads to decisions which reduce the extreme penalties. However,
this risk hedging increases the average value of the penalty. This example is a
particularly clear illustration of the difference of objective between the minimization
of the average or the extreme penalty. The spot-risk approach can thus be considered
as a multi-objective approach, and the risk parameter β corresponds to the weight
given to the objective relative to the minimization of extreme penalties.
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Figure 5.12: Influence of the imbalance price prediction approach on the mean and 0.95-
quantile of the imbalance penalty distribution obtained from the risk-based trading method.
The results presented in figures 5.10 and 5.11 have been obtained with the (ǫ, τ)-
model with (ǫ, τ) = (0.60, 3) as price prediction approach. The last figure 5.12 shows
the mean and 0.95-quantile of the imbalance penalty, obtained with five different
201
Risk-based approach for renewable generation in electricity markets
price prediction approaches. These two plots clearly demonstrate the high sensi-
tivity of the results towards the price prediction approach considered. The perfect
prediction of the imbalance penalty price reduces practically to zero the imbalance
penalty, even without perfect prediction of the wind generation. This results from
the dual-price mechanism for the imbalance penalty settlement. When the penalty
prices are perfectly known, the energy bid equals the maximum bid when the TSO
is down-regulating so that the IPP has only negative energy imbalances which are
not penalized. Similarly, the energy bid equals zero when the TSO is up-regulating
so that the IPP has only positive energy imbalances which are not penalized. Sim-
ilar analysis was made in the study in [68]. Contrary to the perfect prediction, the
constant prediction leads to an increase of both the mean and the 0.95-quantile of
the imbalance penalty for β greater than 7. Also, for the different values of (ǫ, τ)
shown in Figure 5.12, the reduction of the mean and 0.95-quantile increases as the
accuracy of the price prediction approach increases. Finally, Figure 5.12 shows that
the influence of the β parameter on the mean and 0.95-quantile of the penalty, is
higher for more accurate price prediction model (e.g. the case (ǫ, τ) = (0.75, 0))
than for less accurate model (e.g. the case (ǫ, τ) = (0.60, 3)).
To conclude, the application of the risk-based approach for the participation
of wind generation in a day-ahead market permits to illustrate to benefits of the
method, compared to the reference approach which consists in bidding the energy
quantity corresponding to the deterministic forecast of the wind power production.
In this application, the role of the VaR and CVaR measures for informing about
extreme values of imbalance penalty has been confirmed. Also, the integration
of such information in the decision-making process through a spot-risk approach,
demonstrated a reduction of the average and extreme imbalance penalty. Finally, the
results have demonstrated that the proposed risk-based approach can be considered
as a multi-objective approach, where the first objective is to reduce the average
penalty and the second one is to reduce the extreme penalties.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a method for better accounting for the uncertainty related to the
participation of renewable generation in electricity markets has been proposed and
evaluated. The proposed approach is an extension of the general decision-making
method proposed in the previous chapter.
An overview of the state of the art of the uncertainty models, as well as of
the general methods for decision-making under uncertainty, has been carried out.
The method which has been selected for this work is a risk-based approach, which
permits to explicitly measure the risk related to the imbalance penalty from the
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available probabilistic forecasts of renewable power production.
Then, the different physical and financial solutions for reducing the imbalance
penalties, which have been described and modeled in the previous chapters, are
integrated in the general risk management problem as hedging methods. These
solutions aim at reducing the risk associated with a given decision. The example of
the combination with a storage device as a physical hedging method is presented.
Finally, the proposed risk-based decision-making method has been applied for the
participation of wind generation in a day-ahead electricity market, and the results
obtained demonstrate a reduction of both the average and the extreme values of
imbalance penalties in general. The results also illustrate the compromise between
the reduction of the average penalty, and the reduction of the extreme penalties.
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CHAPTER 6
General Conclusions and Perspectives
This chapter summarizes the main partial conclusions which have been given at
the end of each chapter, and also adds some general conclusions about the whole
research work. In addition, some perspectives for further research related to this
Ph.D. thesis are also suggested.
6.1 General Conclusions
The work presented in this thesis has proposed methods for the management of
the uncertainty related to the participation of renewable generation in electricity
markets. This work has been carried out in the context of an increasing share of
electricity generation coming from renewables, in an electricity sector which evolves
from a centralized to a liberalized system. This new environment leads to the need
of tools and methods for the management of the large scale integration of renewable
generation in power systems. The problem considered in this thesis is taken from the
power producer’s point of view, which aims at minimizing the imbalance penalties
relative to its participation in short-term electricity markets.
The first objective was to understand in depth the challenges related to the par-
ticipation of a power producer including RES units in its generation portfolio, in a
short-term electricity market. This was done in chapter 2, where a detailed presen-
tation of the structure of the electricity markets has been proposed. This description
permitted to point out the specificities related to the short-term electricity markets,
which are the main focus of this work. Also, the definitions of the concepts of “inde-
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pendent power producer” (IPP) and balance responsible parties were given, and
used as a base for the formulation of the imbalance penalties given in the following
chapter. A last contribution of chapter 2 was the overview provided on the state of
the art of existing solutions that an IPP can use for reducing its imbalance penalties.
The presented solutions have been classified into two main categories: the financial
solutions, which are relative to the management of the contracted energy by the
market participant operating the RES units, and the physical solutions which are
relative to the management of the delivered energy by the RES units. Despite their
distinctions coming from their definition, the similarities between these solutions
have been discussed all along the thesis.
In chapter 3, models for the imbalance penalty resulting from the partici-
pation of an IPP in electricity markets have been proposed for different physical and
financial solutions. The reference imbalance penalty for each solution corresponds to
the case of the participation of a reference renewable unit in a day-ahead electricity
market. Then, the different physical and financial solutions have been modeled as
a modification of this reference imbalance penalty. Three physical solutions, each
corresponding to a given technical solution, have been modeled. Namely, these solu-
tions are the aggregation of RES units and the combination of RES units with either
a storage device or with a conventional unit. These solutions have been modeled in
the framework of the concept of commercial virtual power plants, which offers
the possibility for combined units to participate in the market as a single entity.
Regarding financial solutions, the case of the additional participation in the intra-
day market has been modeled. The trading of market derivatives (options) has been
discussed.
Having followed a common framework for the above formulations, we made evi-
dent the similarity between the financial and physical solutions about their impact
on the imbalance penalty. Both financial and physical solutions have been modeled
by two parameters which modify the reference imbalance penalty: an additional
cost and a balance energy volume. The additional cost can be interpreted as the
cost to pay to benefit from the balance energy volume, which permits to reduce the
imbalance penalty. In the case of a financial solution, this balance service is bought
from other market participants through electricity markets, whereas this service is
provided by the combined units in the case of the physical solutions. In other words,
for the operator of a RES unit, an adjustment participation in an intraday market is
similar, from the imbalance penalty point of view, to the combination with a storage
unit. Based on this, we developed a generic formulation of the imbalance penalty
that integrates both physical and financial solutions. This unified formulation
permits to generalize the model for a combination of solutions. In fact, in an indus-
trial context, physical solutions may be combined with financial solutions, and the
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generic formulation permits to develop the necessary simulation tools for evaluating,
dimensioning and operating these solutions. Finally, the application given in section
3.5 has illustrated how a parametric analysis based on this unified model can be
used for the general problem of unit dimensioning in the context of virtual power
plants.
In the following chapter, the different problems related to the participation of an
IPP in an electricity market, and more generally the activation of financial and phys-
ical solutions, have been formulated as decision-making problems under uncer-
tainty. A generic method has been proposed for solving these problems based on a
loss function, which is defined from the estimation of the generic imbalance penalty
model previously detailed. In other words, the generic aspect of the decision-making
method is based on the generic aspect of the imbalance penalty model itself. It is
important to note that if the formulation of the imbalance penalty was specific to
each considered solution (i.e. not generic), it would have been necessary to derive
different decision-making methods which would be appropriate to each different so-
lution. In the present work, the generic decision-making method is applied to the
reference case of day-ahead trading, to the case of intraday trading (i.e. financial
solution) and to the case of a storage combination (i.e. physical solution). Also,
the application of the advanced decision-making method for the strategic operation
of a combined wind-hydro plant has demonstrated the importance of the decision
approach on the obtained results. This example has illustrated the difference bet-
ween the two paradigms: the minimization of the average imbalance penalty for a
period, and the minimization of the extreme values of imbalance penalty for the
same period. In particular, a solution which is acceptable for one paradigm is not
always acceptable for the second paradigm, and vice versa.
The consideration of this compromise between the average and extreme values
in a decision-making problem is the core of the risk-based approach proposed in
this thesis. In this method, the risk associated with a given decision is modeled
from the statistical distribution of the imbalance penalty obtained for this decision.
Such imbalance penalty distribution is derived from the probabilistic forecasts of
the energy delivered by the RES unit, as well as from market price forecasts. Since
advanced price forecasting is not a trivial task, we proposed to simulate the price
forecast uncertainty. The resulting price forecasts have a level of forecasting error
which can be adjusted by the simulation, which permit to analyze the influence of
the accuracy of the price forecasts on the decision results. The risk associated with a
decision is then evaluated from risk measures taken from the financial literature, and
integrated in the decision-making problem. The sensitivity of the IPP to extreme
imbalance penalties is modeled in the proposed approach through a risk parameter.
In this context, the physical and financial imbalance management solutions are seen
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as hedging methods, which reduce the risk related to the imbalance penalties.
The risk hedging is illustrated for the case of the combination with storage, which is
an example of physical solution. Also, the benefits from the risk-based approach, in
terms of reduction of the average and extreme imbalance penalties, are demonstrated
from simulations based on real world data.
Finally, the main contribution of the thesis relies on the proposed general metho-
dology, which can be seen as a roadmap for step-by-step building a generic decision-
making method adapted to the considered problem. The first step consists in mod-
eling the outcome of the decision; then a generic decision-making is proposed based
on this model, and finally the method is extended for taking into account the uncer-
tainty related to the decisions. Finally, a number of results on selected real-world
cases demonstrate the applicability and the usefulness of this methodology.
6.2 Perspectives
The first and obvious perspective of this research work consists in applying the
proposed decision-making method to other case studies for obtaining further results
about the benefits of the method. In particular, these additional case studies could
consist in considering either different simulation time periods, different reference
RES units, or different electricity markets for the case study. These additional
results could be given in the form of a sensitivity analysis of the main parameters
which define the case studies. Another extension of this work consists in applying
the risk-based decision-making method in the case of a financial solution other than
day-ahead trading, such as intraday trading, or in the case of physical solutions,
such as strategic operation of a combined wind-hydro plant. Finnaly another direct
application of this work would be to consider different risk measures in the spot-risk
approach.
Another more technical perspective of this present work is related to the opti-
mization algorithms used for solving the decision-making problem. In this thesis,
the optimization problems have been simplified so that they could be solved by clas-
sic continuous optimization techniques already implemented in several numerical
solvers. For example, in the application of the management of a combined wind-
hydro plant in section 4.6, the constraints of the optimization problem have been
simplified so that the problem becomes a linear optimization problem. It would be
interesting to develop adapted optimization techniques which could be used for solv-
ing the problem without having to simplify it. Moreover, only continuous decision
problems have been taken into account in this work. The extension of this decision
approach to discrete decision problems is an interesting perspective of this work.
Technically, optimization techniques such as dynamic programming, used in [120],
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could be considered.
Regarding the uncertainty management, the proposed approach for the deriva-
tion of the loss distribution used in the risk-based approach, assumes that both
renewable generation and market prices are independent. However, in areas with a
high share of electricity generation coming from renewables, such as in Denmark,
renewable generation really impacts the electricity market prices. Furthermore,
the correlation between these two stochastic quantities may increase the imbalance
penalty risk for the IPP. For considering such dependence, a possibility consists in
using conditional forecasts of the renewable generation which are respective to given
levels of market prices.
The generic decision-making method which has been proposed in this work is
based on the concept of virtual power plant (VPP) which combine different genera-
tion units. A perspective concerns the possibility of integrating controllable loads
in the VPP. In this case, the VPP includes loads in addition to the generation units,
and consequently, the participation in the market does not consist only in selling
power production, but may also consist in buying electricity for some market time
units. The VPP operator is then denoted as an aggregator. Indeed, controllable
loads are loads which can be displaced in time, or curtailed. They consequently rep-
resent another possibility for the VPP operator to manage its imbalance penalties.
For instance, a controllable load can be adjusted so that the period of this load cor-
responds to the period when the renewable generation exceeds the contract volume.
In other words, a controllable load can be considered as an additional physical solu-
tion which can reduce the positive energy imbalance. In this case, this corresponds
to an extension of the VPP model.
Regarding the financial solutions, the case of option trading has been dis-
regarded, based on the analysis that specific options adapted to the short-term
management of energy imbalance are not available products in today’s markets.
However, the evolution of the regulatory framework for renewable generation, from
feed-in tariffs to full market integration, leads to the need of new solutions to be
proposed to IPPs for managing their renewable generation. In this context, new ac-
tors, which propose hedging solutions specifically designed for IPPs to manage their
imbalance penalty risk, are emerging. One example is “virtual storage”, which takes
the form of a limited amount of energy available during a given period, and usable
by the IPP when needed. Such virtual storage can be delivered by a real operator
of hydro power units. The possibility to consider the management of these inno-
vative hedging solutions in the proposed generic decision-making method would be
an interesting perspective of the work. Another interesting extension of the method
would be the possibility to take into account long-term contracts in the decision,
which have been excluded in the case of the present formulation.
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A more general perspective of this work is related to the objective of the deci-
sions made by the VPP. In this thesis, the only objective considered for the decisions
is an economic one which consists in minimizing the imbalance penalty. However,
in general, the decisions may be relative to several objectives, which are not only
economic but also technical. This is explained by the fact that the solutions pro-
posed for the management of imbalance penalties can be simultaneously used for
different purposes. For example, the decision about the storage scheduling could be
a multi-objective decision which aims at reducing both the imbalance penalty of the
IPP and the risk of grid congestion.
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Renewable Generation Forecasting Methods
This section gives details about the forecasting of renewable generation. The first
section presents an overview of the state of the art of renewable generation forecas-
ting. Such overview is general and is valid for any stochastic renewable source, such
as photovolta¨ıc or wind generation. The second section gives some illustrations in
the particular case of wind generation forecasting. Finally, the third section focuses
on probabilistic forecasting of wind generation. The information about uncertainty,
provided by these probabilistic methods, is used in chapter 5 for estimating the risk
associated to decision-making problems.
B.1 Overview of the state of the art of renewable gen-
eration forecasting
Renewable generation forecasting aims at providing end-users with estimates of the
likely energy output of a RES unit at a given time in the future. The considered
RES unit can be a wind farm, a photovolta¨ıc plant or another RES unit. In general,
forecasting tools provide an estimation of the future generation based on Numerical
Weather Predictions (NWP), on onsite measurements and on power unit charac-
teristics. Either power or energy can be forecasted as a function of the end-user
requirements.
The two mainstream approaches for RES power forecasting are the so-called
physical and the statistical approaches [78].
• In the physical approach, the model chain includes two steps: in a first step, the
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NWP data available at the nodes of the meteorological model are extrapolated
to the location of the RES unit. Such step is denoted as “downscaling”. In
the case of wind genration forecasting, this can be done by modeling the wind
profile at the location of the RES unit and by using a Computational Fluid
Dynamic code which considers the full description of the terrain close to the
wind farm. The second step consists in converting the downscaled NWP to
power.
• Statistical approaches are based on models which try to establish the relation
between historical values of explanatory variables and historical values of RES
production. The same relation is then used to forecast the expected RES
production from the new explanatory variables. The physical phenomena are
not modeled in this approach. However, one of the main challenges related to
these approaches is the selection of the explanatory variables.
The most common output of RES generation forecasting models are spot fore-
casts, also called point forecasts, where a single power value is provided for each
time step in the future. However, probabilistic forecasting models are being devel-
oped. Such models provide additional information on the expected distribution of
RES production, and will be discussed in the next section B.3. The reference model
used for assessing the performance of advanced power forecasting models is often
the persistence. Such approach consists in using the last measured power value as a
constant prediction for the next period.
Renewable production forecasts time scales
The forecast horizon is the period between the time when the prediction is done
and the given time in future to which the prediction refers. Power forecasting can
be done for different time scales of horizons. A classification of power forecasting
time scales is proposed in [78,168]. This classification has been established for wind
generation forecasting, but remains valid for other variable RES:
• Very short-term power forecasts estimate the future power from seconds up to
a few minutes. These forecasts can be used for the power unit active control.
• Short-term power forecasts are available for the following 48-72 hours. Such
forecasts are used for various power system management functions such as
unit commitment, economic dispatch, reserve estimation or network congestion
management. These forecasts are also used for trading generation in short-
term electricity markets. Regarding day-ahead markets for example, power
forecasts are necessary at day d for the whole duration of the day d+ 1.
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• Medium-term power forecasts estimate the future power for longer time scales,
up to 5-7 days ahead. These forecasts can be used for maintenance planning
for example.
The present thesis focuses on the imbalance penalties related to the participation
in short-term electricity markets, and, thus, only short-term power forecasts are
considered in this work.
A forecasting run is defined as a time series of the estimated variable (i.e.
RES production), for consecutive horizons separated by a constant timestep. This
timestep, or temporal resolution, is often imposed by the timestep of the NWP, since
they are used as direct input. Temporal resolution for short-term power forecasts is
generally between 1 and 3 hours. If the temporal resolution of RES forecasts is lower
than the one requested for the application (e.g. trading), simple interpolation can
be an acceptable solution to increase the temporal resolution. The update time is
defined as the period between two forecasting runs. Similarly, the power forecasting
update time is generally imposed by the NWP update time, which is generally 6,
12 or 24 hours. However, statistical models which use the measurements of RES
generation as input can be updated more frequently (i.e. every 30 or 60 min). Con-
sequently, power forecasts can be described as rolling windows, where the window
length is determined by the series of horizons and the shift between two windows is
the update time.
B.2 Example of approaches for wind generation fore-
casting
This section focuses on approaches from the state of the art regarding wind gen-
eration forecasting. This specific RES is of particular importance, since its fast
development has lead to major issues for the management of electricity networks
including a large share of wind generation. These issues are related to the high
variations of the wind power generation, as well as the difficulty to forecast them.
In this context, wind generation forecasting methods have been considered as a use-
ful solution for the management of such variations, and short-term wind generation
forecasting tools have been in use for more than 15 years [169]. A state of the art of
the wind generation forecasting methods can be found in [168,170]. Also, a compar-
ison between various wind generation forecasting methods, based on statistical or
physical approaches, can be found in [171]. The objective of this section is double:
the first one is to give an illustration of typical forecasts of wind generation obtai-
ned by state-of-the-art forecasting methods. The second objectives is to present and
compare the level of forecast errors obtained with these methods.
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Figure B.1: Consecutive forecasting runs and related measurements for the power genera-
tion of a 18 MW wind farm in Western Denmark the 16 and 17 February 2004.
Figure B.1 presents the results of four consecutive forecasting runs for the power
generation from a wind farm located in Western Denmark. The first run is produced
the 16/02/04 at 00 h and the forecast is then updated every 12 h. The measured
wind generation is illustrated with the black curve. The forecasting runs give the
estimation of the wind generation for the next 48 h. The wind generation forecasts
are produced using an advanced statistical power forecasting model described in
[11, 111]. This model is denoted as the ”Regressive Power Curve” (RPC) model,
and aims at modeling the relationship between the wind speed forecasts and the
power outputs of the wind farm. Such kind of approaches are often referred as
power curve modeling. In this model, the power curve is modeled using a piecewise
least square linear fitting of the wind-speed to power relation.
The different existing forecasting models are usually evaluated based on the
“distance” between the provided forecast value and the measured value. Generally,
these forecast performances are evaluated on a sample of NT forecast values which
have the same horizon index j but with different run time tk. The wind generation
forecasting error ej,k for a given horizon j and a run time tk is the difference between
the measured and forecasted values : ej,k = P˜j,k − P̂j,k.
Two main performance evaluation criteria are commonly used [11,78]. The Nor-
malized Mean Absolute Error (NMAE) is the average of the errors in their absolute
values, normalized by the energy delivered by the wind farm at nominal power dur-
ing a market time unit. Such energy volume is denoted as Enom. The Normalized
Root Mean Square Error (NRMSE) is the square root of the average of the squared
errors, normalized by Enom:
NMAEj =
1
Enom
1
NT
NT∑
k=1
|ej,k| , and NRMSE(j) =
1
Enom
√√√√ 1
NT
NT∑
k=1
(ej,k)
2 (B.1)
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The choice of the NMAE or NRMSE as a main evaluation criterion depends on
the sensitivity of the end-users to the errors. The RMSE measure will be preferred
for applications sensible to quadratic penalization of the errors whereas the NMAE
measure will be preferred for applications sensible to linear penalization of the error.
Note that the NMAE for a period is equivalent to the normalized mean of the
absolute energy imbalance for this period.
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Figure B.2: Mean Absolute Error per horizon for five wind generation forecasting models:
perfect prediction, persistence, constant prediction, RPC and QRF models.
Figure B.2 compares the performance of five wind generation forecasting ap-
proaches. These results corresponds to a 9 month period from 01/10/2003 to
30/06/2004. During this period, a forecasting run is calculated every 12 hours,
for the 48 coming hours. Figure B.2 shows the Normalized Mean Absolute Error
(NMAE) defined in Equation B.1 for the 48 horizons. First, the NMAE relative
to perfect prediction is always null, since the error is always null. Also, the model
denoted as “constant prediction” which NMAE is plotted with the blue curve in
Figure B.2 is an second basic reference model which consists in delivering a con-
stant value for all the different horizons for all the runs. Such constant value is
in the presented example the mean of the wind generation measurements during
a period in the past (often denoted as “climatology”). Here it is calculated based
on the training period which corresponds to the first 9 months of the available
data (01/01/2003-30/09/2003). The RPC model is the power curve modeling ap-
proach already presented in Figure B.1 [11,111], and its NMAE is described with the
green curve. Finally, the “QRF” model corresponds to a second advanced statistical
model based on quantile regression forest. Such approach provides an estimation of
the distribution of the future wind power production, through quantiles [167]. A
further discussion on this kind of probabilistic models which inform on the uncer-
tainty related to the forecast is given in the following chapter 5. In this example,
the considered forecast is the median of the distribution.
217
Renewable generation forecasting methods
From Figure B.2, it can be observed that the constant prediction method results
to a nearly constant NMAE slightly varying around 19 % of the nominal power of
the considered wind farm. The persistence NMAE is lower than the one resulting
from the constant prediction for the first 12 horizons, and greater for the follow-
ing horizons. Also, the “RPC” and “QRF” models have a very close NMAE for
the considered period. This NMAE is close to the persistence NMAE for the first
3 horizons and is highly reduced for the further horizons. Finally, Figure B.2 de-
scribed the forecasting period relative to the trading in day-ahead markets, where
the bidding decision has to be made at 12h00 the day before for the 24 hours of the
following day. The NMAE relative to this period varies between 8 and 10 % of the
Enom for the two advanced models.
B.3 Probabilistic forecasting of wind generation
B.3.1 Overview of the state of the art of the methods for probabi-
listic forecasting of wind generation
The previous section has presented deterministic forecast of the wind generation.
The present section aims at completing the presentation with probabilistic methods.
Focus is given only to methods developed for the forecasting of wind generation.
The incertainty provided by probabilistic wind generation methods is a useful
information for decision-making applications related to the large scale integration of
wind power. For example, the uncertainty information can be used for estimating
the optimal level of reserves that needs to be allocated to compensate wind vari-
ability [139]. Energy bidding in a day-ahead electricity market is another emerging
application. It has been shown that, when trading future production on an elec-
tricity market, the use of probabilistic wind generation forecasts can lead to higher
benefits than those obtained by only using deterministic forecasts [67]. Finally, wind
generation probabilistic forecasts can be used for the optimal operation of combined
wind-hydro power plants [94].
Two main approaches have been used for probabilistic wind generation forecas-
ting: the prediction error approach and the direct approach. Such classification is
taken from the state of the art of probabilistic forecast methods presented in [129].
• The prediction error approach consists in providing probabilistic forecasts of
the errors of an existing deterministic forecasting model. An example of this
approach is given in [78] where the proposed method estimates the distribution
of the errors depending on the weather situations. The fuzzy set theory is used
to overcome the problem of class discontinuity, and the error distributions
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associated to different fuzzy sets are then combined using one of two methods:
linear opinion pool or adapted resampling. Another example of prediction error
approach is proposed in [172]. Such method is based on quantile regression
based on cubic spline regression and provides quantiles of the prediction error
using various explanatory variables.
• The second approach is denoted as the direct approach, and aims at directly
providing probabilistic forecasts of the considered variable. The following ex-
amples of direct approaches are recent studies and demonstrate the active
research activity in this field. First, a method where probabilistic forecasts
can be derived from meteorological ensembles is provided in [173]. In [174],
the probabilistic forecasts are based on physical considerations. Local quantile
regression is use in [175] to compute specific quantiles of the power production.
A comparison of three quantile approaches, namely local quantile regression,
local Gaussian modeling and, the Nadaraya-Watson estimator, is performed
in [176]. Also, a method based on kernel density estimation (KDE) is pro-
posed in [129,166]. Such method provides predictions in the form of probabil-
ity density functions, which can be used as such or transformed into different
sub-products depending on the application (e.g. point prediction, variance,
prediction intervals or quantiles).
The two probabilistic methods which are used in the present thesis for the fore-
casting of wind generation are the KDE and the QRF methods. They are presented
in section 5.1.3.
Based on these probabilistic forecasts, statistical measures have been developed
for informing on the confidence one may have about the point forecast associated
to the considered probabilistic forecasts. Such numerical value is called Prediction
Risk Index (PRI) in [177]. In this article, the PRI is calculated from wind power
ensemble forecasts. Also, in [174], indicators of weather dynamics are defined using
methods from synoptic climatology. These indicators are used for classifying the
local weather conditions and for relating them to different levels of forecast uncer-
tainty. Such classification is based on measurements of wind speed, wind direction
and atmospheric pressure.
Finally, it is important to note that the resulting probabilistic forecasts from
these two approaches are generated on a per look-ahead time basis, and, conse-
quently, do not inform about the temporal dependence between consecutive fore-
casts. Also, such forecast are obtained from a given RES unit. Consequently, they
do not inform about the spatial dependence between forecasts relative to different
units located at different locations, which is useful in the case of aggregation. Ex-
amples of existing methods for considering these temporal and spatial dependences
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are presented in the next section.
B.3.2 Discussion about spatial and temporal dependence of the
probabilistic wind generation forecast
This section focuses on the information relative to the spatial and temporal depen-
dence included in probabilistic forecasts of wind generation.
Temporal dependence of the probabilistic forecast of wind generation
Scenarios based forecasts provide a possible future course of the forecasted vari-
able. However, the other probabilistic forecasting methods presented in the previ-
ous paragraphs are generated on a per look-ahead time basis. They consequently
do not inform on the development of the prediction errors through prediction se-
ries, since they neglect their temporal interdependence structure. Moreover, such
information is of particular importance for many time-dependent and multi-stage
decision-making processes such as the strategic operation of a combined wind-hydro
storage unit.
Based on this need for temporal dependence information, a method is proposed
in [178] for generating statistical scenarios of wind generation from non-parametric
probabilistic forecasts. The resulting scenarios respect the predictive densities and
account for the interdependence structure of prediction errors. Consequently, they
can be used in time-dependent processes. For deriving these scenarios, the set of
random variables composing probabilistic series is transformed into a single multi-
variate normal variable. The normal property for the new variable is the simplest
assumption one can make, and this assumption is analyzed in the study as well.
Then, the multivariate normal variable covariance matrix is tracked with recursive
estimation. Finally, the scenarios are constructed using the covariance matrix and
the normal variable.
Spatial dependence of the probabilistic forecast of wind generation This
paragraph focus on the dependence between stochastic variables in the case of aggre-
gated wind power sources. Spatial interdependence of stochastic variables is often
underestimated in literature, where stochastic variables are assumed to be inde-
pendent. Such independence assumption can lead to a severe underestimation of
the system risk, corresponding to the case of minimum variability of the aggregate
stochastic generation. In [179], a method is proposed for considering the spatial
interdependence structure in the case of aggregated power sources.
The modeling approach is based on the distinction between the one-dimensional
marginal distribution which represents the output spectrum of each stochastic input,
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and the multi-dimensional stochastic dependence structure which determines the
mutual interaction between the stochastic inputs and the direct impact on their
aggregate. The approach is generally referred to as copula theory. In particular,
the method enables to define uncertainty bounds of the stochastic model and to
define worst-case scenario for the aggregated stochastic variables. This uncertainty
analysis and model is used for considering various problems related to aggregated
stochastic power generation, ranging from stability issues to generation expansion
studies [180].
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APPENDIX C
Market Price Forecasting Methods
This appendix gives some additional details about market price forecasting. First,
the main characteristics of the electricity market are presented. These characteristics
are explained from the literature. Then, a second section gives an overview of the
state of the art of existing market price forecasting methods. Due to the complexity
relative to market price forecasting, an approach for simulating forecasts of the
market price is proposed. The price quantity which is necessary for making the
decisions relative to the trading of renewable generation in electricity market is
identified from the model of the imbalance penalty given in chapter 3. Then, the
simulated prices permits to obtain a disrete probabilistic forecast of the market price
with different levels of forecasting error.
C.1 Characterization of electricity market prices
Before the liberalization of the electricity sector, electricity prices were set by reg-
ulators on the basis of the costs of generation, transmission and distribution. In
that setting, power prices used to change rarely, and in an essentially deterministic
manner. Over the last ten years, several countries have been experiencing deregu-
lation in generation and supply activities, as described in section 2.1.1. One of the
important consequences of this restructuring is that prices for electricity are now
determined, like any other commodity, according to the fundamental economic rule
of supply and demand [181,182].
However, electricity is a commodity which has the particularity of a very lim-
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ited storability; the main storage units are now the hydro power units. Another
characteristic of electricity is the high inelasticity of the demand in the short-term
markets. Consequently, the electricity prices are highly sensitive to demand and
supply variations [183].
An analysis of the structure of electricity prices is proposed in [182], and identifies
three main characteristics:
• A first characteristic of electricity prices is the mean reversion towards a level
that represents a marginal cost and may be constant, periodic or periodic with
a trend. A variable is said to be characterized by mean reversion when high
and low values of this variable are temporary, and are expected to tend to an
average trend. When the current market price is less than the average price,
the commodity is considered attractive for purchase, and price is expected to
increase. Similarly, when the current market price is above the average price,
the market price is expected to decrease.
• A second feature of the price process is the existence of small random moves
around the average trend, which represent the temporary imbalances between
supply and demand in the network.
• A third and intrinsic feature of price process is the presence of so-called
“spikes”, which are steep price increases shortly followed by a steep decrease.
Such spikes may occur as a result of a generation unit outage, when a large gen-
eration unit is disconnected. Figure C.1 describes the hourly time series of the
day-ahead market price for the period between 01/10/2003 and 30/06/2004.
The average price during this period is 29.14 e/MWh. However, this price can
reach extreme values during very short periods, such as on the 21/06/2004 at
14h00 when the day-ahead price reaches 89.67 e/MWh.
Without considering the spike effects, the main parameters which influence the
market price can be classified into three categories [183]:
• Influence relative to the electricity demand: The electricity demand first de-
pends on the considered period (i.e. season, day, hour) and also on meteo-
rological conditions such as cloudiness and temperature, which are stochastic
variables.
• Influence relative to the power supply: The power supply first depends on the
characteristics and operation of the generation units involved in the considered
electricity markets. Power supply also depends on stochastic factors such as
unit outages, variations of delivered energy by renewable units or meteorolo-
gical conditions.
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Figure C.1: Day-ahead electricity market price in the Elspot market for the Western Den-
mark area, from 01/10/2003 to 30/06/2004.
• More general factors influence the energy prices which in turn impact the
electricity prices: such factors are for example the geopolitical context or the
regulation framework.
C.2 Overview of the state of the art of electricity mar-
ket price forecasting
The main characteristics of the structure of the electricity market prices which have
been described above make them hardly predictable. Three main reasons of the
difficulties relative to price forecasting are given in [181,184]:
• Firstly, the seasonality regarding daily, weekly and annual timescales, is low.
• Secondly, many quantifiable exogenous variables may be considered for price
forecasting. Loads and network constraints are two examples of such exogenous
variables.
• Psychological and sociological factors can cause an unexpected and irrational
buyout of certain contracts leading to price spikes.
However, several recent studies propose forecasting models for electricity prices.
The paper [185] gives a review of some of the main methodological issues and tech-
niques relative to price forecasting in the new competitive power markets. Also
the review paper [184] documents the main issues and recent research on modeling
and forecasting electricity prices. In the same article, the special microstructure of
electricity market is described as an explanation stochastic properties of electricity
price time series.
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Many approaches for modeling electricity price time series are based on autore-
gressive moving average (ARMA) models. Such models are also called Box-Jenkins
models after the iterative Box-Jenkins methodology usually used to estimate the
considered time series [186]. ARMA models generally consist of two parts, an
autoregressive (AR) part and a moving average (MA) part. Autoregressive inte-
grated moving average (ARIMA) models consist in a generalization of the ARMA
model. Such models may be applied in some cases where data show evidence of non-
stationarity. An initial differencing step (corresponding to the ”integrated” part of
the model) can be applied to remove the non-stationarity. An example of price sce-
nario generation method based on ARIMA models in presented in [187]. Also, the
autoregressive moving average model with exogenous inputs model (ARMAX) is an
extension of ARMA models including exogenous inputs terms. An example of elec-
tricity price forecasting method based on ARMAX model is given in [188,189], with
system load considered as the exogenous variable. Finally, many stochastic models
are inspired by the financial literature and consist in adaptations of well known and
widely applied in practice approaches. Such adaptations involve the addition of some
of the electricity price characteristics, like price spikes or mean-reversion [181,184].
These price forecasting techniques are methods related to electricity market price
in general and are not specific to any given market. In the proposed decision-making
formulation, the loss function is based on a forecast of the price quantity ∆Π which
is defined as the difference between the day-ahead price and the regulation price.
Consequently, specific attention is paid in the following paragraph to these two
categories of electricity price.
C.2.1 Day-ahead market price forecasting
A wide survey about of electricity price forecasting techniques developed over the
last fifteen years is given in [190]. The main focus of this survey is given to the
methods for forecasting electricity prices on a pool-style energy market including
day-ahead market. Most of the presented approaches for forecasting day-ahead
market prices are based on time series models as described in the previous paragraph.
A specific example is presented in [191]. In this study, different time series models
are explained and compared from real-world case studies based on the electricity
markets of mainland Spain and California.
A conditional parametric model of the day-ahead market price as a function of
external variables is proposed in [192]. The considered external variable is the wind
power forecasted production converted into a forecasted wind power penetration.
Conditional parametric models of two different dimensions are constructed. One
models the price as a function of time of day and wind power penetration and the
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other one has an additional input variable, indicating the weekday. For the dynamic
part, Recursive Pseudo Linear Regression is used. Results based on the NordPool
day-ahead market price in the Western Denmark area are presented.
C.2.2 Regulation price forecasting
Regulation prices are settled in the real-time market, where the transmission system
operator (TSO) takes regulation measures for ensuring the overall equilibrium bet-
ween production and consumption in the considered regulation area. Consequently,
the regulation prices are used for the calculation of the penalty that an Independent
Power Producers (IPP) has to pay as a result from its energy imbalance.
Regulation markets are closely linked to the reliable operation of the grid, and
thus precaution is taken regarding the design of such markets. More precisely,
regulation markets are designed for preventing gaming in these markets, which could
jeopardize the grid reliability [61]. The extremely high volatility of regulation market
prices and the resulting hard predictability is a consequence of such anti-gaming
design [60, 61, 193]. If regulation prices were easily predictable, gaming methods
could lead the IPP to intend energy imbalance. Conversely, regulation markets are
designed for encouraging the IPP to reduce their energy imbalance.
Recent models have been proposed for better understanding the regulation price
structure. In [187], a method for generating time series of real-time balancing market
price is described. Such method combines a seasonal auto regressive integrated
moving average (SARIMA) approach with discrete Markov processes. The resulting
scenario trees aim at representing possible realization of the stochastic prices. Such
scenario trees can be used in planning models based on stochastic optimization to
generate bid sequences to the balancing market. The application of such approach
to the real-time Nordic power market example demonstrates the consistency of the
approach used to model real-time balancing power prices. In a previous paper, the
same authors proposed a method based on autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) for generating regulating power price scenarios [194].
C.3 Simplification of the price forecasting problem and
formulation of a discrete probabilistic forecast
C.3.1 Reformulation of the requested price forecast
The decision-making method proposed in the previous section is based on a forecast
of the price quantity ∆Π, which is derived from the difference between the day-
ahead price and the regulation price, and the sign of the IPP energy imbalance in
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Equation 3.8:
∆Π
(
E˜, EC
)
=
∆Π− = Π− −ΠDA ⇐ E˜ < EC∆Π+ = ΠDA −Π+ ⇐ E˜ ≥ EC (C.1)
where E˜ and EC are the delivered and contracted energy volumes respectively. ΠDA
is the day-ahead market price, and Π+ and Π− are the regulation prices for positive
and negative imbalance respectively. From such formulation, it appears that the
requested forecast ∆̂Π depends on the sign of the forecast of the energy imbalance
(E˜ −EC), which increases the difficulty relative to the forecasting. However, in the
case of dual price imbalance settlement mechanism, the problem can be simplified
as follows.
The dual price imbalance settlement mechanism has already been explained in
section 2.2.5. In this mechanism, the regulation prices for positive and negative
imbalance depend on the regulation state of the TSO, and three main states can be
determined, from the overall energy imbalance in the balancing area:
1. The overall energy imbalance is negative and the TSO is up-regulating. In
that case, only negative energy imbalances are penalized. In other words,
Π− > ΠDA and Π+ = ΠDA.
2. The overall energy imbalance is small enough so that no regulation is needed.
Because the regulation need is defined from the overall imbalance in the system,
the occurrence of no regulation need is not negligible [195]. In that case,
Π− = ΠDA and Π+ = ΠDA.
3. The overall energy imbalance is positive and the TSO is down-regulating. In
that case, only positive energy imbalances are penalized. In other words,
Π− = ΠDA and Π+ < ΠDA.
An additional fourth state consists in a simultaneous need, in the same market time
period, of up-regulation and down-regulation. Such situations may happen [195],
but remain infrequent.
An example of the repartition of the TSO regulation states in the Western Den-
mark area, for the period from 01/10/2003 to 30/06/2004 is given in Table C.1.
This example shows that the two main states are the up and down regulation states,
which correspond to a non null overall energy imbalance. The frequency of absence
of regulation need reaches 21.70 %. Also, the frequency of simultaneous up and
down regulation state is less than 1 %. Finally, it can be verified from the same
example that the four states cover all the possibilities of regulation states, since the
sum of the four relative frequencies equals one.
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TSO regulation state frequency
up regulation 42.69 %
down regulation 35.69 %
no regulation 21.70 %
up and down regulation 0.08 %
Table C.1: Repartition of the TSO regulation states in the Western Denmark area, for the
period from 01/10/2003 to 30/06/2004.
Based on the three main TSO regulation states, we define the price quantity Π∆
as the price time series given by:
Π∆ =

ΠDA −Π− , up-regulation
ΠDA −Π+ , down-regulation
0 , no regulation
sign(|ΠDA −Π+| − |ΠDA −Π−|) ·max (|ΠDA −Π+|, |ΠDA −Π−|)
, both up and down regulation
(C.2)
In the fourth case corresponding to both up and down regulation, only the regulation
price which deviates from the day-ahead price with the greatest extent is taken.
This corresponds to considering only the main regulation state. This assumption is
necessary for representing the quantity Π∆ as a time series, otherwise the variable
Π∆ would have two possible values for the same time step.
The price quantity ∆Π is then formulated from the price time series Π∆ as
follows:
∆Π
(
Ê, EC
)
=
|Π∆| , sign(Π∆) = sign(Ê − EC)0 else (C.3)
Also, given such time series Π∆, the estimated reference imbalance penalty func-
tion δ̂
DA
derived in Equation 4.11 can be rewritten as follows:
δ̂
DA (
Ê, EDA
)
=
∣∣∣Ê − EDA∣∣∣× ∆̂Π (C.4)
= max
(
0,
(
Ê − EDA
)
× Π̂∆
)
(C.5)
To conclude, the forecasting of the combined price quantity ∆Π, based on three
market prices, can be reformulated as the forecasting of only one time series Π∆.
The main advantage of this formulation is the consideration of only one price value,
but the forecasting of such quantity remains a hard task.
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C.3.2 Formulation of a discrete probabilistic forecast for imbalance
penalty price
Forecasting the sign of Π∆ consists in forecasting the TSO regulation state, which
is a difficult task [60]. Moreover, the estimated imbalance penalty derived in Equa-
tion C.5 is highly sensitive to the sign of Π̂∆: if Π̂∆ has the same sign as the
estimated energy imbalance (Ê − EDA), the imbalance penalty equals the product
of these two quantities. If these two quantities have an opposite sign, the penalty
is null. Consequently, the decision relative to the day-ahead quantity bid is highly
sensible to such price forecast. In other words, an error about the sign of this price
forecast may lead to bidding or scheduling decisions which increase the imbalance
penalty, instead of reducing it.
In order to manage the high uncertainty related to this price forecast, a discrete
probabilistic forecast respresentation with three possible outcomes is proposed. Each
outcome is associated to a TSO regulation state : up-regulation, no regulation, and
down-regulation. These three regulation states respectively correspond to negative,
null and positive values for Π̂∆, from Equation C.2. Each state is assigned a prob-
ability α, and the sum of the three probabilities equals one.
Π̂∆ =

(
Π̂∆− < 0, α−
)(
Π̂∆o = 0, αo
)(
Π̂∆+ > 0, α+
) , with α− + αo + α+ = 1 (C.6)
The determination forecasts in the form of Equation C.6 is a difficul task. How-
ever, for the purposes of our study, we need realistic price forecasts in the decision-
making methods. In the work presented in this thesis, instead of using a specific price
forecasting method, we propose to simulate different levels of price forecasting
error. These different levels permit to evaluate the influence of the accuracy of the
price forecasts on the results of the decision-making. As a starting point, we define
two reference approaches, which are the perfect prediction forecasting method, and
the constant prediction forecasting method. Also, we propose a third method which
permits to simulate different levels of forecasting errors. The obtained levels of er-
ror are bounded by the performance of the two reference approaches. These three
methods are presented and evaluated in the next section.
Before explaining the details of these approaches, it is interesting to derive the
relation between the price Π̂∆ formulated in Equation C.6 and the original price
∆̂Π. This relation is obtained as follows:
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δ̂
DA (
Ê, EDA
)
=
∑
s={−,o,+}
αs · δ̂
DA (
Ê, EDA
)
|Π̂∆=Π̂∆s
(C.7)
=
∑
s={−,o,+}
αs ·max
(
0,
(
Ê − EDA
)
× Π̂∆s
)
(C.8)
=
|Ê − E
DA| ×
(
α− · |Π̂
∆
− |
)
Ê < EDA
|Ê − EDA| ×
(
α+ · |Π̂
∆
+ |
)
Ê ≥ EDA
(C.9)
By comparing the later equation with the formulation of δ̂
DA
given in Equa-
tion 4.11, we obtain ∆̂Π− = α− · |Π̂
∆
− | and ∆̂
Π
+ = α+ · |Π̂
∆
+ |.
C.4 Proposition of a simulation approach for market
price forecasts and errors
C.4.1 Formulation of the considered simulation approaches
The perfect prediction approach
In the perfect prediction approach, the TSO regulation state is perfectly known and
either α− or αo or α+ equals one. The corresponding price quantity Π̂
∆
s , where s is
the state so that αs = 1, is equal to the observed imbalance penalty price Π
∆. For
example, in the case of TSO up-regulation, the perfect prediction forecast for the
market time unit Ti is:(
Π̂∆−, Ti = Π
∆
Ti < 0, α−, Ti = 1
)
(C.10)
The constant prediction approach
In the constant prediction approach, the discrete probabilistic forecast is constant
for all the different runs and horizons. This approach is similar to the constant
approach relative to wind generation forecasting, described in section B.2. The ap-
proach also consists in assuming equal positive and negative imbalance penalization.
Consequently, for any market time unit Ti, the constant forecast Π̂
∆
Ti
is given by:
Π̂∆Ti =

(
Π̂∆− = −10, α− = 0.40
)(
Π̂∆o = 0, αo = 0.20
)(
Π̂∆+ = 10, α+ = 0.40
) (C.11)
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The probabilities α and prices Π̂∆+/− proposed here are obtained by considering the
observed prices in the NordPool market during the years 2003 and 2004.
With this constant price forecast, the estimated imbalance penalty δ̂
DA
is pro-
portional to the estimated absolute energy imbalance, as can be straightforwardly
obtained from Equation C.9:
δ̂
DA
∝ |Ê − EDA| (C.12)
In other words, the decision-making methods which aim at minimizing the expected
imbalance penalty δ̂
DA
based on this constant price forecast, are actually methods
which aim at minimizing the expected absolute energy imbalance |Ê − EDA|. This
point is discussed in the section 4.6 relative to the strategic combination of a storage
unit with a winf farm. Finally, the performance of this baseline approach is evaluated
in the next section C.4.2.
Proposal of a method for simulating imbalance penalty price forecasting
errors
The two forecasting approaches presented above correspond to the upper and lower
bounds of the forecasting problem: in the perfect prediction approach, all the infor-
mation about future price is available in the forecast whereas the constant prediction
provides the minimal information about the future price. This section gives a method
for simulating price forecasts with a level of error between these two references. The
simulated forecast is derived from the perfect prediction forecast based on two error
parameters :
• A first parameter ǫ is a constant which is related to the uncertainty about the
TSO regulation state. For example, in the case of up-regulation, instead of
having a probability α− = 1 and α+ = 0 in the perfect prediction case, the
proposed ǫ-model will give α− = ǫ and α+ = (1 − ǫ). Similarly, in the case
of down-regulation, instead of having a probability α− = 0 and α+ = 1 in
the perfect prediction case, the proposed ǫ-model will give α− = (1 − ǫ) and
α+ = ǫ. The constant parameter ǫ models the uncertainty about the TSO
regulation state. The perfect prediction approach is a particular case of the
model with ǫ = 1. The ǫ-model does not affect the situations where there is
no regulation (i.e. αo = 1). Also, the price forecast values Π̂
∆
+ and Π̂
∆
− are
equal in the proposed model.
• The second parameter τ models a phase error. Such parameter is a time
period duration and corresponds to a delay. It is also a constant for a given
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τ -model. For example, instead of considering the perfect prediction for a given
market time Ti, the τ -model gives the perfect prediction relative to the market
time Ti − τ . Such approach corresponds to the so-called persistence model,
already described in the wind power forecasting section. The perfect prediction
approach is a particular case of the τ -model with τ = 0.
The (ǫ, τ)-model combines the two parameters. For example, if the regulation
state corresponding to the market time Ti− τ is up-regulation, the (ǫ, τ) forecast for
the market time Ti is given by:
Π̂∆Ti =

Π̂∆−, Ti = Π̂
∆
−, Ti−τ
, α− = ǫ
Π̂∆o, Ti = 0 , αo = 0
Π̂∆+, Ti = Π̂
∆
−, Ti−τ
, α+ = 1− ǫ
(C.13)
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Figure C.2: Example of results of simulated forecasts of the imbalance penalty price ∆Π
+/−,
based on an uncertainty parameter ǫ = 0.75 and the phase error τ = 3 h. Note that the real
value of the prices coincides to the perfect prediction.
Figure C.3 illustrates the imbalance penalty price resulting from the (ǫ, τ)-model.
The prices ∆̂Π+ ∆̂
Π
−
1 described in the figure are obtained from the distribution of Π̂∆
from the relation given in section C.3.2:
∆̂Π+ = α+ · |Π̂
∆
+ | and ∆̂
Π
− = α− · |Π̂
∆
− | (C.14)
and t he perfect predictions are illustrated with plain lines while the (ǫ, τ)-forecasts
are illustrated with dashed lines. Regarding the prefect prediction, either the price
for positive imbalance ∆Π+, or the price for negative imbalance ∆
Π
−, is non null. In
1Note that, due to editing problems, the price forecast ∆̂Π− is denoted as ∆
Π
− in the figure;
similarly, the price forecast ∆̂Π+ is denoted as ∆
Π
+. This comment is also valid for the next figure
C.3.
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the case of the (ǫ, τ)-forecast, the non null price ∆Π+/− is reduced to ǫ = 75 % of the
non null price. Also, the price which was null in the case of perfect prediction equals
(1− ǫ) = 25 % of the non null price. Also the (ǫ, τ)-forecast is delayed by τ = 2 h.
C.4.2 Evaluation of the considered simulation approaches
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Figure C.3: Mean absolute error of the (ǫ, τ)-price forecasting model, and comparison with
the constant prediction and the perfect prediction.
Figure C.3 presents the performance of the different imbalance penalty price
forecasting models. The forecasting performance is evaluated through the Mean
Absolute Error, as a fraction of the mean imbalance penalty price ∆̂Π+/−. The
constant and perfect prediction approaches are represented as the upper and lower
bounds: the perfect prediction has a null error, while the constant prediction has a
high MAE, reaching 200 % of the mean imbalance penalty price. Figure C.3 also
shows that, regarding the (ǫ, τ)-model, the MAE increases as ǫ increases, and that,
similarly, the MAE increases as τ increases.
Finally, Figure C.3 demonstrates the interest of the proposed method for simu-
lating imbalance penalty price forecasts. More precisely, the resulting forecasts have
a level of performance which can be adjusted in order to reach a given level of error.
Such a method is particularly useful for evaluating the influence of the price fore-
casting performance on the decision relative to the trading of renewable generation
in short-term electricity market, such as in section 5.5.
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APPENDIX D
Estimation of the Loss Distribution from the Predictive
Energy and Price Distribution
The aim of this section is to explain the derivation of loss distribution from the
energy and price distributions. In a first step, the loss is formulated as a function of
the energy and market price. Then, the general formulation of the loss distribution
is given in the case of continuous probabilistic distribution for both the energy and
the market price. The simplified formulation in the case of discrete probabilistic
forecast of the market price is presented in the last section.
D.1 Formulation of the loss
For a decision v, the loss λ(v) associated to this decision is formulated in Equa-
tion 5.34 as:
λ(v) = Y (v˜) + max
(
0,
(
Ê + y(v˜)− EDA
)
× Π̂∆
)
(D.1)
where Ê and Π̂∆ are the energy and price forecasts. v˜ is the realization associated
to v. Y (v˜) and y(v˜) are the additional cost and balance energy volume associated
to the realization v˜, respectively. The quantities v˜, Y (v˜) and y(v˜) depend on the
decision v. In the present formulation, the decision v is supposed to be given (i.e.
to have a fixed value), and consequently, the loss can be rewritten as:
λ(v) = a+max
(
0, (Ê − b)× Π̂∆
)
(D.2)
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with the parameters a and b defined by a = Y (v˜) and b = EDA − y(v˜). In Equa-
tion D.3, the loss is a function of the energy forecast Ê and price forecast Π̂∆. Such
function is denoted as γ, which is defined by:
γ
(
Ê, Π̂∆
)
= a+max
(
0, (Ê − b)× Π̂∆
)
(D.3)
The function γ does not aim at modeling a different loss, but rather at reformulating
the loss as a function of the energy forecast Ê and price forecast Π̂∆.
D.2 General solution of the problem
The loss λ is formulated in Equation D.3 as a function of the energy forecast Ê
and the price forecast Π̂∆. For simplifying the mathematical expressions, the price
quantity Π∆ is simplified to Π. In the general case, the energy and price forecasts are
considered to be probabilistic forecasts in the form of predictive probability density
function (pdf). The pdf associated to the energy forecast is denoted as f̂E and the
one for the price forecast as f̂Π.
The determination of the distribution of a random variable λ then consists in de-
termining the its pdf denoted as fλ. The formulation of the loss given Equation D.3,
combined with Bayes’ theorem for continuous distributions, gives:
fλ(z) = fγ(E,Π)(z) =
∫
AΠ
fγ(E,Π)|Π=y(z) · f̂Π(y)dy (D.4)
where AΠ is the set of possible price Π. Then, the main objective is to obtain the
pdf fγ(E,Π)|(Π=y). For a given price Π set to Π = y, the function γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) is
a function of only one variable: the energy E. For simplifying the mathematical
expressions, the function γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) is denoted as γy:
γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) = γy (D.5)
fγ(E,Π)|(Π=y) = fγ
y
(E) (D.6)
The derivation of the pdf fγ(E,Π)|(Π=y) can thus be interpreted as a variable
substitution problem, from the variable E to the variable γ(E,Π)|(Π = y). Then,
the new variable γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) is simplified by considering three cases: y < 0, y = 0
and y > 0.
236
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
y < 0 : γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) = γy(E) =
a+ (E − b)× y , E < ba , E ≥ b (D.7)
y = 0 : γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) = γy(E) = a (D.8)
y > 0 : γ(E,Π)|(Π=y) = γy(E) =
a , E < ba+ (E − b)× y , E ≥ b (D.9)
E is the energy delivered by the RES unit and is positive; the maximum delivered
energy is denoted as Emax. Consequently, the function γy is defined on the interval
I = [0, Emax]. Also, the interval I is divided into two interval I− and I+ defined as
follows:
I = I− ∪ I+ , with
I− = [0, b]I+ = [b, Emax] (D.10)
Such decomposition is valid for 0 ≤ b ≤ Emax. If b < 0, I− = ∅ and I+ = I. If
b > Emax, I− = I and I+ = ∅.
D.2.1 Formulation of the variable substitution problem
The following equations give the derivation of the pdf fγ
y
(E) for the three cases:
y > 0, y > 0 and y = 0. For each case, the derivation of the pdf fγ
y
(E) is then
based on the decomposition of the definition interval I = I− ∪ I+. For each one
of these two sub intervals, the variable substitution problem is simplified.
• y > 0
– I− = [0, b]: the function γy on the interval I
−, is a constant function equal
to a. The image of the interval I− by the function γy is the singleton
{a};
– I+ = [b, Emax]: the function γy is an affine function, which is derivable
and invertible;
The restriction of γy on I
+ is denoted as γ+y ;
The inverse function of γy on I
+ is denoted as γ+,−1y ;
The derivative function of γy is denoted as γ
+
y ′;
The image of the interval I+ is the interval γy(I
+) = [a, a+ (Emax − b) · y].
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The resulting pdf fγ
y
(E) is defined for z ∈ γy(I
+) as:
fγ
y
(E)(z) =
∫ b
0
f̂E|Π=y(x)dx ·d(z−a)+
1
|γ+y ′(z)|
· f̂E|Π=y(γ
+,−1
y (z)) (D.11)
where d is the Dirac delta function, defined by:
d(z − a) =
1 if z = a0 if z 6= a
The first term of Equation D.11 is relative to the variable substitution for
the interval I−, while the second term is relative to the interval I+. Also, in
the present case, γ+y ′ = y. The function fγy(E) is considered to be null for
z /∈ γy(I
+).
• y < 0
Similarly to the case y > 0, the pdf fγ
y
(E) is defined for z ∈ γy(I
−) as:
fγ
y
(E)(z) =
∫ Emax
b
f̂E|Π=y(x)dx·d(z−a)+
1
|γ−y ′(z)|
·f̂E|Π=y(γ
−,−1
y (z)) (D.12)
where γ−y is the restriction of γy on I
−. Also the function fγ
y
(E) is considered
to be null for z /∈ γy(I
−).
• y = 0
The function γy is a constant function equal to a on both intervals I
− and
I+. Consequenlty,
fγ
y
(E)(z) = d(z − a) (D.13)
D.2.2 Summary
Finally, the pdf fγ(E,Π)|Π=y has been formulated for the different possible values
of y as a function of the conditional distribution of the delivered energy: f̂E|Π∆=y.
Then, the final loss pdf fλ can be obtained from Equation D.4 by decomposing the
set AΠ into three domains where Π < 0, Π = 0 and Π > 0. For each domain,
the conditional loss pdf fγ(E,Π)|Π=y is given from Equation D.11, Equation D.12,
Equation D.13.
The loss pdf fλ is not explicitly formulated here. However, the explicit formula-
tion is given in the simplified case of discrete probabilistic forecast of the price.
238
Management of uncertainties related to renewable generation in electricity markets
D.3 Solution of the simplified problem
The general problem discussed in the previous paragraph is simplified when consi-
dering a discrete probabilistic forecast of the market price. Also, the forecast of the
delivered energy is supposed to be independent from the price Π∆, and consequently,
for all y ∈ AΠ, f̂E|Π∆=y = f̂E .
The discrete distribution of the market price Π = Π∆ is the one given in Equa-
tion C.6:
Π̂∆ =

(
Π̂∆− < 0, α−
)(
Π̂∆o = 0, αo
)(
Π̂∆+ > 0, α+
) (D.14)
Based on this discrete price distribution, the loss pdf can be rewritten from
Equation D.4 as:
fγ(E,Π)(z) =
∑
s={−,o,+}
αs · fγ(E,Π)|Π=Π∆s (z) (D.15)
with Π∆− < 0, Π
∆
+ > 0 and Π
∆
o < 0
The expressions of fγ(E,Π)|Π=Π∆s are given from the previous paragraph, accord-
ing to the sign of the price Π = Π∆s :
• fγ(E,Π)|Π=Π∆+ is determined using Equation D.11;
• fγ(E,Π)|Π=Π∆− is determined using Equation D.12;
• fγ(E,Π)|Π=Π∆o is determined using Equation D.13.
Equation D.11 and Equation D.12 are simplified by using cumulated density
function F̂E of the delivered energy Ê:∫ b
0
f̂E(x)dx = F̂E(b) and
∫ Emax
b
f̂E(x)dx = 1− F̂E(b) (D.16)
which gives:
fλ(z) = A · d(z − a) +B · f̂E(γ
−,−1
Π̂∆−
(z)) + C · f̂E(γ
+,−1
Π̂∆+
(z)) (D.17)
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with
A = α− · (1− F̂E(b)) + α0 + α+ · F̂E(b) (D.18)
B = α− ·
1
|Π̂∆− |
(D.19)
C = α+ ·
1
|Π̂∆+ |
(D.20)
The functions γ−
Π̂∆−
and γ+
Π̂∆+
are affine functions defined by:
γ−
Π̂∆−
: [0, b] 7→
[
a, a− b · Π̂∆−
]
(D.21)
z 7→ γ−
Π̂∆−
(z) = a+ Π̂∆− × (z − b) (D.22)
and
γ+
Π̂∆+
: [b, Emax] 7→
[
a, a+ (Emax − b) · Π̂∆+
]
(D.23)
z 7→ γ+
Π̂∆+
(z) = a+ Π̂∆+ × (z − b) (D.24)
The first term of the loss pdf in the first line of Equation D.17 is the weighted
dirac function d(z − a). The last two terms correspond to the penalization of the
negative and positive imbalance energy.
Consequently, in the case of the simplified problem based on discrete distribution
of the market price Π̂∆, and independent from the energy forecast Ê, the pdf of the
loss can be explicitly derived from the predictive pdf of the delivered energy and
the function γ. The predictive pdf for delivered energy E is given from RES power
forecasting methods. Example of loss pdf are given in section 5.4, where the risk
management related to the storage combination is analyzed.
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GESTION DES INCERTITUDES LIE´ES A` LA PRODUCTION RENOUVELABLE DANS LE
CADRE DES MARCHE´S D’E´LECTRICITE´
Re´sume´
L’inte´gration de production d’e´lectricite´ renouvelable dans les re´seaux d’e´lectricite´ est rendue
difficile a` cause du caracte`re variable et ale´atoire de cette production. Le travail de cette the`se se
penche sur la participation des producteurs d’e´nergie renouvelable aux marche´s d’e´lectricite´, et plus
pre´cise´ment sur les couˆts de re´gulation impute´s a` ces producteurs pour tout e´cart entre la production
de´livre´e et la production contracte´e sur ces marche´s. Dans ce contexte, l’objectif de cette the`se est
de mode´liser et d’e´valuer les diffe´rentes me´thodes de gestion de ces pe´nalisations d’e´carts lie´es a` la
participation de producteurs d’e´nergie renouvelable dans les marche´s court-terme d’e´lectricite´. Ce
travail propose d’abord une classification des me´thodes existantes pour la diminution de ces pe´nalite´s.
Les solutions dites physiques, lie´es au portefeuille de production, sont distingue´es par rapport aux
solutions dites financie`res, qui sont base´es sur des produits de marche´ tels que les options. Les
solutions physiques sont aborde´es dans le cadre des centrales virtuelles. Un mode`le ge´ne´rique de la
pe´nalisation des e´carts d’e´nergie est propose´. Le proble`me de prise de de´cision relatif a` ces diverses
solutions est ensuite formule´ en tant que proble`me d’optimisation sous incertitude. Cette approche
est base´e sur une fonction de couˆt qui est exprime´e a` partir du mode`le ge´ne´rique de pe´nalite´s. Enfin,
l’incertitude lie´e a` la production renouvelable est conside´re´e a` travers une me´thode base´e sur le
risque, qui est mesure´ a` partir d’outils financiers. Les diffe´rentes me´thodes sont illustre´es avec des
cas d’e´tude base´s sur des donne´es re´elles.
Mot cle´s : Energies Renouvelables, Marche´ d’E´lectricite´, Me´canisme d’Ajustement, Centrale Virtuelle,
Gestion des Syste`mes E´lectriques, Prise de De´cision, Incertitude, Risque.
MANAGEMENT OF UNERTAINTIES RELATED TO RENEWABLE GENERATION PAR-
TICIPATING IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Synopsis
The operation of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) units, such as wind or solar plants, is intrin-
sically dependent on the variability of the wind or solar resource. This makes large scale integration
of RES into power systems particularly challenging. The research work in the frame of this thesis fo-
cuses on the participation of renewable power producers in liberalized electricity markets, and more
precisely on the management of the regulation costs incurred by the producer for any imbalance
between the contracted and delivered energy. In such context, the main objective of the thesis is
to model and evaluate different methods for the management of imbalance penalties related to the
participation of renewable power producers in short-term electricity markets. First, the thesis gives
a classification of the existing solutions for the management of these imbalance penalties. A distinc-
tion is made between physical solutions which are related to the generation portfolio, and financial
solutions which are based on market products. The physical solutions are considered in the frame of
a Virtual Power Plant. A generic model of the imbalance penalty resulting from the use of physical
or financial solutions is formulated, based on a market rule model. Then, the decision-making prob-
lem relative to both physical and financial solutions is formulated as an optimization problem under
uncertainty. The approach is based on a loss function derived from the generic imbalance penalty
model. Finally, the uncertainty related to the RES production is considered in the risk-based decision
making process. The methods are illustrated using case studies based on real world data.
Keywords : Renewable Energies, Electricity Market, Balancing Mechnism, Virtual Power Plant, Power
System Management, Decision-Making, Uncertainty, Risk.
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